CWE-636 CVEs
8 CVEs, 1 protected by Waratek
Overview 8 matches · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
1
12.5%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
7
87.5%
blocked by ARMR today
1
12.5%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
7
87.5%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
1
12.5%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
7
87.5%
split by
peak 3 / month
Jul 263
No exploit published3
Critical1
High2
not blocked3
No public exploit3
Aug 260
Sep 261
No exploit published1
Critical1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Oct 263
No exploit published3
Critical1
Medium2
not blocked3
No public exploit3
Nov 261
Protected by Waratek1
High1
blocked by ARMR today1
No public exploit1
Jul 26Aug 26Sep 26Oct 26Nov 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-109408 | High | 2026-11-05 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | vault-java-driver, a Java client for HashiCorp Vault, silently disables TLS certificate and hostname verification in three states where the caller asked for verification: an SslConfig passed to VaultConfig without calling build(), an SslConfig restored by Java deserialization, and VAULT_SSL_VERIFY set to a truthy value other than "true", such as 1, yes or on. In each case SslConfig.isVerify() returns false and the driver installs a trust-all SSLContext. An attacker on the network path to the Vault server can then read the Vault token and secrets in transit and forge responses. This issue affects io.github.jopenlibs:vault-java-driver 5.2.0 through 6.2.3. It is fixed in 7.0.0. |
| CVE-2026-110985 | Critical | 2026-10-28 | No exploit published | No public exploit | A Kafka broker using SASL/OAUTHBEARER with the default validator (sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class=DefaultJwtValidator) selects its implementation from configuration. When sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url is set, the validator verifies the JWT signature. When that URL is unset (the default) and no verification key resolver is supplied, DefaultJwtValidator silently falls back to ClientJwtValidator, which does not verify the JWT signature, algorithm, or issuer - and the broker starts with no warning or error. This is the residual of CVE-2026-33557, whose fix restored signature verification only on the path where the JWKS endpoint URL is set. Impact: A broker in this state accepts any structurally valid JWT, including "alg":"none" tokens. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach the listener can forge a token asserting any principal - including configured superusers - and gain full access to the cluster. Only brokers that enable SASL/OAUTHBEARER validation without a JWKS endpoint URL (and without a custom verification key resolver) are affected; brokers that set the URL verify signatures and are not affected. Unlike CVE-2026-110952 (issuer/audience not enforced by default), here no signature is verified at all. Mitigation (all affected versions, no upgrade required): Set sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url for every listener/mechanism that uses OAuthBearerValidatorCallbackHandler, or configure a signature-verifying sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class. Resolution: From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.1, and 4.4.0: a broker that would fall back to the non-verifying ClientJwtValidator fails to start with a ConfigException instead of running without signature verification (secure by default). |
| CVE-2026-74048 | Medium | 2026-10-20 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open') vulnerability in Apache Tomcat. If the OpenSSLLifecycleListener is configured to use FIPS mode but FIPS activation fails, Tomcat logs and error but continues to use JSSE in non-FIPS mode with the provided configuration. This issue affects Apache Tomcat: from 11.0.0-M14 through 11.0.26, from 10.1.22 through 10.1.60, from 9.0.92 through 9.0.122. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 11.0.27, 10.1.61 or 9.0.123, which fix the issue. |
| CVE-2026-107314 | Medium | 2026-10-07 | No exploit published | No public exploit | pgjdbc, the PostgreSQL JDBC Driver, versions 42.7.11 through 42.7.13 enforce no restriction when the requireAuth connection property excludes all six authentication methods the driver knows, for example requireAuth=!password,!md5,!gss,!sspi,!scram-sha-256,!none. The driver then accepts any method the server asks for, including cleartext password authentication. A value without a method in it, such as requireAuth=, (a single comma), is affected the same way. An attacker positioned between the application and its server can ask for cleartext password authentication and receive the database password. A positive list such as requireAuth=scram-sha-256, and a partial exclusion such as requireAuth=!password,!md5, are enforced correctly. The property has no default value, so a deployment that does not set it is not affected. 42.7.14 fixes the problem: such a connection is refused with SQLState 08004, and a value without a method in it is rejected as invalid. |
