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Vendor com.fasterxml.jackson.core✕
Overview 12 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
12matches 0protected0.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 12 100.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 0 0.0% Medium 12 100.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 12 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 3 25.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 9 75.0%
split by peak 6 / month
No exploit published: 12 Medium: 12 not blocked: 12 No public exploit: 9Proof of concept only: 3
Jun 251 No exploit published1 Medium1 not blocked1 Proof of concept only1 Jul 250 Aug 250 Sep 250 Oct 250 Nov 250 Dec 250 Jan 260 Feb 260 Mar 260 Apr 260 May 260 Jun 266 No exploit published6 Medium6 not blocked6 No public exploit6 Jul 262 No exploit published2 Medium2 not blocked2 No public exploit2 Aug 262 No exploit published2 Medium2 not blocked2 Proof of concept only1 No public exploit1 Sep 261 No exploit published1 Medium1 not blocked1 Proof of concept only1
Jul 25Sep 25Nov 25Jan 26Mar 26May 26Jul 26Sep 26
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-83557 Medium 2026-09-01 No exploit published Proof of concept only DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator is the PolymorphicTypeValidator applied automatically whenever @JsonTypeInfo is used without an explicitly configured custom validator. It denies polymorphic resolution only for a fixed set of "unsafe base types", and its isSafeSubType method returns true unconditionally for every base type outside that set. java.lang.Comparable was absent from the list despite being implemented by a very large fraction of JDK and application classes, comparable in breadth to java.io.Serializable, which is on the list for that reason. An application declaring an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated property or class with Comparable as its base type, and no custom PolymorphicTypeValidator, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable. This yields an attacker-controlled object instantiation primitive; a demonstrated case constructs a java.io.File for an arbitrary attacker-chosen path, which becomes path-traversal-adjacent if the application subsequently calls path-sensitive methods on the value. No class implementing Comparable has been identified that yields code execution through deserialization alone. Global Default Typing via activateDefaultTyping is not affected, because that method structurally requires an explicit PolymorphicTypeValidator argument. This affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.11.0 before 2.18.10, from 2.19.0 before 2.21.6, and from 2.22.0 before 2.22.2, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0 before 3.1.6 and from 3.2.0 before 3.2.2. Users should upgrade to 2.18.10, 2.21.6, 2.22.2, 3.1.6, or 3.2.2.
CVE-2026-77310 Medium 2026-08-24 No exploit published No public exploit jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. Prior to versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1 on their respective release lines, the java.net.InetAddress branch of FromStringDeserializer.Std._deserialize() calls InetAddress.getByName() on attacker-controlled input, causing eager DNS resolution during deserialization and enabling DNS-based server-side request forgery and internal-host enumeration. This issue is fixed in versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1.
CVE-2026-18401 Medium 2026-08-04 No exploit published Proof of concept only The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined in StreamReadConstraints (default: 1000 characters). An attacker able to submit JSON to an application that uses the async parser API can supply a number token of arbitrary length, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a denial of service. The synchronous parser enforces this limit correctly, so the constraint is applied inconsistently depending on which parsing API the application uses. Root cause: the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase and related classes never invokes the number length validation methods. Number parsing methods such as _finishNumberIntegralPart() accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length check, then call _valueComplete() to finalize the token. _valueComplete() does not call resetInt() or resetFloat(), which are the methods in ParserBase where validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() are performed. Because that validation step is skipped, maxNumberLength is never enforced on the async code path. Impact: an attacker sending a JSON document containing an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (for example a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application) can cause unbounded allocation in the TextBuffer and an OutOfMemoryError. If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM may additionally be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing, causing CPU-based denial of service. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.5 and from 2.19.0 through 2.21.0, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0 through 3.0.x. Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints -- which defines the maxNumberLength setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq records the lower bound of the affected 2.x range as 2.0.0.
CVE-2026-59889 Medium 2026-07-14 No exploit published No public exploit jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.18.0 until 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1, UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrapped() replays buffered JSON for a @JsonUnwrapped property and calls prop.deserializeAndSet() without a prop.visibleInView(ctxt.getActiveView()) guard, allowing a property annotated with both @JsonView and @JsonUnwrapped to be written from attacker JSON under a less-privileged active view. This issue is fixed in versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1.
