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Protection: Full✕Published from 2026-10-01✕Vendor apache✕
Overview 9 matches · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
9matches 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 9 100.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 0 0.0%
Critical 3 33.3% High 2 22.2% Medium 4 44.4% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 9 100.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 0 0.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 3 33.3% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 6 66.7%
split by peak 9 / month
Protected by Waratek: 9 Medium: 4High: 2Critical: 3 blocked by ARMR today: 9 No public exploit: 6Proof of concept only: 3
Oct 26
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-95629 Medium 2026-10-26 Protected by Waratek No public exploit Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.15.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.2. DoclingProducer runs the external docling tool in CLI mode, the default, and tells it where to write the converted document through the --output flag. When the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header was set, addOutputDirectoryArguments handed its value to that flag verbatim: the value was not normalized, an absolute path or a path containing .. segments was accepted as given, and no endpoint option could confine it to a directory. The custom-argument validation added by the fix for CVE-2026-40047 refuses the --output and -o flags in the CamelDoclingCustomArguments header and tells callers to choose the output directory with this header instead, so the one value that decides where docling writes reached the command line without any of the checks applied to custom arguments. Docling writes the conversion result, as Markdown, HTML, JSON or text, into that directory, naming the file after the input file, and the producer afterwards removes only its own temporary directory, so the file is left in place. A party able to set the header could therefore have conversion output created in any directory the Camel process can write to. The content of such a file is the conversion of the document carried by the message, so it is shaped by whoever supplies that document without being written byte for byte, and when the document content arrives in the message body the producer stores it under a random temporary name, which the output file then carries. The header belongs to the Camel header namespace, which consumers applying Camel's default header filtering, such as the JMS and Kafka consumers, remove from incoming messages, so the issue is reached where a route forwards externally influenced values into the header or where a consumer maps incoming headers without that filtering. The docling-serve mode does not use the header. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.2. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The fix adds an outputBaseDirectory endpoint option that is unset by default, so after upgrading, set it on every docling endpoint whose CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header can carry a value influenced from outside the deployment; without it the header is normalized but can still name any directory. The 4.15.x to 4.17.x and 4.19.x to 4.21.x release lines reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on them must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, do not build the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header from values that originate outside the deployment, remove that header from messages that arrive from outside before they reach a docling endpoint, and make sure that consumers which map incoming message headers drop the Camel header namespace, so that only the route itself chooses the output directory.
CVE-2026-95628 Medium 2026-10-26 Protected by Waratek No public exploit Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.15.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.2. DoclingProducer builds the command line of the external docling tool and appends to it the custom arguments supplied in the CamelDoclingCustomArguments header, a list of strings whose flags the fix for CVE-2026-40047 restricted to an allowlist. That fix also introduced validatePathSafety to keep path-like argument values inside the intended directory, but the method only looked for relative traversal: it rejected a value containing a traversal sequence such as ../ and a value whose normalized form still held a .. element. It never checked whether a value was an absolute path, and an absolute path without traversal segments contains neither, so it passed unchanged. Every path-like value went through this check, whether it was a separate list element following its flag or was attached to the flag after an equals sign, so an absolute path was accepted in either form, for example as the directory given to the allowlisted --artifacts-path flag, which tells docling where to find its model artifacts. Such a value reached the docling command line as given, so a party able to choose the custom arguments could point the docling process at any directory the Camel process can access, outside the working directory that the check was meant to keep path values in, which is the outcome the CVE-2026-40047 fix set out to prevent. Only the CLI mode, which is the default, passes custom arguments to docling. The header belongs to the Camel header namespace, which consumers applying Camel's default header filtering, such as the JMS and Kafka consumers, remove from incoming messages, so the issue is reached where a route forwards externally influenced values into the header or where a consumer maps incoming headers without that filtering. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.2. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.15.x to 4.17.x and 4.19.x to 4.21.x release lines reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on them must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, do not build the CamelDoclingCustomArguments header from values that originate outside the deployment, remove that header from messages that arrive from outside before they reach a docling endpoint, and make sure that consumers which map incoming message headers drop the Camel header namespace, so that only the route itself chooses the custom arguments.
CVE-2026-88900 High 2026-10-19 Protected by Waratek No public exploit Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Camel-Jgroups component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. JGroupsEndpoint.createExchange(Message), which CamelJGroupsReceiver calls for every message the jgroups consumer receives before the exchange is routed, set the exchange body from org.jgroups.Message.getObject(). For an ObjectMessage, which is the message type the Camel jgroups producer sends, JGroups Java-deserializes the payload through an ObjectInputStream on its own receive thread as the message arrives, and getObject() returns the resulting object. No java.io.ObjectInputFilter was applied on that path unless the deployment had set a JVM-wide serialization filter: camel-jgroups installed none, and the JGroups versions shipped with the affected releases apply none of their own, so any serializable class on the application classpath could be instantiated and its deserialization callbacks run. Unless a channel or the channelProperties option is configured, the consumer creates its channel with new JChannel(), the stock JGroups protocol stack, which multicasts over UDP without the AUTH protocol and without encryption, so any host able to reach the cluster's multicast group or bind port can join the cluster and send messages to the consumer without credentials. Such a host could send a crafted serialized object that leads to remote code execution in the Camel process when a usable deserialization gadget chain is present on the classpath, and no non-default option was required on the consumer. Because JGroups materializes the object before Camel's receiver runs, a check performed by Camel can only inspect the deserialized result and cannot stop code that runs during deserialization, so closing the issue also requires a control that applies before the payload is read, as described in the mitigation. Exploitation requires network access to the cluster's multicast group or bind port, which with the default UDP multicast transport means a host on an adjacent network, and a usable gadget chain on the classpath, which is why the severity is assessed as high rather than critical. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier, and the 4.15.x to 4.17.x and 4.19.x to 4.21.x release lines, reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release.
