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Oracle SQL Developer Installation (Apache Kafka) CVEs

3 CVEs, 1 exploited

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Oracle product: Oracle SQL Developer / Installation (Apache Kafka)✕
Overview 3 matches · 0 protected · 1 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 1 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches 0protected0.0% 1exploited33.3% 0CISA KEV0.0% 1public PoC33.3% 1EPSS ≥ 0.533.3%
Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 1 33.3% No exploit published 2 66.7%
Critical 1 33.3% High 1 33.3% Medium 1 33.3% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 3 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 1 33.3% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 2 66.7%
split by peak 1 / month
No exploit published: 2Mitigation candidate: 1 Medium: 1High: 1Critical: 1 not blocked: 3 No public exploit: 2Exploited: 1
Dec 241 No exploit published1 Medium1 not blocked1 No public exploit1 Jan 250 Feb 250 Mar 250 Apr 250 May 250 Jun 251 Mitigation candidate1 High1 not blocked1 Exploited1 Jul 250 Aug 250 Sep 250 Oct 250 Nov 250 Dec 250 Jan 260 Feb 260 Mar 260 Apr 261 No exploit published1 Critical1 not blocked1 No public exploit1
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-33557 Critical 2026-04-20 No exploit published No public exploit A possible security vulnerability has been identified in Apache Kafka. By default, the broker property `sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class` is set to `org.apache.kafka.common.security.oauthbearer.DefaultJwtValidator`. It accepts any JWT token without validating its signature, issuer, or audience. An attacker can generate a JWT token from any issuer with the `preferred_username` set to any user, and the broker will accept it. We advise the Kafka users using kafka v4.1.0 or v4.1.1 to set the config `sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class` to `org.apache.kafka.common.security.oauthbearer.BrokerJwtValidator` explicitly to avoid this vulnerability. Since Kafka v4.1.2 and v4.2.0 and later, the issue is fixed and will correctly validate the JWT token.
CVE-2025-27817 High 2025-06-10 Mitigation candidate Exploited A possible arbitrary file read and SSRF vulnerability has been identified in Apache Kafka Client. Apache Kafka Clients accept configuration data for setting the SASL/OAUTHBEARER connection with the brokers, including "sasl.oauthbearer.token.endpoint.url" and "sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url". Apache Kafka allows clients to read an arbitrary file and return the content in the error log, or sending requests to an unintended location. In applications where Apache Kafka Clients configurations can be specified by an untrusted party, attackers may use the "sasl.oauthbearer.token.endpoint.url" and "sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url" configuratin to read arbitrary contents of the disk and environment variables or make requests to an unintended location. In particular, this flaw may be used in Apache Kafka Connect to escalate from REST API access to filesystem/environment/URL access, which may be undesirable in certain environments, including SaaS products. Since Apache Kafka 3.9.1/4.0.0, we have added a system property ("-Dorg.apache.kafka.sasl.oauthbearer.allowed.urls") to set the allowed urls in SASL JAAS configuration. In 3.9.1, it accepts all urls by default for backward compatibility. However in 4.0.0 and newer, the default value is empty list and users have to set the allowed urls explicitly.
CVE-2024-56128 Medium 2024-12-18 No exploit published No public exploit Incorrect Implementation of Authentication Algorithm in Apache Kafka's SCRAM implementation. Issue Summary: Apache Kafka's implementation of the Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) did not fully adhere to the requirements of RFC 5802 [1]. Specifically, as per RFC 5802, the server must verify that the nonce sent by the client in the second message matches the nonce sent by the server in its first message. However, Kafka's SCRAM implementation did not perform this validation. Impact: This vulnerability is exploitable only when an attacker has plaintext access to the SCRAM authentication exchange. However, the usage of SCRAM over plaintext is strongly discouraged as it is considered an insecure practice [2]. Apache Kafka recommends deploying SCRAM exclusively with TLS encryption to protect SCRAM exchanges from interception [3]. Deployments using SCRAM with TLS are not affected by this issue. How to Detect If You Are Impacted: If your deployment uses SCRAM authentication over plaintext communication channels (without TLS encryption), you are likely impacted. To check if TLS is enabled, review your server.properties configuration file for listeners property. If you have SASL_PLAINTEXT in the listeners, then you are likely impacted. Fix Details: The issue has been addressed by introducing nonce verification in the final message of the SCRAM authentication exchange to ensure compliance with RFC 5802. Affected Versions: Apache Kafka versions 0.10.2.0 through 3.9.0, excluding the fixed versions below. Fixed Versions: 3.9.0 3.8.1 3.7.2 Users are advised to upgrade to 3.7.2 or later to mitigate this issue. Recommendations for Mitigation: Users unable to upgrade to the fixed versions can mitigate the issue by: - Using TLS with SCRAM Authentication: Always deploy SCRAM over TLS to encrypt authentication exchanges and protect against interception. - Considering Alternative Authentication Mechanisms: Evaluate alternative authentication mechanisms, such as PLAIN, Kerberos or OAuth with TLS, which provide additional layers of security.