netty-incubator-codec-ohttp CVEs
7 CVEs
Overview 7 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
7matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
7
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
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0.0%
not blocked
7
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
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0.0%
Exploited
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0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
2
28.6%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
5
71.4%
split by
peak 3 / quarter
Q2 241
No exploit published1
Critical1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q3 240
Q4 240
Q1 250
Q2 250
Q3 250
Q4 250
Q1 260
Q2 263
No exploit published3
Medium3
not blocked3
No public exploit3
Q3 261
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q4 262
No exploit published2
High1
Medium1
not blocked2
Proof of concept only2
Q2 24Q3 24Q4 24Q1 25Q2 25Q3 25Q4 25Q1 26Q2 26Q3 26Q4 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-69133 | Medium | 2026-11-19 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. From 0.0.20.Final until 0.0.27.Final, OHttpClientCodec in codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpClientCodec.java and OHttpServerCodec in codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpServerCodec.java retain the consumed outer cumulationBuffer after a valid OHTTP exchange completes, even though OHttpRequestResponseContext.destroy in codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpRequestResponseContext.java releases the inner Binary HTTP cumulation and the channel remains active. A peer can complete a large request or response and leave the keep-alive connection idle, causing the client and server handlers to retain the current high-water pooled or direct buffer capacity until later inbound content replaces it or the handler is removed. Many long-lived idle connections can pin substantial memory and create availability pressure. The issue does not cause unbounded growth for repeated exchanges on a single channel. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.27.Final. |
| CVE-2026-61798 | High | 2026-11-19 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java includes its private parameter, BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java renders the complete private-key byte array when isPrivate is true, and BoringSSL.EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java includes rejected privateKeyBytes in an exception message. Applications that log affected key-pair objects or initialization exceptions can persist complete HPKE private key material in logs or telemetry. Anyone who can read those records can recover the key and may compromise OHTTP message confidentiality or authenticity expectations while the key remains usable. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final. |
| CVE-2026-54251 | High | 2026-09-15 | No exploit published | No public exploit | netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, the OHTTP gateway decryption path in codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpRequestResponseContext.java allocates a pooled direct ByteBuf for decrypted plaintext before the AEAD tag is verified. When an invalid tag causes decryptChunk() to throw CryptoException, OHttpRequestResponseContext.decodeChunk() does not release the ByteBuf because the allocation is not guarded by try/finally. Repeated invalid encrypted requests can therefore leak native off-heap memory until the gateway is unable to continue serving requests. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final. |
| CVE-2026-48480 | Medium | 2026-06-04 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. Prior to version 0.0.22.FInal, the codec-ohttp implementation of draft-ietf-ohai-chunked-ohttp does not verify that a cryptographically-signed final chunk was received before the outer HTTP body terminates. An on-path adversary (the OHTTP relay itself, or any MITM on the relay↔gateway or relay↔client transport) can forward a prefix of a legitimate chunked-OHTTP message—cut at a non-final chunk boundary—and close the outer body cleanly, producing no decryption error and no exception in the receiving application. Version 0.0.22.Final fixes the issue. |
| CVE-2026-48040 | Medium | 2026-06-04 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. The library implements Oblivious HTTP (RFC 9458) using BoringSSL's HPKE C library via JNI. When deriving native memory addresses for cryptographic operations versions prior to 0.0.22.Final provide a fallback path for direct ByteBufs that do not expose their memory address through `hasMemoryAddress()`. This fallback occurs when `sun.misc.Unsafe` is unavailable to Netty — for example, when the JVM is started with `-Dio.netty.noUnsafe=true`, when a SecurityManager restricts Unsafe access, or when running on non-HotSpot JVMs. In these configurations, Netty's default `PooledByteBufAllocator` returns `PooledDirectByteBuf` instances for which `hasMemoryAddress()` returns false. Under the enabling JVM configuration, an unauthenticated network attacker can cause the OHTTP gateway to corrupt memory belonging to other concurrent connections and disclose the contents of adjacent pooled direct buffers by triggering cryptographic operations with crafted OHTTP requests. The corruption occurs regardless of whether the AEAD tag verification succeeds, as BoringSSL zeroizes the output buffer on failure. The information disclosure path provides the attacker with the encryption key needed to extract the leaked data. This violates the confidentiality and integrity of all connections sharing the same Netty buffer arena. Version 0.0.22.Final fixes the issue. |
| CVE-2026-41207 | Medium | 2026-06-04 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. Prior to version 0.0.21.Final, HKDF_expand returns non-NULL on failure. The byte[] is filled with zeros and has no way to distinguish success from failure. Since this output is used as HKDF key material for the response AEAD, a failure silently produces an all-zero key. When EVP_HPKE_CTX_export fails it also returns an empty byte[] array filled with zeros. This byte[] feeds directly into OHttpCrypto.createResponseAEAD(...). A silent all-zero export secret would produce a deterministic, attacker-predictable AEAD key. Version 0.0.21.Final patches the issue. |
| CVE-2024-36121 | Critical | 2024-06-04 | No exploit published | No public exploit | netty-incubator-codec-ohttp is the OHTTP implementation for netty. BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat. |