Overview 2 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
2matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
2
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
1
50.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
1
50.0%
split by
peak 1 / month
Apr 26May 26Jun 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-45300 | High | 2026-06-05 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | The AsyncHttpClient (AHC) library allows Java applications to easily execute HTTP requests and asynchronously process HTTP responses. Versions on the 2.x branch prior to 2.15.0 and the 3.x branch prior to 3.0.10 leak `Cookie` headers to cross-origin redirect targets. When following a redirect to a different origin, the `propagatedHeaders()` method in `Redirect30xInterceptor.java` strips `Authorization` and `Proxy-Authorization` headers but does not strip the `Cookie` header, causing session cookies and other sensitive cookie values to be sent to attacker-controlled servers. Versions 2.15.0 and 3.0.10 patch the issue. |
| CVE-2026-40490 | Medium | 2026-04-18 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The AsyncHttpClient (AHC) library allows Java applications to easily execute HTTP requests and asynchronously process HTTP responses. When redirect following is enabled (followRedirect(true)), versions of AsyncHttpClient prior to 3.0.9 and 2.14.5 forward Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers along with Realm credentials to arbitrary redirect targets regardless of domain, scheme, or port changes. This leaks credentials on cross-domain redirects and HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades. Additionally, even when stripAuthorizationOnRedirect is set to true, the Realm object containing plaintext credentials is still propagated to the redirect request, causing credential re-generation for Basic and Digest authentication schemes via NettyRequestFactory. An attacker who controls a redirect target (via open redirect, DNS rebinding, or MITM on HTTP) can capture Bearer tokens, Basic auth credentials, or any other Authorization header value. The fix in versions 3.0.9 and 2.14.5 automatically strips Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers and clears Realm credentials whenever a redirect crosses origin boundaries (different scheme, host, or port) or downgrades from HTTPS to HTTP. For users unable to upgrade, set `(stripAuthorizationOnRedirect(true))` in the client config and avoid using Realm-based authentication with redirect following enabled. Note that `(stripAuthorizationOnRedirect(true))` alone is insufficient on versions prior to 3.0.9 and 2.14.5 because the Realm bypass still re-generates credentials. Alternatively, disable redirect following (`followRedirect(false)`) and handle redirects manually with origin validation. |