Overview 8 matches · 0 in Waratek scope · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
8matches
0in Waratek scope0.0%
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
1public PoC12.5%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
8
100.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
8
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
1
12.5%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
7
87.5%
split by
peak 3 / quarter
Q1 201
Not applicable1
Low1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q2 200
Q3 200
Q4 200
Q1 213
Not applicable3
Low3
not blocked3
Proof of concept only1
No public exploit2
Q2 213
Not applicable3
Low3
not blocked3
No public exploit3
Q3 210
Q4 210
Q1 220
Q2 220
Q3 220
Q4 220
Q1 230
Q2 230
Q3 230
Q4 230
Q1 241
Not applicable1
Low1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q1 20Q3 20Q1 21Q3 21Q1 22Q3 22Q1 23Q3 23Q1 24
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-6068 | Low | 2024-03-04 | Not applicable | No public exploit | On affected 7130 Series FPGA platforms running MOS and recent versions of the MultiAccess FPGA, application of ACL’s may result in incorrect operation of the configured ACL for a port resulting in some packets that should be denied being permitted and some |
| CVE-2020-24588 | Low | 2021-05-11 | Not applicable | No public exploit | The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets. |
| CVE-2020-24587 | Low | 2021-05-11 | Not applicable | No public exploit | The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed. |
| CVE-2020-24586 | Low | 2021-05-11 | Not applicable | No public exploit | The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that received fragments be cleared from memory after (re)connecting to a network. Under the right circumstances, when another device sends fragmented frames encrypted using WEP, CCMP, or GCMP, this can be abused to inject arbitrary network packets and/or exfiltrate user data. |
| CVE-2020-25686 | Low | 2021-01-20 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | A flaw was found in dnsmasq before version 2.83. When receiving a query, dnsmasq does not check for an existing pending request for the same name and forwards a new request. By default, a maximum of 150 pending queries can be sent to upstream servers, so there can be at most 150 queries for the same name. This flaw allows an off-path attacker on the network to substantially reduce the number of attempts that it would have to perform to forge a reply and have it accepted by dnsmasq. This issue is mentioned in the "Birthday Attacks" section of RFC5452. If chained with CVE-2020-25684, the attack complexity of a successful attack is reduced. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data integrity. |
| CVE-2020-25685 | Low | 2021-01-20 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A flaw was found in dnsmasq before version 2.83. When getting a reply from a forwarded query, dnsmasq checks in forward.c:reply_query(), which is the forwarded query that matches the reply, by only using a weak hash of the query name. Due to the weak hash (CRC32 when dnsmasq is compiled without DNSSEC, SHA-1 when it is) this flaw allows an off-path attacker to find several different domains all having the same hash, substantially reducing the number of attempts they would have to perform to forge a reply and get it accepted by dnsmasq. This is in contrast with RFC5452, which specifies that the query name is one of the attributes of a query that must be used to match a reply. This flaw could be abused to perform a DNS Cache Poisoning attack. If chained with CVE-2020-25684 the attack complexity of a successful attack is reduced. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data integrity. |
| CVE-2020-25684 | Low | 2021-01-20 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A flaw was found in dnsmasq before version 2.83. When getting a reply from a forwarded query, dnsmasq checks in the forward.c:reply_query() if the reply destination address/port is used by the pending forwarded queries. However, it does not use the address/port to retrieve the exact forwarded query, substantially reducing the number of attempts an attacker on the network would have to perform to forge a reply and get it accepted by dnsmasq. This issue contrasts with RFC5452, which specifies a query's attributes that all must be used to match a reply. This flaw allows an attacker to perform a DNS Cache Poisoning attack. If chained with CVE-2020-25685 or CVE-2020-25686, the attack complexity of a successful attack is reduced. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data integrity. |
| CVE-2015-6815 | Low | 2020-01-31 | Not applicable | No public exploit | The process_tx_desc function in hw/net/e1000.c in QEMU before 2.4.0.1 does not properly process transmit descriptor data when sending a network packet, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and guest crash) via unspecified vectors. |