Overview 6 matches · 0 protected · 4 exploited · 4 CISA KEV · 5 public PoC · 5 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
6
100.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
6
100.0%
not blocked
0
0.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
4
66.7%
Working exploit published
1
16.7%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
1
16.7%
split by
peak 2 / year
20162
Protected by Waratek2
Critical2
partly blocked2
Exploited1
Working exploit published1
20172
Protected by Waratek2
High2
partly blocked2
Exploited2
20180
20191
Protected by Waratek1
High1
partly blocked1
Exploited1
20200
20210
20220
20230
20240
20250
20261
Protected by Waratek1
Medium1
partly blocked1
No public exploit1
20162017201820192020202120222023202420252026
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-63317 | Medium | 2026-07-24 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Arbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP Versions Affected: - before 2.5.10 - before 3.0.0-M5 Description: Three code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type. The affected paths are: (1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly. (2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input). (3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not drop-in remote code execution. T Mitigation: Upgrade to a fixed release. The fix routes all three paths through ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(...), which consults a package-prefix allowlist before Class.forName() is invoked, so a disallowed class is never loaded, initialized, or constructed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing feature generator factories, object stream factories, or string interners outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure all model files and format names are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors. |
| CVE-2019-17558 | High | 2019-12-30 | Protected by Waratek | Exploited | Apache Solr 5.0.0 to Apache Solr 8.3.1 are vulnerable to a Remote Code Execution through the VelocityResponseWriter. A Velocity template can be provided through Velocity templates in a configset `velocity/` directory or as a parameter. A user defined configset could contain renderable, potentially malicious, templates. Parameter provided templates are disabled by default, but can be enabled by setting `params.resource.loader.enabled` by defining a response writer with that setting set to `true`. Defining a response writer requires configuration API access. Solr 8.4 removed the params resource loader entirely, and only enables the configset-provided template rendering when the configset is `trusted` (has been uploaded by an authenticated user). |
| CVE-2017-12617 | High | 2017-10-04 | Protected by Waratek | Exploited | When running Apache Tomcat versions 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.0, 8.5.0 to 8.5.22, 8.0.0.RC1 to 8.0.46 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.81 with HTTP PUTs enabled (e.g. via setting the readonly initialisation parameter of the Default servlet to false) it was possible to upload a JSP file to the server via a specially crafted request. This JSP could then be requested and any code it contained would be executed by the server. |
| CVE-2017-12615 | High | 2017-09-19 | Protected by Waratek | Exploited | When running Apache Tomcat 7.0.0 to 7.0.79 on Windows with HTTP PUTs enabled (e.g. via setting the readonly initialisation parameter of the Default to false) it was possible to upload a JSP file to the server via a specially crafted request. This JSP could then be requested and any code it contained would be executed by the server. |
| CVE-2016-4437 | Critical | 2016-06-07 | Protected by Waratek | Exploited | Apache Shiro before 1.2.5, when a cipher key has not been configured for the "remember me" feature, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or bypass intended access restrictions via an unspecified request parameter. |
| CVE-2016-3087 | Critical | 2016-06-07 | Protected by Waratek | Working exploit published | Apache Struts 2.3.19 to 2.3.20.2, 2.3.21 to 2.3.24.1, and 2.3.25 to 2.3.28, when Dynamic Method Invocation is enabled, allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via vectors related to an ! (exclamation mark) operator to the REST Plugin. |