CVE-2026-110952
| Severity | 5.9 Medium CVSS 3.1 |
|---|---|
| Weakness | CWE-345 |
| Published | 28 Oct 2026 |
| Updated | 5 Nov 2026 |
Published 17 days ago. NVD often adds the list of affected products days or weeks after a CVE is published, and the other sources we check lag too. The scope and status here may change.
Description
A Kafka broker that authenticates clients with SASL/OAUTHBEARER using the bundled JWKS-backed validator always verifies the JWT signature, but two further checks are only performed when explicitly configured: - The issuer (iss) claim is verified only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token carrying the expected audience is accepted regardless of which issuer minted it. - An audience (aud) claim is required only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token that omits the aud claim is accepted. (A token that carries an aud claim is still rejected when no expected audience is configured.) Both options default to unset and have been documented as optional (Importance LOW) since KIP-768 (3.1.0). Impact: The exposure is realizable mainly in deployments whose JWKS endpoint serves signing keys for more than one issuer (a multi-tenant identity provider, an aggregated/shared JWKS, or shared signing keys): a token minted for a different issuer, or a token lacking an audience, may be accepted to authenticate — potentially as a higher-privileged principal. In a single-issuer deployment where the provider controls the iss claim and issues audience-scoped tokens, exposure is limited. The signature trust anchor remains enforced in all cases. This is distinct from CVE-2026-33557 (acceptance of unsigned/unvalidated tokens); here the signature is validated and only the issuer/audience checks are not enforced by default. Mitigation (all affected versions, no upgrade required): Set both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer (to your provider's exact iss value) and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience (to the audience(s) your brokers expect), per listener. Brokers that set these perform exact-match issuer/audience checks and are not affected. Both have been available since 3.1.0. Resolution: - From Apache Kafka 4.4.0: a broker configured with a JWKS endpoint fails to start unless both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience are set (secure by default). Deployments that intentionally do not restrict the issuer and/or audience may opt out per axis with sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.issuer=true and/or sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.audience=true.
CWE-1188
Exploitation status
No public exploit
No exploit has been reported in the sources we check.
Exploitation status
- CISA KEV not listed
- VulnCheck KEV not listed
- CISA Vulnrichment exploitation: none
- Indexed PoC none indexed
- EPSS 0.14% chance in 30 days
Waratek protection
Within Waratek scope. In the sources we check, nobody has published exploit code for this CVE or reported it being exploited.
VRT has not found a public code change for this CVE yet.
- Protection none
- Action not pursued
- Review automated Upstream data
- Record active
| Decided by | Nothing to build a rule from yet: no published exploit, no CISA record of exploitation and no source-level change to read |
|---|---|
| Finding | This CVE affects a known product, but nothing published names a fix and nothing published shows an exploit. That is a statement about the evidence, not about the defect — it does not mean the vulnerability is unimportant or unreachable, only that neither of the two things VRT can act on exists. |
References
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://kafka.apache.org/cve-list |
Timeline
Timeline
| Published | 2026-10-28 | By the CVE Program. |
|---|---|---|
| NVD record modified | 2026-11-05 | NVD's own last-modified date for this record. |