Overview 5 matches · 2 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
2
40.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
3
60.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
2
40.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
3
60.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
1
20.0%
Proof of concept only
4
80.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 2 / quarter
Q4 221
Mitigation candidate1
Critical1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q1 230
Q2 230
Q3 231
Protected by Waratek1
High1
blocked by ARMR today1
Proof of concept only1
Q4 231
Protected by Waratek1
Medium1
blocked by ARMR today1
Proof of concept only1
Q1 240
Q2 240
Q3 240
Q4 240
Q1 250
Q2 250
Q3 250
Q4 250
Q1 262
Mitigation candidate2
Critical1
High1
not blocked2
Working exploit published1
Proof of concept only1
Q1 23Q3 23Q1 24Q3 24Q1 25Q3 25Q1 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-22738 | Critical | 2026-03-27 | Mitigation candidate | Proof of concept only | In Spring AI, a SpEL injection vulnerability exists in SimpleVectorStore when a user-supplied value is used as a filter expression key. A malicious actor could exploit this to execute arbitrary code. Only applications that use SimpleVectorStore and pass user-supplied input as a filter expression key are affected. This issue affects Spring AI: from 1.0.0 before 1.0.5, from 1.1.0 before 1.1.4. |
| CVE-2026-22739 | High | 2026-03-24 | Mitigation candidate | Working exploit published | Vulnerability in Spring Cloud when substituting the profile parameter from a request made to the Spring Cloud Config Server configured to the native file system as a backend, because it was possible to access files outside of the configured search directories.This issue affects Spring Cloud: from 3.1.X before 3.1.13, from 4.1.X before 4.1.9, from 4.2.X before 4.2.3, from 4.3.X before 4.3.2, from 5.0.X before 5.0.2. |
| CVE-2023-34050 | Medium | 2023-10-19 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | In spring AMQP versions 1.0.0 to 2.4.16 and 3.0.0 to 3.0.9 , allowed list patterns for deserializable class names were added to Spring AMQP, allowing users to lock down deserialization of data in messages from untrusted sources; however by default, when no allowed list was provided, all classes could be deserialized. Specifically, an application is vulnerable if * the SimpleMessageConverter or SerializerMessageConverter is used * the user does not configure allowed list patterns * untrusted message originators gain permissions to write messages to the RabbitMQ broker to send malicious content |
| CVE-2023-34040 | High | 2023-08-24 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | In Spring for Apache Kafka 3.0.9 and earlier and versions 2.9.10 and earlier, a possible deserialization attack vector existed, but only if unusual configuration was applied. An attacker would have to construct a malicious serialized object in one of the deserialization exception record headers. Specifically, an application is vulnerable when all of the following are true: * The user does not configure an ErrorHandlingDeserializer for the key and/or value of the record * The user explicitly sets container properties checkDeserExWhenKeyNull and/or checkDeserExWhenValueNull container properties to true. * The user allows untrusted sources to publish to a Kafka topic By default, these properties are false, and the container only attempts to deserialize the headers if an ErrorHandlingDeserializer is configured. The ErrorHandlingDeserializer prevents the vulnerability by removing any such malicious headers before processing the record. |
| CVE-2022-31692 | Critical | 2022-10-31 | Mitigation candidate | Proof of concept only | Spring Security, versions 5.7 prior to 5.7.5 and 5.6 prior to 5.6.9 could be susceptible to authorization rules bypass via forward or include dispatcher types. Specifically, an application is vulnerable when all of the following are true: The application expects that Spring Security applies security to forward and include dispatcher types. The application uses the AuthorizationFilter either manually or via the authorizeHttpRequests() method. The application configures the FilterChainProxy to apply to forward and/or include requests (e.g. spring.security.filter.dispatcher-types = request, error, async, forward, include). The application may forward or include the request to a higher privilege-secured endpoint.The application configures Spring Security to apply to every dispatcher type via authorizeHttpRequests().shouldFilterAllDispatcherTypes(true) |