Netty-incubator-codec-ohttp CVEs

6 CVEs

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Overview 6 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5

6matches 0protected0.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%

Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 6 100.0%

Critical 1 16.7% High 2 33.3% Medium 3 50.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%

blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 6 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%

Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 6 100.0%

split by StatusSeverityProtectionExploit maturity peak 3 / quarter

Q2 241 No exploit published1 Critical1 not blocked1 No public exploit1 Q3 241 No exploit published1 High1 not blocked1 No public exploit1 Q4 240 Q1 250 Q2 250 Q3 250 Q4 250 Q1 260 Q2 263 No exploit published3 Medium3 not blocked3 No public exploit3 Q3 261 No exploit published1 High1 not blocked1 No public exploit1

Q2 24Q3 24Q4 24Q1 25Q2 25Q3 25Q4 25Q1 26Q2 26Q3 26

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CVE	Severity	Published▾	Status	Exploitation	Description
CVE-2026-54251	High	2026-09-15	No exploit published	No public exploit	netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, the OHTTP gateway decryption path in codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpRequestResponseContext.java allocates a pooled direct ByteBuf for decrypted plaintext before the AEAD tag is verified. When an invalid tag causes decryptChunk() to throw CryptoException, OHttpRequestResponseContext.decodeChunk() does not release the ByteBuf because the allocation is not guarded by try/finally. Repeated invalid encrypted requests can therefore leak native off-heap memory until the gateway is unable to continue serving requests. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final.
CVE-2026-48480	Medium	2026-06-04	No exploit published	No public exploit	The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. Prior to version 0.0.22.FInal, the codec-ohttp implementation of draft-ietf-ohai-chunked-ohttp does not verify that a cryptographically-signed final chunk was received before the outer HTTP body terminates. An on-path adversary (the OHTTP relay itself, or any MITM on the relay↔gateway or relay↔client transport) can forward a prefix of a legitimate chunked-OHTTP message—cut at a non-final chunk boundary—and close the outer body cleanly, producing no decryption error and no exception in the receiving application. Version 0.0.22.Final fixes the issue.
CVE-2026-48040	Medium	2026-06-04	No exploit published	No public exploit	The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. The library implements Oblivious HTTP (RFC 9458) using BoringSSL's HPKE C library via JNI. When deriving native memory addresses for cryptographic operations versions prior to 0.0.22.Final provide a fallback path for direct ByteBufs that do not expose their memory address through `hasMemoryAddress()`. This fallback occurs when `sun.misc.Unsafe` is unavailable to Netty — for example, when the JVM is started with `-Dio.netty.noUnsafe=true`, when a SecurityManager restricts Unsafe access, or when running on non-HotSpot JVMs. In these configurations, Netty's default `PooledByteBufAllocator` returns `PooledDirectByteBuf` instances for which `hasMemoryAddress()` returns false. Under the enabling JVM configuration, an unauthenticated network attacker can cause the OHTTP gateway to corrupt memory belonging to other concurrent connections and disclose the contents of adjacent pooled direct buffers by triggering cryptographic operations with crafted OHTTP requests. The corruption occurs regardless of whether the AEAD tag verification succeeds, as BoringSSL zeroizes the output buffer on failure. The information disclosure path provides the attacker with the encryption key needed to extract the leaked data. This violates the confidentiality and integrity of all connections sharing the same Netty buffer arena. Version 0.0.22.Final fixes the issue.
CVE-2026-41207	Medium	2026-06-04	No exploit published	No public exploit	The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. Prior to version 0.0.21.Final, HKDF_expand returns non-NULL on failure. The byte[] is filled with zeros and has no way to distinguish success from failure. Since this output is used as HKDF key material for the response AEAD, a failure silently produces an all-zero key. When EVP_HPKE_CTX_export fails it also returns an empty byte[] array filled with zeros. This byte[] feeds directly into OHttpCrypto.createResponseAEAD(...). A silent all-zero export secret would produce a deterministic, attacker-predictable AEAD key. Version 0.0.21.Final patches the issue.
CVE-2024-40642	High	2024-07-18	No exploit published	No public exploit	The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. In affected versions the `BinaryHttpParser` class does not properly validate input values thus giving attackers almost complete control over the HTTP requests constructed from the parsed output. Attackers can abuse several issues individually to perform various injection attacks including HTTP request smuggling, desync attacks, HTTP header injections, request queue poisoning, caching attacks and Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Attacker could also combine several issues to create well-formed messages for other text-based protocols which may result in attacks beyond the HTTP protocol. The BinaryHttpParser class implements the readRequestHead method which performs most of the relevant parsing of the received request. The data structure prefixes values with a variable length integer value. The parsing code below first gets the lengths of the values from the prefixed variable length integer. After it has all of the lengths and calculates all of the indices, the parser casts the applicable slices of the ByteBuf to String. Finally, it passes these values into a new `DefaultBinaryHttpRequest` object where no further parsing or validation occurs. Method is partially validated while other values are not validated at all. Software that relies on netty to apply input validation for binary HTTP data may be vulnerable to various injection and protocol based attacks. This issue has been addressed in version 0.0.13.Final. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
CVE-2024-36121	Critical	2024-06-04	No exploit published	No public exploit	netty-incubator-codec-ohttp is the OHTTP implementation for netty. BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat.

