Oracle Critical Patch Update October 2026
Released October 2026 · Oracle's advisory ↗ · ← Security Patch Update, September 2026 · Security Patch Update, November 2026 →
1,693 CVEs in this release, one square each
By status
20Protected by Waratek1Mitigation candidate1,112No exploit published11Outside Waratek scope549Not applicable
5Exploited, marked by the ring
No exploit published. For 858 of them, Oracle's security advisory is the source of public detail.
Protected by Waratek. Waratek RASP can block exploitation of these on systems that have not applied the patch yet.
Overview 21 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
21matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
21
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
21
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
21
100.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 10 / quarter
Q4 241
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q1 251
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q2 251
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q3 251
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q4 250
Q1 260
Q2 2610
No exploit published10
Critical3
High4
Medium2
Low1
not blocked10
Proof of concept only10
Q3 267
No exploit published7
High6
Medium1
not blocked7
Proof of concept only7
Q4 24Q1 25Q2 25Q3 25Q4 25Q1 26Q2 26Q3 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-91777 | High | 2026-09-23 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Forward-reference completion for @JsonIdentityInfo object IDs in FasterXML jackson-databind performs a linear scan of the pending-reference accumulator for every resolved ID. The affected paths are CollectionDeserializer.CollectionReferringAccumulator.resolveForwardReference() and the equivalent implementation in MapDeserializer. When a document first creates N unresolved object-ID references in an identity-enabled collection or map and then defines those same IDs in reverse order, completion performs on the order of N * (N + 1) / 2 identity comparisons, so a shallow document whose size grows linearly causes quadratic CPU work during deserialization. The reporter instrumented equals() calls on the ID class and measured exactly 2,003,000 comparisons at N = 2,000, against zero comparisons in the pending-reference lookup path for an equally sized control in which every reference was already resolved. The input requires no deep nesting and no syntactically unusual JSON. Exploitation requires an application that deserializes attacker-influenced JSON into an identity-enabled collection or map. The fix replaces the repeated linear lookup with a keyed pending-reference structure. |
| CVE-2026-91776 | High | 2026-09-23 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | TypeDeserializerBase._findDeserializer() in FasterXML jackson-databind caches the resolved deserializer under the raw, attacker-supplied type ID. When name-based polymorphism is configured with a fallback, for example @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.NAME, defaultImpl = ...), every distinct unrecognized type ID resolves to the same fallback deserializer but is retained as its own key in the _deserializers map. That map has no configurable bound and lives for the lifetime of the type deserializer, so an attacker who can repeatedly supply fresh unknown type IDs causes monotonic memory retention across requests. The reporter observed 10,000 retained entries from 10,000 distinct unknown IDs, against a single entry for a control that repeated one unknown ID the same number of times, isolating attacker-controlled key cardinality from request volume. Exploitation requires an application that enables name-based polymorphism with a defaultImpl or equivalent fallback, accepts attacker-influenced type IDs, and reuses a long-lived ObjectMapper across requests. The fix stops caching fallback resolutions for unrecognized IDs and bounds both the number of cached entries and the length of a cacheable type ID. |
| CVE-2026-89425 | High | 2026-09-23 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | UTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken() in FasterXML jackson-core builds the offending-token text for its error message by appending Java identifier characters to a StringBuilder in a loop that has no upper bound. Unlike the three sibling parser implementations, including UTF8StreamJsonParser, it never consults ErrorReportConfiguration.getMaxErrorTokenLength() (default 256). A malformed token supplied to a parser created through JsonFactory.createParser(DataInput) is therefore accumulated in full. No StreamReadConstraints setting mitigates this: maxDocumentLength cannot be applied to DataInput sources at all, and maxStringLength does not cover this path because the accumulation bypasses ReadConstrainedTextBuffer. The reporter measured a 20,000,109-character exception message from a 20-million-character malformed token on the DataInput path, against 367 characters for identical input on the InputStream path. Scaling the payload drives the StringBuilder, which also incurs byte-to-char expansion and internal array doubling, to many times the raw payload size and can trigger OutOfMemoryError for the whole JVM. UTF8DataInputJsonParser was introduced in 2.8.0 together with createParser(DataInput); releases before 2.8.0 do not contain the affected class. |
| CVE-2026-77422 | High | 2026-09-23 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | JLine is a Java library for handling console input. From 3.0.0 until 3.30.15 and 4.3.1, the JLine built-in grep command in builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/PosixCommands.java accepts a user-controlled regular expression in grep(...) and, unless line-regexp mode is used, automatically adds a dot-star prefix and suffix before compiling it with Java's backtracking regular expression engine. The wrapping expands the backtracking search space, so a short nested-quantifier expression evaluated against non-matching input can consume excessive CPU and indefinitely block a command worker, including in remotely exposed shell sessions. This issue is fixed in versions 3.30.15 and 4.3.1. |
