Oracle Critical Patch Update January 2026
Released January 2026 · Oracle's advisory ↗ · ← Critical Patch Update, October 2025 · Critical Patch Update, April 2026 →
219 CVEs in this release, one square each
By status
15Protected by Waratek2Mitigation candidate62No exploit published11Outside Waratek scope129Not applicable
6Exploited, marked by the ring
No exploit published. For 27 of them, Oracle's security advisory is the source of public detail.
Protected by Waratek. Waratek RASP can block exploitation of these on systems that have not applied the patch yet.
Overview 3 matches · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
1
33.3%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
2
66.7%
blocked by ARMR today
1
33.3%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
66.7%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
3
100.0%
split by
peak 1 / month
Dec 241
Protected by Waratek1
Critical1
blocked by ARMR today1
No public exploit1
Jan 250
Feb 250
Mar 250
Apr 250
May 250
Jun 250
Jul 250
Aug 250
Sep 250
Oct 250
Nov 251
No exploit published1
Critical1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Dec 250
Jan 261
No exploit published1
Critical1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Jan 25Mar 25May 25Jul 25Sep 25Nov 25Jan 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-21969 | Critical | 2026-01-20 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Vulnerability in the Oracle Agile Product Lifecycle Management for Process product of Oracle Supply Chain (component: Supplier Portal). The supported version that is affected is 6.2.4. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Agile Product Lifecycle Management for Process. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Agile Product Lifecycle Management for Process. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). |
| CVE-2025-12383 | Critical | 2025-11-18 | No exploit published | No public exploit | In Eclipse Jersey versions 2.45, 3.0.16, 3.1.9 a race condition can cause ignoring of critical SSL configurations - such as mutual authentication, custom key/trust stores, and other security settings. This issue may result in SSLHandshakeException under normal circumstances, but under certain conditions, it could lead to unauthorized trust in insecure servers (see PoC) |
| CVE-2024-52046 | Critical | 2024-12-25 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | The ObjectSerializationDecoder in Apache MINA uses Java’s native deserialization protocol to process incoming serialized data but lacks the necessary security checks and defenses. This vulnerability allows attackers to exploit the deserialization process by sending specially crafted malicious serialized data, potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE) attacks. This issue affects MINA core versions 2.0.X, 2.1.X and 2.2.X, and will be fixed by the releases 2.0.27, 2.1.10 and 2.2.4. It's also important to note that an application using MINA core library will only be affected if the IoBuffer#getObject() method is called, and this specific method is potentially called when adding a ProtocolCodecFilter instance using the ObjectSerializationCodecFactory class in the filter chain. If your application is specifically using those classes, you have to upgrade to the latest version of MINA core library. Upgrading will not be enough: you also need to explicitly allow the classes the decoder will accept in the ObjectSerializationDecoder instance, using one of the three new methods: /** * Accept class names where the supplied ClassNameMatcher matches for * deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected. * * @param classNameMatcher the matcher to use */ public void accept(ClassNameMatcher classNameMatcher) /** * Accept class names that match the supplied pattern for * deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected. * * @param pattern standard Java regexp */ public void accept(Pattern pattern) /** * Accept the wildcard specified classes for deserialization, * unless they are otherwise rejected. * * @param patterns Wildcard file name patterns as defined by * {@link org.apache.commons.io.FilenameUtils#wildcardMatch(String, String) FilenameUtils.wildcardMatch} */ public void accept(String... patterns) By default, the decoder will reject *all* classes that will be present in the incoming data. Note: The FtpServer, SSHd and Vysper sub-project are not affected by this issue. |