CVE

Severity

Published▾

Status

Exploitation

Description

CVE-2026-54251

High

2026-09-15

No exploit published

No public exploit

netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, the OHTTP gateway decryption path in codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpRequestResponseContext.java allocates a pooled direct ByteBuf for decrypted plaintext before the AEAD tag is verified. When an invalid tag causes decryptChunk() to throw CryptoException, OHttpRequestResponseContext.decodeChunk() does not release the ByteBuf because the allocation is not guarded by try/finally. Repeated invalid encrypted requests can therefore leak native off-heap memory until the gateway is unable to continue serving requests. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final.

CVE-2026-48480

Medium

2026-06-04

No exploit published

No public exploit

The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. Prior to version 0.0.22.FInal, the codec-ohttp implementation of draft-ietf-ohai-chunked-ohttp does not verify that a cryptographically-signed final chunk was received before the outer HTTP body terminates. An on-path adversary (the OHTTP relay itself, or any MITM on the relay↔gateway or relay↔client transport) can forward a prefix of a legitimate chunked-OHTTP message—cut at a non-final chunk boundary—and close the outer body cleanly, producing no decryption error and no exception in the receiving application. Version 0.0.22.Final fixes the issue.

CVE-2026-48040

Medium

2026-06-04

No exploit published

No public exploit

The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. The library implements Oblivious HTTP (RFC 9458) using BoringSSL's HPKE C library via JNI. When deriving native memory addresses for cryptographic operations versions prior to 0.0.22.Final provide a fallback path for direct ByteBufs that do not expose their memory address through `hasMemoryAddress()`. This fallback occurs when `sun.misc.Unsafe` is unavailable to Netty — for example, when the JVM is started with `-Dio.netty.noUnsafe=true`, when a SecurityManager restricts Unsafe access, or when running on non-HotSpot JVMs. In these configurations, Netty's default `PooledByteBufAllocator` returns `PooledDirectByteBuf` instances for which `hasMemoryAddress()` returns false. Under the enabling JVM configuration, an unauthenticated network attacker can cause the OHTTP gateway to corrupt memory belonging to other concurrent connections and disclose the contents of adjacent pooled direct buffers by triggering cryptographic operations with crafted OHTTP requests. The corruption occurs regardless of whether the AEAD tag verification succeeds, as BoringSSL zeroizes the output buffer on failure. The information disclosure path provides the attacker with the encryption key needed to extract the leaked data. This violates the confidentiality and integrity of all connections sharing the same Netty buffer arena. Version 0.0.22.Final fixes the issue.

CVE-2026-41207

Medium

2026-06-04

No exploit published

No public exploit

The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. Prior to version 0.0.21.Final, HKDF_expand returns non-NULL on failure. The byte[] is filled with zeros and has no way to distinguish success from failure. Since this output is used as HKDF key material for the response AEAD, a failure silently produces an all-zero key. When EVP_HPKE_CTX_export fails it also returns an empty byte[] array filled with zeros. This byte[] feeds directly into OHttpCrypto.createResponseAEAD(...). A silent all-zero export secret would produce a deterministic, attacker-predictable AEAD key. Version 0.0.21.Final patches the issue.

CVE-2024-40642

High

2024-07-18

No exploit published

No public exploit

The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. In affected versions the `BinaryHttpParser` class does not properly validate input values thus giving attackers almost complete control over the HTTP requests constructed from the parsed output. Attackers can abuse several issues individually to perform various injection attacks including HTTP request smuggling, desync attacks, HTTP header injections, request queue poisoning, caching attacks and Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Attacker could also combine several issues to create well-formed messages for other text-based protocols which may result in attacks beyond the HTTP protocol. The BinaryHttpParser class implements the readRequestHead method which performs most of the relevant parsing of the received request. The data structure prefixes values with a variable length integer value. The parsing code below first gets the lengths of the values from the prefixed variable length integer. After it has all of the lengths and calculates all of the indices, the parser casts the applicable slices of the ByteBuf to String. Finally, it passes these values into a new `DefaultBinaryHttpRequest` object where no further parsing or validation occurs. Method is partially validated while other values are not validated at all. Software that relies on netty to apply input validation for binary HTTP data may be vulnerable to various injection and protocol based attacks. This issue has been addressed in version 0.0.13.Final. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

CVE-2024-36121

Critical

2024-06-04

No exploit published

No public exploit

netty-incubator-codec-ohttp is the OHTTP implementation for netty. BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat.