Overview 3 matches · 2 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
2
66.7%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
1
33.3%
blocked by ARMR today
2
66.7%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
1
33.3%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
3
100.0%
split by
peak 3 / month
Sep 19
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2019-10071 | Critical | 2019-09-16 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The code which checks HMAC in form submissions used String.equals() for comparisons, which results in a timing side channel for the comparison of the HMAC signatures. This could lead to remote code execution if an attacker is able to determine the correct signature for their payload. The comparison should be done with a constant time algorithm instead. |
| CVE-2019-0207 | High | 2019-09-16 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Tapestry processes assets `/assets/ctx` using classes chain `StaticFilesFilter -> AssetDispatcher -> ContextResource`, which doesn't filter the character `\`, so attacker can perform a path traversal attack to read any files on Windows platform. |
| CVE-2019-0195 | Critical | 2019-09-16 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Manipulating classpath asset file URLs, an attacker could guess the path to a known file in the classpath and have it downloaded. If the attacker found the file with the value of the tapestry.hmac-passphrase configuration symbol, most probably the webapp's AppModule class, the value of this symbol could be used to craft a Java deserialization attack, thus running malicious injected Java code. The vector would be the t:formdata parameter from the Form component. |