Overview 2 matches · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
2matches
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
2
100.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
0
0.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
2
100.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
0
0.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
2
100.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 1 / month
Mar 26Apr 26May 26Jun 26Jul 26Aug 26Sep 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-55846 | Medium | 2026-09-14 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | Allure 2 is the version 2.x branch of Allure Report, a multi-language test reporting tool. Prior to 2.39.0, the HTTP server started by allure serve and allure open uses URI.getPath() in Commands.setUpServer() in allure-commandline/src/main/java/io/qameta/allure/Commands.java and passes the percent-decoded request path to reportDirectory.resolve() without normalizing the result or confirming that it remains inside that directory. An unauthenticated client that can reach the server can submit parent-directory segments, including percent-encoded segments, and cause serveFile() to return any regular file readable by the Allure process. The server binds to localhost by default, but the --host option can expose it to other systems, and local users, adjacent containers, or browser-origin attacks may reach a local listener. This can disclose credentials, configuration, source code, build secrets, and other CI/CD data. This issue is fixed in version 2.39.0. |
| CVE-2026-33166 | High | 2026-03-20 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | Allure 2 is the version 2.x branch of Allure Report, a multi-language test reporting tool. The Allure report generator prior to version 2.38.0 is vulnerable to an arbitrary file read via path traversal when processing test results. An attacker can craft a malicious result file (-result.json, -container.json, or .plist) that points an attachment source to a sensitive file on the host system. During report generation, Allure will resolve these paths and include the sensitive files in the final report. Version 2.38.0 fixes the issue. |