Overview 7 matches · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
1
14.3%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
6
85.7%
blocked by ARMR today
1
14.3%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
6
85.7%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
7
100.0%
split by
peak 4 / quarter
Q4 171
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q1 180
Q2 180
Q3 180
Q4 180
Q1 190
Q2 190
Q3 190
Q4 190
Q1 204
No exploit published4
High4
not blocked4
No public exploit4
Q2 200
Q3 200
Q4 200
Q1 210
Q2 211
Protected by Waratek1
High1
blocked by ARMR today1
No public exploit1
Q3 210
Q4 211
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q4 17Q2 18Q4 18Q2 19Q4 19Q2 20Q4 20Q2 21Q4 21
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-43807 | High | 2021-12-14 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Opencast is an Open Source Lecture Capture & Video Management for Education. Opencast versions prior to 9.10 allow HTTP method spoofing, allowing to change the assumed HTTP method via URL parameter. This allows attackers to turn HTTP GET requests into PUT requests or an HTTP form to send DELETE requests. This bypasses restrictions otherwise put on these types of requests and aids in cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks, which would otherwise not be possible. The vulnerability allows attackers to craft links or forms which may change the server state. This issue is fixed in Opencast 9.10 and 10.0. You can mitigate the problem by setting the `SameSite=Strict` attribute for your cookies. If this is a viable option for you depends on your integrations. We strongly recommend updating in any case. |
| CVE-2021-32623 | High | 2021-06-16 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Opencast is a free and open source solution for automated video capture and distribution. Versions of Opencast prior to 9.6 are vulnerable to the billion laughs attack, which allows an attacker to easily execute a (seemingly permanent) denial of service attack, essentially taking down Opencast using a single HTTP request. To exploit this, users need to have ingest privileges, limiting the group of potential attackers The problem has been fixed in Opencast 9.6. There is no known workaround for this issue. |
| CVE-2020-5230 | High | 2020-01-30 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Opencast before 8.1 and 7.6 allows almost arbitrary identifiers for media packages and elements to be used. This can be problematic for operation and security since such identifiers are sometimes used for file system operations which may lead to an attacker being able to escape working directories and write files to other locations. In addition, Opencast's Id.toString(…) vs Id.compact(…) behavior, the latter trying to mitigate some of the file system problems, can cause errors due to identifier mismatch since an identifier may unintentionally change. This issue is fixed in Opencast 7.6 and 8.1. |
| CVE-2020-5229 | High | 2020-01-30 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Opencast before 8.1 stores passwords using the rather outdated and cryptographically insecure MD5 hash algorithm. Furthermore, the hashes are salted using the username instead of a random salt, causing hashes for users with the same username and password to collide which is problematic especially for popular users like the default `admin` user. This essentially means that for an attacker, it might be feasible to reconstruct a user's password given access to these hashes. Note that attackers needing access to the hashes means that they must gain access to the database in which these are stored first to be able to start cracking the passwords. The problem is addressed in Opencast 8.1 which now uses the modern and much stronger bcrypt password hashing algorithm for storing passwords. Note, that old hashes remain MD5 until the password is updated. For a list of users whose password hashes are stored using MD5, take a look at the `/user-utils/users/md5.json` REST endpoint. |
| CVE-2020-5228 | High | 2020-01-30 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Opencast before 8.1 and 7.6 allows unauthorized public access to all media and metadata by default via OAI-PMH. OAI-PMH is part of the default workflow and is activated by default, requiring active user intervention of users to protect media. This leads to users unknowingly handing out public access to events without their knowledge. The problem has been addressed in Opencast 7.6 and 8.1 where the OAI-PMH endpoint is configured to require users with `ROLE_ADMIN` by default. In addition to this, Opencast 9 removes the OAI-PMH publication from the default workflow, making the publication a conscious decision users have to make by updating their workflows. |
| CVE-2020-5222 | High | 2020-01-30 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Opencast before 7.6 and 8.1 enables a remember-me cookie based on a hash created from the username, password, and an additional system key. This means that an attacker getting access to a remember-me token for one server can get access to all servers which allow log-in using the same credentials without ever needing the credentials. This problem is fixed in Opencast 7.6 and Opencast 8.1 |
| CVE-2017-1000217 | High | 2017-11-17 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Opencast 2.3.2 and older versions are vulnerable to script injections through media and metadata in the player and media module resulting in arbitrary code execution, fixed in 2.3.3 and 3.0. |