Overview 3 matches · 0 in Waratek scope · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches
0in Waratek scope0.0%
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
3
100.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
3
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
2
66.7%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
1
33.3%
split by
peak 2 / quarter
Q4 23Q1 24Q2 24Q3 24Q4 24Q1 25Q2 25Q3 25
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-58157 | High | 2025-08-29 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | gnark is a zero-knowledge proof system framework. In version 0.12.0, there is a potential denial of service vulnerability when computing scalar multiplication is using the fake-GLV algorithm. This is because the algorithm didn't converge quickly enough for some of the inputs. This issue has been patched in version 0.13.0. |
| CVE-2025-57801 | High | 2025-08-22 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | gnark is a zero-knowledge proof system framework. In versions prior to 0.14.0, the Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go used the S value from a signature without asserting that 0 ≤ S < order, leading to a signature malleability vulnerability. Because gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from R and S, this enables signature malleability and may allow double spending. This issue has been addressed in version 0.14.0. |
| CVE-2023-44378 | High | 2023-10-09 | Not applicable | No public exploit | gnark is a zk-SNARK library that offers a high-level API to design circuits. Prior to version 0.9.0, for some in-circuit values, it is possible to construct two valid decomposition to bits. In addition to the canonical decomposition of `a`, for small values there exists a second decomposition for `a+r` (where `r` is the modulus the values are being reduced by). The second decomposition was possible due to overflowing the field where the values are defined. Upgrading to version 0.9.0 should fix the issue without needing to change the calls to value comparison methods. |