| CVE-2026-77420 | Medium | 2026-09-23 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | JLine is a Java library for handling console input. From 3.0.0 until 3.30.15 and 4.3.1, DefaultHistory.matchPatterns(String patterns, String line) in reader/src/main/java/org/jline/reader/impl/history/DefaultHistory.java converts the HISTORY_IGNORE configuration value into a Java regular expression while escaping only part of its syntax, allowing other regex metacharacters to reach the backtracking engine. An attacker who can control application or user configuration can supply a nested-quantifier expression that is reevaluated whenever a command is added to history, consuming excessive CPU and indefinitely blocking the reader thread. This issue is fixed in versions 3.30.15 and 4.3.1. |
| CVE-2026-89407 | High | 2026-09-22 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() in FasterXML jackson-core pre-validates "stringified numbers" with two regular expressions: PATTERN_FLOAT ([+-]?[0-9]*[\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?), present since 2.17.0, and PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT, added in 2.17.2. PATTERN_FLOAT places adjacent quantifiers over the same character class -- an optional [0-9]* run, an optional dot, then a required [0-9]+ run -- so input that ultimately fails to match forces Java's backtracking engine to retry every possible split point of the digit run. Matching cost therefore grows with the square of the input length. An attacker who can supply JSON that an application deserializes into a numeric target type reaches this method through jackson-databind's default String-to-number coercion (StdDeserializer and NumberDeserializers for BigDecimal, BigInteger, Double and Float). Because StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength defaults to 20,000,000 characters, no constraint bounds the input before it reaches the regex. Testing by the reporter confirmed O(n^2) growth across five consecutive input-size doublings, with a single 160,000-character string consuming roughly 74 seconds in one call; a small number of concurrent requests of ordinary body size can therefore exhaust a server's request-handling thread pool. The affected method does not exist before 2.17.0, so 2.16.x and earlier releases are not affected. The fix replaces both regular expressions with a hand-rolled single-pass scan. |
| CVE-2026-56741 | High | 2026-07-17 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | JLine is a Java library for handling console input. Prior to 3.30.14, 4.0.16, and 4.2.1, the JLine3 Telnet server remote-telnet module does not apply an upper bound to terminal dimensions received via the Telnet NAWS option, and TelnetIO.handleNAWS() in TelnetIO.java:856-879 reads client-supplied width and height as 16-bit unsigned integers and passes values such as 65535x65535 to setTerminalGeometry(), allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to repeatedly alternate values and trigger continuous expensive rendering work that causes CPU exhaustion and denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 3.30.14, 4.0.16, and 4.2.1. |
| CVE-2026-54512 | High | 2026-06-23 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization. An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4. |
| CVE-2026-42587 | High | 2026-05-13 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpContentDecompressor accepts a maxAllocation parameter to limit decompression buffer size and prevent decompression bomb attacks. This limit is correctly enforced for gzip and deflate encodings via ZlibDecoder, but is silently ignored when the content encoding is br (Brotli), zstd, or snappy. An attacker can bypass the configured decompression limit by sending a compressed payload with Content-Encoding: br instead of Content-Encoding: gzip, causing unbounded memory allocation and out-of-memory denial of service. The same vulnerability exists in DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener for HTTP/2 connections. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2026-42585 | High | 2026-05-13 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty incorrectly parses malformed Transfer-Encoding, enabling request smuggling attacks. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2026-42584 | Critical | 2026-05-13 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by queue.poll() once per response, including for 1xx. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2026-42583 | High | 2026-05-13 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Lz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size decompressedLength (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus compressedLength payload bytes - 22 bytes if compressedLength == 1 - to force that allocation. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2026-42581 | Critical | 2026-05-13 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpObjectDecoder strips a conflicting Content-Length header when a request carries both Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Content-Length, but only for HTTP/1.1 messages. The guard is absent for HTTP/1.0. An attacker that sends an HTTP/1.0 request with both headers causes Netty to decode the body as chunked while leaving Content-Length intact in the forwarded HttpMessage. Any downstream proxy or handler that trusts Content-Length over Transfer-Encoding will disagree on message boundaries, enabling request smuggling. