Oracle Critical Patch Update April 2022
Released April 2022 · Oracle's advisory ↗ · ← Critical Patch Update, January 2022 · Critical Patch Update, July 2022 →
222 CVEs in this release, one square each
By status
29Protected by Waratek9Mitigation candidate96No exploit published88Not applicable
13Exploited, marked by the ring
No exploit published. For 46 of them, Oracle's security advisory is the source of public detail.
Protected by Waratek. Waratek RASP can block exploitation of these on systems that have not applied the patch yet.
Overview 3 matches · 2 in Waratek scope · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches
2in Waratek scope66.7%
1protected33.3%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
1
33.3%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
1
33.3%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
1
33.3%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
1
33.3%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
66.7%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
3
100.0%
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2019-3740 | Medium | 2019-09-18 | No exploit published | No public exploit | RSA BSAFE Crypto-J versions prior to 6.2.5 are vulnerable to an Information Exposure Through Timing Discrepancy vulnerabilities during DSA key generation. A malicious remote attacker could potentially exploit those vulnerabilities to recover DSA keys. |
| CVE-2019-10086 | High | 2019-08-20 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | In Apache Commons Beanutils 1.9.2, a special BeanIntrospector class was added which allows suppressing the ability for an attacker to access the classloader via the class property available on all Java objects. We, however were not using this by default characteristic of the PropertyUtilsBean. |
| CVE-2019-13565 | High | 2019-07-26 | Not applicable | No public exploit | An issue was discovered in OpenLDAP 2.x before 2.4.48. When using SASL authentication and session encryption, and relying on the SASL security layers in slapd access controls, it is possible to obtain access that would otherwise be denied via a simple bind for any identity covered in those ACLs. After the first SASL bind is completed, the sasl_ssf value is retained for all new non-SASL connections. Depending on the ACL configuration, this can affect different types of operations (searches, modifications, etc.). In other words, a successful authorization step completed by one user affects the authorization requirement for a different user. |