| CVE-2026-95848 | Critical | 2026-09-23 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Moquette is a lightweight Java MQTT broker. Prior to 0.18.1, when a configured authenticator or authorizator class cannot be loaded, Server.initializeAuthenticator and Server.initializeAuthorizatorPolicy treat the failure as though no custom class was configured and fall back to AcceptAllAuthenticator or PermitAllAuthorizatorPolicy. A misspelled class name, missing dependency, constructor failure, or classpath problem can therefore start the broker with authentication or authorization disabled even though the operator configured those controls. This issue is fixed in version 0.18.1. |
| CVE-2026-53712 | High | 2026-07-17 | No exploit published | No public exploit | SCRAM (Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism) is part of the family of Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL, RFC 4422) authentication mechanisms. Prior to 3.3, a flaw in com.ongres.scram:scram-client and com.ongres.scram:scram-common allows an attacker capable of a TLS man-in-the-middle attack to silently downgrade a connection from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS with channel binding to standard SCRAM-SHA-256 without channel binding when TlsServerEndpoint processes an X.509 certificate using a modern signature algorithm such as Ed25519; getChannelBindingData() can return an empty byte array after NoSuchAlgorithmException, and the ScramClient builder treats that as absent channel-binding data. This issue is fixed in version 3.3. |
| CVE-2026-54291 | High | 2026-07-06 | No exploit published | No public exploit | pgjdbc is an open source postgresql JDBC Driver. In releases 42.7.4 through 42.7.11, channelBinding=require connections can be silently downgraded from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS with channel binding to plain SCRAM-SHA-256 without it, losing the man-in-the-middle protection the setting is meant to guarantee. An attacker who can intercept the TLS connection can trigger the downgrade with a certificate whose signature algorithm has no tls-server-end-point channel-binding hash, because the bundled com.ongres.scram:scram-client returns an empty byte array instead of failing and pgJDBC ScramAuthenticator checks only that the server advertised a PLUS mechanism, without rejecting the empty binding or checking that the negotiated mechanism uses channel binding. This issue is fixed in version 42.7.12. |
| CVE-2026-53913 | Critical | 2026-07-06 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Improper Authentication, Missing Authentication for Critical Function, Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open') vulnerability in Apache Camel Keycloak Component. The KeycloakSecurityPolicy of camel-keycloak guards a route by running KeycloakSecurityProcessor.beforeProcess(), which performs three checks in sequence: it rejects a request that carries no access token, then - only if requiredRoles is non-empty - validates the roles, and - only if requiredPermissions is non-empty - validates the permissions. The actual cryptographic verification of the bearer access token (signature, issuer and expiry for a local JWT, or active-state and issuer for token introspection) is performed exclusively inside those role and permission checks. KeycloakSecurityPolicy defaults requiredRoles and requiredPermissions to empty - which is the documented 'Basic Setup' - so on a route configured that way the role and permission checks are skipped and the access token is therefore never verified. The token-presence check still rejects a missing token, but an invalid token is accepted: any non-null value in the Authorization: Bearer header - including an arbitrary string or a forged, unsigned JWT - passes the policy and the request reaches the protected route, with no signature, issuer or expiry check and no request to Keycloak. The token is read from the inbound request header because allowTokenFromHeader defaults to true. Because the normal reason to place a route behind this policy is that the route performs server-side work, the bypass results in unauthenticated access to that work; where the protected route forwards to a code-execution-capable producer, it can result in unauthenticated remote code execution. This defect is independent of CVE-2026-23552: that issue concerned the issuer claim and was fixed by adding a check inside the verification routine, but here the verification routine is not reached at all in the default configuration, so the defect remains. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a non-empty requiredRoles or requiredPermissions on every KeycloakSecurityPolicy so that the token-verification path is exercised, set allowTokenFromHeader to false where the token is not expected from the request header, or perform token verification at the framework layer ahead of the policy. |