Medium Oracle NoSQL Database Administration (Netty) CVEs
6 CVEs
Overview 6 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
6matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
6
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
6
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
4
66.7%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
2
33.3%
split by
peak 2 / quarter
Q1 211
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q2 210
Q3 210
Q4 210
Q1 220
Q2 220
Q3 220
Q4 220
Q1 230
Q2 231
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q3 230
Q4 230
Q1 241
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q2 240
Q3 240
Q4 240
Q1 251
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q2 250
Q3 250
Q4 250
Q1 260
Q2 262
No exploit published2
Medium2
not blocked2
Proof of concept only2
Q2 21Q4 21Q2 22Q4 22Q2 23Q4 23Q2 24Q4 24Q2 25Q4 25Q2 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-42580 | Medium | 2026-05-13 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty's chunk size parser silently overflows int, enabling request smuggling attacks. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2026-41417 | Medium | 2026-05-06 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty allows request-line validation to be bypassed when a `DefaultHttpRequest` or `DefaultFullHttpRequest` is created first and its URI is later changed via `setUri()`. The constructors reject CRLF and whitespace characters that would break the start-line, but `setUri()` does not apply the same validation. `HttpRequestEncoder` and `RtspEncoder` then write the URI into the request line verbatim. If attacker-controlled input reaches `setUri()`, this enables CRLF injection and insertion of additional HTTP or RTSP requests, leading to HTTP request smuggling or desynchronization on the HTTP side and request injection on the RTSP side. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2025-25193 | Medium | 2025-02-10 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty, an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework, has a vulnerability in versions up to and including 4.1.118.Final. An unsafe reading of environment file could potentially cause a denial of service in Netty. When loaded on an Windows application, Netty attempts to load a file that does not exist. If an attacker creates such a large file, the Netty application crash. A similar issue was previously reported as CVE-2024-47535. This issue was fixed, but the fix was incomplete in that null-bytes were not counted against the input limit. Commit d1fbda62d3a47835d3fb35db8bd42ecc205a5386 contains an updated fix. |
| CVE-2024-29025 | Medium | 2024-03-25 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. The `HttpPostRequestDecoder` can be tricked to accumulate data. While the decoder can store items on the disk if configured so, there are no limits to the number of fields the form can have, an attacher can send a chunked post consisting of many small fields that will be accumulated in the `bodyListHttpData` list. The decoder cumulates bytes in the `undecodedChunk` buffer until it can decode a field, this field can cumulate data without limits. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.108.Final. |
| CVE-2023-34462 | Medium | 2023-06-22 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. The `SniHandler` can allocate up to 16MB of heap for each channel during the TLS handshake. When the handler or the channel does not have an idle timeout, it can be used to make a TCP server using the `SniHandler` to allocate 16MB of heap. The `SniHandler` class is a handler that waits for the TLS handshake to configure a `SslHandler` according to the indicated server name by the `ClientHello` record. For this matter it allocates a `ByteBuf` using the value defined in the `ClientHello` record. Normally the value of the packet should be smaller than the handshake packet but there are not checks done here and the way the code is written, it is possible to craft a packet that makes the `SslClientHelloHandler`. This vulnerability has been fixed in version 4.1.94.Final. |
| CVE-2021-21409 | Medium | 2021-03-30 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.61.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The content-length header is not correctly validated if the request only uses a single Http2HeaderFrame with the endStream set to to true. This could lead to request smuggling if the request is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1. This is a followup of GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which did miss to fix this one case. This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final. |