Overview 2 matches · 0 protected · 1 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
1
50.0%
No exploit published
1
50.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
1
50.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
1
50.0%
split by
peak 1 / quarter
Q4 18Q1 19Q2 19Q3 19Q4 19Q1 20Q2 20
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2020-9480 | Critical | 2020-06-23 | Mitigation candidate | Exploited | In Apache Spark 2.4.5 and earlier, a standalone resource manager's master may be configured to require authentication (spark.authenticate) via a shared secret. When enabled, however, a specially-crafted RPC to the master can succeed in starting an application's resources on the Spark cluster, even without the shared key. This can be leveraged to execute shell commands on the host machine. This does not affect Spark clusters using other resource managers (YARN, Mesos, etc). |
| CVE-2018-17190 | Critical | 2018-11-19 | No exploit published | No public exploit | In all versions of Apache Spark, its standalone resource manager accepts code to execute on a 'master' host, that then runs that code on 'worker' hosts. The master itself does not, by design, execute user code. A specially-crafted request to the master can, however, cause the master to execute code too. Note that this does not affect standalone clusters with authentication enabled. While the master host typically has less outbound access to other resources than a worker, the execution of code on the master is nevertheless unexpected. |