Oracle Financial Services Applications User Interface (Apache Kafka) CVEs
3 CVEs, 1 protected by Waratek
Overview 3 matches · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
1
33.3%
Rule in development
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0.0%
Mitigation candidate
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No exploit published
2
66.7%
blocked by ARMR today
1
33.3%
partly blocked
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not blocked
2
66.7%
not established
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unrecorded
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0.0%
Exploited
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0.0%
Working exploit published
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0.0%
Proof of concept only
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Forecast only
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No public exploit
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100.0%
split by
peak 2 / month
Dec 241
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
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Protected by Waratek1
No exploit published1
Critical1
High1
blocked by ARMR today1
not blocked1
No public exploit2
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| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-33557 | Critical | 2026-04-20 | No exploit published | No public exploit | A possible security vulnerability has been identified in Apache Kafka. By default, the broker property `sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class` is set to `org.apache.kafka.common.security.oauthbearer.DefaultJwtValidator`. It accepts any JWT token without validating its signature, issuer, or audience. An attacker can generate a JWT token from any issuer with the `preferred_username` set to any user, and the broker will accept it. We advise the Kafka users using kafka v4.1.0 or v4.1.1 to set the config `sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class` to `org.apache.kafka.common.security.oauthbearer.BrokerJwtValidator` explicitly to avoid this vulnerability. Since Kafka v4.1.2 and v4.2.0 and later, the issue is fixed and will correctly validate the JWT token. |
| CVE-2026-35554 | High | 2026-04-07 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | A race condition in the Apache Kafka Java producer client’s buffer pool management can cause messages to be silently delivered to incorrect topics. When a produce batch expires due to delivery.timeout.ms while a network request containing that batch is still in flight, the batch’s ByteBuffer is prematurely deallocated and returned to the buffer pool. If a subsequent producer batch—potentially destined for a different topic—reuses this freed buffer before the original network request completes, the buffer contents may become corrupted. This can result in messages being delivered to unintended topics without any error being reported to the producer. Data Confidentiality: Messages intended for one topic may be delivered to a different topic, potentially exposing sensitive data to consumers who have access to the destination topic but not the intended source topic. Data Integrity: Consumers on the receiving topic may encounter unexpected or incompatible messages, leading to deserialization failures, processing errors, and corrupted downstream data. This issue affects Apache Kafka versions ≤ 3.9.1, ≤ 4.0.1, and ≤ 4.1.1. Kafka users are advised to upgrade to 3.9.2, 4.0.2, 4.1.2, 4.2.0, or later to address this vulnerability. |
| CVE-2024-56128 | Medium | 2024-12-18 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Incorrect Implementation of Authentication Algorithm in Apache Kafka's SCRAM implementation. Issue Summary: Apache Kafka's implementation of the Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) did not fully adhere to the requirements of RFC 5802 [1]. Specifically, as per RFC 5802, the server must verify that the nonce sent by the client in the second message matches the nonce sent by the server in its first message. However, Kafka's SCRAM implementation did not perform this validation. Impact: This vulnerability is exploitable only when an attacker has plaintext access to the SCRAM authentication exchange. However, the usage of SCRAM over plaintext is strongly discouraged as it is considered an insecure practice [2]. Apache Kafka recommends deploying SCRAM exclusively with TLS encryption to protect SCRAM exchanges from interception [3]. Deployments using SCRAM with TLS are not affected by this issue. How to Detect If You Are Impacted: If your deployment uses SCRAM authentication over plaintext communication channels (without TLS encryption), you are likely impacted. To check if TLS is enabled, review your server.properties configuration file for listeners property. If you have SASL_PLAINTEXT in the listeners, then you are likely impacted. Fix Details: The issue has been addressed by introducing nonce verification in the final message of the SCRAM authentication exchange to ensure compliance with RFC 5802. Affected Versions: Apache Kafka versions 0.10.2.0 through 3.9.0, excluding the fixed versions below. Fixed Versions: 3.9.0 3.8.1 3.7.2 Users are advised to upgrade to 3.7.2 or later to mitigate this issue. Recommendations for Mitigation: Users unable to upgrade to the fixed versions can mitigate the issue by: - Using TLS with SCRAM Authentication: Always deploy SCRAM over TLS to encrypt authentication exchanges and protect against interception. - Considering Alternative Authentication Mechanisms: Evaluate alternative authentication mechanisms, such as PLAIN, Kerberos or OAuth with TLS, which provide additional layers of security. |