Overview 4 matches · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
1
25.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
3
75.0%
blocked by ARMR today
1
25.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
3
75.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
4
100.0%
split by
peak 3 / month
May 26Jun 26Jul 26Aug 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-67342 | Critical | 2026-08-01 | No exploit published | No public exploit | ArcadeDB versions before 26.7.2 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in HTTP handlers for time series, batch, Prometheus, and Grafana endpoints that fail to validate database access permissions. Attackers can access and modify databases they are not authorized to use by directly calling affected endpoints with arbitrary database parameters. |
| CVE-2026-67341 | Critical | 2026-08-01 | No exploit published | No public exploit | ArcadeDB versions before 26.7.2 fail to enforce scripting authorization checks on the SQL DEFINE FUNCTION statement with LANGUAGE js. Attackers with database access can execute arbitrary JavaScript code by submitting DEFINE FUNCTION statements, bypassing security controls intended to restrict scripting to administrators. |
| CVE-2026-67340 | High | 2026-08-01 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | ArcadeDB before 26.7.2 (arcadedb-engine) allows trigger scripts to look up host classes in java.lang.* (via Java.type) because ScriptTriggerExecutor adds java.lang.* to the allowed packages. An authenticated user with UPDATE_SCHEMA permission can create a JavaScript trigger that invokes java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec() (or ProcessBuilder), achieving OS command execution when the trigger fires. |
| CVE-2026-44221 | Critical | 2026-05-12 | No exploit published | No public exploit | ArcadeDB is a Multi-Model DBMS. Starting in version 21.10.1 and prior to version 26.4.2, authenticated users and API tokens scoped to a specific database could read, write, and mutate schema on any other database on the same server. Two distinct defects contributed: (1) ServerSecurityUser.getDatabaseUser() returned a DB user with an uninitialized fileAccessMap, which requestAccessOnFile treated as allow-all; (2) ArcadeDBServer.createDatabase() omitted factory.setSecurity(...) so any database created via POST /api/v1/server {"command":"create database X"} had its entire record-level authorization system silently disabled. In combination, record-level and database-level authorization could be bypassed by any authenticated principal. This vulnerability is fixed in 26.4.2. |