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2026-42580 | Medium | 2026-05-13 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty's chunk size parser silently overflows int, enabling request smuggling attacks. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2026-42579 | Critical | 2026-05-13 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty's DNS codec does not enforce RFC 1035 domain name constraints during either encoding or decoding. This creates a bidirectional attack surface: malicious DNS responses can exploit the decoder, and user-influenced hostnames can exploit the encoder. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2026-42578 | Low | 2026-05-13 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty's HttpProxyHandler constructs HTTP CONNECT requests with header validation explicitly disabled. The newInitialMessage() method creates headers using DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory().withValidation(false), then adds user-provided outboundHeaders without any CRLF validation. This allows an attacker who can influence the outbound headers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers into the CONNECT request sent to the proxy server. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2026-41417 | Medium | 2026-05-06 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty allows request-line validation to be bypassed when a `DefaultHttpRequest` or `DefaultFullHttpRequest` is created first and its URI is later changed via `setUri()`. The constructors reject CRLF and whitespace characters that would break the start-line, but `setUri()` does not apply the same validation. `HttpRequestEncoder` and `RtspEncoder` then write the URI into the request line verbatim. If attacker-controlled input reaches `setUri()`, this enables CRLF injection and insertion of additional HTTP or RTSP requests, leading to HTTP request smuggling or desynchronization on the HTTP side and request injection on the RTSP side. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2025-53864 | Medium | 2025-07-11 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Connect2id Nimbus JOSE + JWT 10.0.x before 10.0.2 and 9.37.x before 9.37.4 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a deeply nested JSON object supplied in a JWT claim set, because of uncontrolled recursion. NOTE: this is independent of the Gson 2.11.0 issue because the Connect2id product could have checked the JSON object nesting depth, regardless of what limits (if any) were imposed by Gson. |
| CVE-2025-48734 | High | 2025-05-28 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Improper Access Control vulnerability in Apache Commons. A special BeanIntrospector class was added in version 1.9.2. This can be used to stop attackers from using the declared class property of Java enum objects to get access to the classloader. However this protection was not enabled by default. PropertyUtilsBean (and consequently BeanUtilsBean) now disallows declared class level property access by default. Releases 1.11.0 and 2.0.0-M2 address a potential security issue when accessing enum properties in an uncontrolled way. If an application using Commons BeanUtils passes property paths from an external source directly to the getProperty() method of PropertyUtilsBean, an attacker can access the enum’s class loader via the “declaredClass” property available on all Java “enum” objects. Accessing the enum’s “declaredClass” allows remote attackers to access the ClassLoader and execute arbitrary code. The same issue exists with PropertyUtilsBean.getNestedProperty(). Starting in versions 1.11.0 and 2.0.0-M2 a special BeanIntrospector suppresses the “declaredClass” property. Note that this new BeanIntrospector is enabled by default, but you can disable it to regain the old behavior; see section 2.5 of the user's guide and the unit tests. This issue affects Apache Commons BeanUtils 1.x before 1.11.0, and 2.x before 2.0.0-M2.Users of the artifact commons-beanutils:commons-beanutils 1.x are recommended to upgrade to version 1.11.0, which fixes the issue. Users of the artifact org.apache.commons:commons-beanutils2 2.x are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.0-M2, which fixes the issue. |
| CVE-2025-25193 | Medium | 2025-02-10 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty, an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework, has a vulnerability in versions up to and including 4.1.118.Final. An unsafe reading of environment file could potentially cause a denial of service in Netty. When loaded on an Windows application, Netty attempts to load a file that does not exist. If an attacker creates such a large file, the Netty application crash. A similar issue was previously reported as CVE-2024-47535. This issue was fixed, but the fix was incomplete in that null-bytes were not counted against the input limit. Commit d1fbda62d3a47835d3fb35db8bd42ecc205a5386 contains an updated fix. |
| CVE-2024-6763 | Medium | 2024-10-14 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Eclipse Jetty is a lightweight, highly scalable, Java-based web server and Servlet engine . It includes a utility class, HttpURI, for URI/URL parsing. The HttpURI class does insufficient validation on the authority segment of a URI. However the behaviour of HttpURI differs from the common browsers in how it handles a URI that would be considered invalid if fully validated against the RRC. Specifically HttpURI and the browser may differ on the value of the host extracted from an invalid URI and thus a combination of Jetty and a vulnerable browser may be vulnerable to a open redirect attack or to a SSRF attack if the URI is used after passing validation checks. |