CVE-2026-59888 Medium 2026-07-14 No exploit published No public exploit jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.15.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, Java Records using a PropertyNamingStrategy can bypass @JsonIgnore because POJOPropertiesCollector._removeUnwantedIgnorals() records an ignored component under its original implicit name before _renameUsing() applies the naming strategy, allowing the renamed JSON key to be assigned to the Record constructor parameter. This issue is fixed in versions 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.
CVE-2026-54518 Medium 2026-06-23 No exploit published No public exploit jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() replays buffered JSON into creator parameters but never consults prop.visibleInView(activeView). The normal property-based creator path gates creator properties on the active view, but this unwrapped-creator replay path bypasses that check, so a constructor parameter annotated with both @JsonView(AdminView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is populated from attacker JSON even when a more restrictive view is active. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.21.4 and 3.1.4.
CVE-2026-54517 Medium 2026-06-23 No exploit published No public exploit jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, in BeanDeserializer._deserializeUsingPropertyBased, the active-view (@JsonView) filter was applied only to creator properties; the regular property-buffering branch performed no prop.visibleInView(activeView) check. A change making SetterlessProperty.isMerging() return true routed setterless Collection/Map properties through this unguarded path, so a setterless collection annotated with a restricted @JsonView is populated from attacker JSON even when the active view excludes it. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.21.4 and 3.1.4.
CVE-2026-54516 Medium 2026-06-23 No exploit published No public exploit jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, POJOPropertiesCollector._renameProperties() allows a property with @JsonProperty("renamed") on the getter and @JsonIgnore on the setter to be renamed rather than dropped. With MapperFeature.INFER_PROPERTY_MUTATORS enabled (default), the private backing field is retained; during deserialization BeanDeserializerFactory.addBeanProps() sees hasField()==true, builds a FieldProperty, and makes the backing field writable. An attacker supplying the renamed JSON key writes the backing field directly, bypassing the @JsonIgnore on the setter. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.4.
CVE-2026-54515 Medium 2026-06-23 No exploit published No public exploit jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.8.0 until 2.18.9, 2.21.5, and 3.1.4, in BeanDeserializerBase.createContextual(), per-property @JsonIgnoreProperties exclusions are applied by _handleByNameInclusion(), producing a contextual deserializer whose BeanPropertyMap has the ignored properties removed. The subsequent per-property case-insensitivity block (triggered by @JsonFormat(ACCEPT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_PROPERTIES)) rebuilds from this._beanProperties (the original, unfiltered map) instead of contextual._beanProperties, then overwrites the filtered map — restoring every property _handleByNameInclusion had just removed. The ignored property becomes writable again. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.9, 2.21.5, and 3.1.4.
CVE-2026-54514 Medium 2026-06-23 No exploit published No public exploit jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.0.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, JDKFromStringDeserializer constructed InetSocketAddress with new InetSocketAddress(host, port), which performs eager DNS name resolution for hostname inputs at deserialization time. An application that binds untrusted JSON into a type containing an InetSocketAddress field issues an attacker-chosen DNS query during readValue, before any application-level validation or connect logic. The fix uses InetSocketAddress.createUnresolved(host, port), deferring DNS to an explicit connect. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.
CVE-2026-50193 Medium 2026-06-23 No exploit published No public exploit jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.13.0 until 2.14.0, a potential Denial-of-Service exists when attacker sends deeply nested JSON if (and only if) the service reads deeply nested (1000s of levels) JSON as JsonNode (ObjectMapper.readTree()) and writes out same (or modifided) node using JsonNode.toString(). This can consume significant amount of resources with concurrent relatively small requests (1000 nested arrays is 2kB). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.14.0.
CVE-2025-49128 Medium 2025-06-06 No exploit published Proof of concept only Jackson-core contains core low-level incremental ("streaming") parser and generator abstractions used by Jackson Data Processor. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.13.0, a flaw in jackson-core's `JsonLocation._appendSourceDesc` method allows up to 500 bytes of unintended memory content to be included in exception messages. When parsing JSON from a byte array with an offset and length, the exception message incorrectly reads from the beginning of the array instead of the logical payload start. This results in possible information disclosure in systems using pooled or reused buffers, like Netty or Vert.x. This issue was silently fixed in jackson-core version 2.13.0, released on September 30, 2021, via PR #652. All users should upgrade to version 2.13.0 or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, applications can mitigate the issue by disabling exception message exposure to clients to avoid returning parsing exception messages in HTTP responses and/or disabling source inclusion in exceptions to prevent Jackson from embedding any source content in exception messages, avoiding leakage.