Overview 3 matches · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
1
33.3%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
2
66.7%
blocked by ARMR today
1
33.3%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
66.7%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
3
100.0%
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-39410 | High | 2023-09-29 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | When deserializing untrusted or corrupted data, it is possible for a reader to consume memory beyond the allowed constraints and thus lead to out of memory on the system. This issue affects Java applications using Apache Avro Java SDK up to and including 1.11.2. Users should update to apache-avro version 1.11.3 which addresses this issue. |
| CVE-2023-42503 | Medium | 2023-09-14 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Improper Input Validation, Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in Apache Commons Compress in TAR parsing.This issue affects Apache Commons Compress: from 1.22 before 1.24.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.24.0, which fixes the issue. A third party can create a malformed TAR file by manipulating file modification times headers, which when parsed with Apache Commons Compress, will cause a denial of service issue via CPU consumption. In version 1.22 of Apache Commons Compress, support was added for file modification times with higher precision (issue # COMPRESS-612 [1]). The format for the PAX extended headers carrying this data consists of two numbers separated by a period [2], indicating seconds and subsecond precision (for example “1647221103.5998539”). The impacted fields are “atime”, “ctime”, “mtime” and “LIBARCHIVE.creationtime”. No input validation is performed prior to the parsing of header values. Parsing of these numbers uses the BigDecimal [3] class from the JDK which has a publicly known algorithmic complexity issue when doing operations on large numbers, causing denial of service (see issue # JDK-6560193 [4]). A third party can manipulate file time headers in a TAR file by placing a number with a very long fraction (300,000 digits) or a number with exponent notation (such as “9e9999999”) within a file modification time header, and the parsing of files with these headers will take hours instead of seconds, leading to a denial of service via exhaustion of CPU resources. This issue is similar to CVE-2012-2098 [5]. [1]: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/COMPRESS-612 [2]: https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/utilities/pax.html#tag_20_92_13_05 [3]: https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/java/math/BigDecimal.html [4]: https://bugs.openjdk.org/browse/JDK-6560193 [5]: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-2098 Only applications using CompressorStreamFactory class (with auto-detection of file types), TarArchiveInputStream and TarFile classes to parse TAR files are impacted. Since this code was introduced in v1.22, only that version and later versions are impacted. |
| CVE-2023-40743 | Critical | 2023-09-05 | No exploit published | No public exploit | ** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** When integrating Apache Axis 1.x in an application, it may not have been obvious that looking up a service through "ServiceFactory.getService" allows potentially dangerous lookup mechanisms such as LDAP. When passing untrusted input to this API method, this could expose the application to DoS, SSRF and even attacks leading to RCE. As Axis 1 has been EOL we recommend you migrate to a different SOAP engine, such as Apache Axis 2/Java. As a workaround, you may review your code to verify no untrusted or unsanitized input is passed to "ServiceFactory.getService", or by applying the patch from https://github.com/apache/axis-axis1-java/commit/7e66753427466590d6def0125e448d2791723210 . The Apache Axis project does not expect to create an Axis 1.x release fixing this problem, though contributors that would like to work towards this are welcome. |