Karaf CVEs
17 CVEs, 7 protected by Waratek
Overview 17 matches · 7 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
7
41.2%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
10
58.8%
blocked by ARMR today
7
41.2%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
10
58.8%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
1
5.9%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
16
94.1%
split by
peak 3 / year
20173
No exploit published3
Critical1
High1
Medium1
not blocked3
No public exploit3
20183
No exploit published3
High2
Medium1
not blocked3
No public exploit3
20193
Protected by Waratek3
Critical1
Medium2
blocked by ARMR today3
Proof of concept only1
No public exploit2
20202
No exploit published2
High1
Medium1
not blocked2
No public exploit2
20210
20223
Protected by Waratek2
No exploit published1
Critical1
High1
Medium1
blocked by ARMR today2
not blocked1
No public exploit3
20230
20241
No exploit published1
Critical1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
20250
20262
Protected by Waratek2
High1
Low1
blocked by ARMR today2
No public exploit2
2017201820192020202120222023202420252026
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-91006 | High | 2026-09-28 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Apache Karaf's instance-management service (InstanceServiceImpl) builds the command line used to launch a child Karaf JVM by string concatenation, then executes it through /bin/sh (Unix) or cscript (Windows). The caller-supplied javaOpts value is spliced into that string unquoted. A javaOpts value containing shell metacharacters (;, |, `, $(...)) is interpreted by the shell instead of being passed to the JVM as an option, giving arbitrary OS command execution as the Karaf process user. Reachable via the shell commands instance:create, instance:start, instance:restart, instance:change-opts, and the equivalent InstanceMBean JMX operations (createInstance, startInstance, changeJavaOpts, cloneInstance). Mitigation * Set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties to close the fail-open gap for all unconfigured command scopes. * Restrict which principals can reach instance:* commands and InstancesMBean via etc/users.properties role assignments. * Treat javaOpts passed to instance:create/instance:start/instance:change-opts/InstancesMBean as untrusted input only from fully-trusted operators. |
| CVE-2026-24656 | Low | 2026-01-26 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Karaf Decanter. The Decanter log socket collector exposes the port 4560, without authentication. If the collector exposes allowed classes property, this configuration can be bypassed. It means that the log socket collector is vulnerable to deserialization of untrusted data, eventually causing DoS. NB: Decanter log socket collector is not installed by default. Users who have not installed Decanter log socket are not impacted by this issue. This issue affects Apache Karaf Decanter before 2.12.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.12.0, which fixes the issue. |
| CVE-2024-34365 | Critical | 2024-05-14 | No exploit published | No public exploit | ** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Apache Karaf Cave.This issue affects all versions of Apache Karaf Cave. As this project is retired, we do not plan to release a version that fixes this issue. Users are recommended to find an alternative or restrict access to the instance to trusted users.NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. |
| CVE-2022-40145 | Critical | 2022-12-21 | No exploit published | No public exploit | This vulnerable is about a potential code injection when an attacker has control of the target LDAP server using in the JDBC JNDI URL. The function jaas.modules.src.main.java.porg.apache.karaf.jass.modules.jdbc.JDBCUtils#doCreateDatasource use InitialContext.lookup(jndiName) without filtering. An user can modify `options.put(JDBCUtils.DATASOURCE, "osgi:" + DataSource.class.getName());` to `options.put(JDBCUtils.DATASOURCE,"jndi:rmi://x.x.x.x:xxxx/Command");` in JdbcLoginModuleTest#setup. This is vulnerable to a remote code execution (RCE) attack when a configuration uses a JNDI LDAP data source URI when an attacker has control of the target LDAP server.This issue affects all versions of Apache Karaf up to 4.4.1 and 4.3.7. We encourage the users to upgrade to Apache Karaf at least 4.4.2 or 4.3.8 |
| CVE-2022-22932 | Medium | 2022-01-26 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Apache Karaf obr:* commands and run goal on the karaf-maven-plugin have partial path traversal which allows to break out of expected folder. The risk is low as obr:* commands are not very used and the entry is set by user. This has been fixed in revision: https://gitbox.apache.org/repos/asf?p=karaf.git;h=36a2bc4 https://gitbox.apache.org/repos/asf?p=karaf.git;h=52b70cf Mitigation: Apache Karaf users should upgrade to 4.2.15 or 4.3.6 or later as soon as possible, or use correct path. JIRA Tickets: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KARAF-7326 |
| CVE-2021-41766 | High | 2022-01-26 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Apache Karaf allows monitoring of applications and the Java runtime by using the Java Management Extensions (JMX). JMX is a Java RMI based technology that relies on Java serialized objects for client server communication. Whereas the default JMX implementation is hardened against unauthenticated deserialization attacks, the implementation used by Apache Karaf is not protected against this kind of attack. The impact of Java deserialization vulnerabilities strongly depends on the classes that are available within the targets class path. Generally speaking, deserialization of untrusted data does always represent a high security risk and should be prevented. The risk is low as, by default, Karaf uses a limited set of classes in the JMX server class path. It depends of system scoped classes (e.g. jar in the lib folder). |
| CVE-2020-28052 | High | 2020-12-18 | No exploit published | No public exploit | An issue was discovered in Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC Java 1.65 and 1.66. The OpenBSDBCrypt.checkPassword utility method compared incorrect data when checking the password, allowing incorrect passwords to indicate they were matching with previously hashed ones that were different. |
