Pdfbox-examples CVEs
2 CVEs, 2 protected by Waratek
Overview 2 matches · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
2matches
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0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
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Rule in development
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Mitigation candidate
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No exploit published
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blocked by ARMR today
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partly blocked
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not blocked
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not established
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unrecorded
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Exploited
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Working exploit published
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Proof of concept only
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Forecast only
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No public exploit
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| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-33929 | Medium | 2026-04-14 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Apache PDFBox Examples. This issue affects the ExtractEmbeddedFiles example in Apache PDFBox: from 2.0.24 through 2.0.36, from 3.0.0 through 3.0.7. Users are recommended to update to version 2.0.37 or 3.0.8 once available. Until then, they should apply the fix provided in GitHub PR 427. The ExtractEmbeddedFiles example contained a path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) mentioned in CVE-2026-23907. However the change in the releases 2.0.36 and 3.0.7 is flawed because it doesn't consider the file path separator. Because of that, a user having writing rights on /home/ABC could be victim to a malicious PDF resulting in a write attempt to any path starting with /home/ABC, e.g. "/home/ABCDEF". Users who have copied this example into their production code should apply the mentioned change. The example has been changed accordingly and is available in the project repository. |
| CVE-2026-23907 | Medium | 2026-03-10 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | This issue affects the ExtractEmbeddedFiles example in Apache PDFBox: from 2.0.24 through 2.0.35, from 3.0.0 through 3.0.6. The ExtractEmbeddedFiles example contains a path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) because the filename that is obtained from PDComplexFileSpecification.getFilename() is appended to the extraction path. Users who have copied this example into their production code should review it to ensure that the extraction path is acceptable. The example has been changed accordingly, now the initial path and the extraction paths are converted into canonical paths and it is verified that extraction path contains the initial path. The documentation has also been adjusted. |