Oracle Critical Patch Update October 2021
Released October 2021 · Oracle's advisory ↗ · ← Critical Patch Update, July 2021 · Critical Patch Update, January 2022 →
231 CVEs in this release, one square each
By status
26Protected by Waratek3Mitigation candidate72No exploit published42Outside Waratek scope88Not applicable
7Exploited, marked by the ring
No exploit published. For 52 of them, Oracle's security advisory is the source of public detail.
Protected by Waratek. Waratek RASP can block exploitation of these on systems that have not applied the patch yet.
Overview 2 matches · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV
Protected by Waratek
1
50.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
1
50.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
1
50.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
1
50.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
2
100.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 1 / month
May 20Jul 20Sep 20Nov 20Jan 21Mar 21May 21
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-29505 | High | 2021-05-28 | Mitigation candidate | Working exploit published | XStream is software for serializing Java objects to XML and back again. A vulnerability in XStream versions prior to 1.4.17 may allow a remote attacker has sufficient rights to execute commands of the host only by manipulating the processed input stream. No user who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types is affected. The vulnerability is patched in version 1.4.17. |
| CVE-2020-9484 | High | 2020-05-20 | Protected by Waratek | Working exploit published | When using Apache Tomcat versions 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M4, 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.34, 8.5.0 to 8.5.54 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.103 if a) an attacker is able to control the contents and name of a file on the server; and b) the server is configured to use the PersistenceManager with a FileStore; and c) the PersistenceManager is configured with sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter="null" (the default unless a SecurityManager is used) or a sufficiently lax filter to allow the attacker provided object to be deserialized; and d) the attacker knows the relative file path from the storage location used by FileStore to the file the attacker has control over; then, using a specifically crafted request, the attacker will be able to trigger remote code execution via deserialization of the file under their control. Note that all of conditions a) to d) must be true for the attack to succeed. |