| CVE-2020-11980 | Medium | 2020-06-12 | No exploit published | No public exploit | In Karaf, JMX authentication takes place using JAAS and authorization takes place using ACL files. By default, only an "admin" can actually invoke on an MBean. However there is a vulnerability there for someone who is not an admin, but has a "viewer" role. In the 'etc/jmx.acl.cfg', such as role can call get*. It's possible to authenticate as a viewer role + invokes on the MLet getMBeansFromURL method, which goes off to a remote server to fetch the desired MBean, which is then registered in Karaf. At this point the attack fails as "viewer" doesn't have the permission to invoke on the MBean. Still, it could act as a SSRF style attack and also it essentially allows a "viewer" role to pollute the MBean registry, which is a kind of privilege escalation. The vulnerability is low as it's possible to add a ACL to limit access. Users should update to Apache Karaf 4.2.9 or newer. |
| CVE-2019-0226 | Medium | 2019-05-09 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Apache Karaf Config service provides a install method (via service or MBean) that could be used to travel in any directory and overwrite existing file. The vulnerability is low if the Karaf process user has limited permission on the filesystem. Any Apache Karaf version before 4.2.5 is impacted. User should upgrade to Apache Karaf 4.2.5 or later. |
| CVE-2019-0191 | Medium | 2019-03-21 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Apache Karaf kar deployer reads .kar archives and extracts the paths from the "repository/" and "resources/" entries in the zip file. It then writes out the content of these paths to the Karaf repo and resources directories. However, it doesn't do any validation on the paths in the zip file. This means that a malicious user could craft a .kar file with ".." directory names and break out of the directories to write arbitrary content to the filesystem. This is the "Zip-slip" vulnerability - https://snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability. This vulnerability is low if the Karaf process user has limited permission on the filesystem. Any Apache Karaf releases prior 4.2.3 is impacted. |
| CVE-2018-11788 | Critical | 2019-01-07 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | Apache Karaf provides a features deployer, which allows users to "hot deploy" a features XML by dropping the file directly in the deploy folder. The features XML is parsed by XMLInputFactory class. Apache Karaf XMLInputFactory class doesn't contain any mitigation codes against XXE. This is a potential security risk as an user can inject external XML entities in Apache Karaf version prior to 4.1.7 or 4.2.2. It has been fixed in Apache Karaf 4.1.7 and 4.2.2 releases. |
| CVE-2018-11787 | High | 2018-09-18 | No exploit published | No public exploit | In Apache Karaf version prior to 3.0.9, 4.0.9, 4.1.1, when the webconsole feature is installed in Karaf, it is available at .../system/console and requires authentication to access it. One part of the console is a Gogo shell/console that gives access to the command line console of Karaf via a Web browser, and when navigated to it is available at .../system/console/gogo. Trying to go directly to that URL does require authentication. And optional bundle that some applications use is the Pax Web Extender Whiteboard, it is part of the pax-war feature and perhaps others. When it is installed, the Gogo console becomes available at another URL .../gogo/, and that URL is not secured giving access to the Karaf console to unauthenticated users. A mitigation for the issue is to manually stop/uninstall Gogo plugin bundle that is installed with the webconsole feature, although of course this removes the console from the .../system/console application, not only from the unauthenticated endpoint. One could also stop/uninstall the Pax Web Extender Whiteboard, but other components/applications may require it and so their functionality would be reduced/compromised. |
| CVE-2018-11786 | High | 2018-09-18 | No exploit published | No public exploit | In Apache Karaf prior to 4.2.0 release, if the sshd service in Karaf is left on so an administrator can manage the running instance, any user with rights to the Karaf console can pivot and read/write any file on the file system to which the Karaf process user has access. This can be locked down a bit by using chroot to change the root directory to protect files outside of the Karaf install directory; it can be further locked down by defining a security manager policy that limits file system access to those directories beneath the Karaf home that are necessary for the system to run. However, this still allows anyone with ssh access to the Karaf process to read and write a large number of files as the Karaf process user. |
| CVE-2016-8750 | Medium | 2018-02-19 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Apache Karaf prior to 4.0.8 used the LDAPLoginModule to authenticate users to a directory via LDAP. However, it did not encoding usernames properly and hence was vulnerable to LDAP injection attacks leading to a denial of service. |
| CVE-2017-1000406 | High | 2017-11-30 | No exploit published | No public exploit | OpenDaylight Karaf 0.6.1-Carbon fails to clear the cache after a password change, allowing the old password to be used until the Karaf cache is manually cleared (e.g. via restart). |
| CVE-2014-0219 | Medium | 2017-11-15 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Apache Karaf before 4.0.10 enables a shutdown port on the loopback interface, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (shutdown) by sending a shutdown command to all listening high ports. |
| CVE-2015-1778 | Critical | 2017-06-27 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The custom authentication realm used by karaf-tomcat's "opendaylight" realm in Opendaylight before Helium SR3 will authenticate any username and password combination. |