CVE-2026-85250 High 2026-10-19 Protected by Waratek No public exploit Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference vulnerability in Apache Camel XPath component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. With documentType set to InputSource, XPathBuilder handed the payload straight to javax.xml.xpath, which builds a DocumentBuilder of its own using the JDK defaults. The hardening applied to Camel's default document type was therefore bypassed: a DOCTYPE declaration that is refused on the default type was accepted here, and the external entity it declared was resolved and expanded into the evaluated document. An external sender whose XML reaches such an expression could read files readable by the Camel process and cause the process to issue requests to hosts it names. The two document types disagreeing on parser configuration is what made this reachable, since a deployment choosing InputSource for streaming reasons had no indication it was also choosing a weaker parser. Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. The InputSource document type now goes through the same hardened parser as the default type, so a DOCTYPE is refused. Note that it also shares that type's documented escape hatch: the same DocumentBuilderFactory system properties that relax the default type relax this one, so a deployment that has set them remains unprotected by design. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, do not use documentType=InputSource on expressions evaluated over untrusted XML; the default document type already refuses a DOCTYPE.
CVE-2026-85245 Medium 2026-10-19 Protected by Waratek No public exploit Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session vulnerability in Apache Camel Thrift component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The Thrift data format unmarshalled incoming data into the shared defaultInstance of the target type rather than into a fresh copy, and returned that shared object as the exchange body. Because the instance is shared process-wide, state written while unmarshalling one message stayed on the object and was visible to every later message that used the same type. Fields absent from a later payload retained the previous message's values, so content belonging to one sender could be read while processing another sender's message, and concurrent exchanges could observe each other's partially written state. In a deployment that serves more than one tenant or user through the same route, that is disclosure of one party's data to another. Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Unmarshalling now deserializes into a copy, so each exchange gets its own instance and no state carries between messages. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, copy the unmarshalled body into a new instance immediately after the data format runs, and do not retain references to the returned object.
CVE-2026-79986 Critical 2026-10-19 Protected by Waratek Proof of concept only Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Apache Camel Azure Files component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The Camel remote-file consumers poll a directory on a remote server and build the absolute remote path of each file by concatenating the configured directory with the file name reported in the server's directory listing. That concatenation (FtpUtils.absoluteFilePath and GenericFileConsumer) applied no lexical normalization and no check that the result stayed inside the directory being polled, and the resulting path became the operand for every subsequent remote operation on the file: retrieval (FtpOperations.retrieveFile / SftpOperations, reached from GenericFileConsumer where the retrieve name is taken verbatim from GenericFile.getAbsoluteFilePath), deletion when delete=true (GenericFileDeleteProcessStrategy), and renaming when move, preMove, moveFailed or readLock=rename is configured (GenericFileProcessStrategySupport and GenericFileRenameExclusiveReadLockStrategy). Neither isValidFile nor isMatched performed any containment check. A listing entry that is not a single path segment therefore resolved to a path outside the configured polling directory, causing Camel to read, delete or rename files outside it using the endpoint's own credentials. A listing name is not route-controlled data. It is supplied by the remote server, and the FTP control channel carries no integrity protection at all, so an on-path attacker can rewrite a LIST response without holding any credentials; a compromised, malicious or multi-tenant server, or a server backed by a virtual filesystem, can emit such a name directly. Retrieval is reachable in a default consumer configuration, since the remote consumers download every listed file; deletion and renaming additionally require one of the disposition options above, all of which are common. Escape from the directory Camel was configured to poll is unconditional, while escape from the server's own account boundary additionally depends on whether that server confines the account. The jailStartingDirectory option, which is documented as restricting Camel to the starting directory and is enabled by default, governed producer writes and, since the localWorkDirectory containment work, consumer downloads to the local work directory - but it did not constrain this remote operand, so its name and description claimed a boundary that was not enforced here. The same entry point had already been recognised on the local side: the localWorkDirectory download path was constrained so that a remote file name containing parent-directory segments could not resolve outside the local work directory. The remote operand was the remaining half of that surface. This artifact provides the azure-files scheme. Its consumer derives from the same RemoteFileConsumer base class and composed the remote path through a plain concatenation helper, so it inherited the same unconstrained resolution. Reaching it requires a listing name that is not a single path segment, which the Azure Files REST service does not normally return; the exposure was corrected on the same basis as the other remote-file consumers rather than from a demonstrated proof of concept against this scheme. Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x stream reached end of life and does not receive this fix; users on it should move to a supported releases stream.
CVE-2026-79983 Critical 2026-10-19 Protected by Waratek Proof of concept only Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Apache Camel FTP component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The Camel remote-file consumers poll a directory on a remote server and build the absolute remote path of each file by concatenating the configured directory with the file name reported in the server's directory listing. That concatenation (FtpUtils.absoluteFilePath and GenericFileConsumer) applied no lexical normalization and no check that the result stayed inside the directory being polled, and the resulting path became the operand for every subsequent remote operation on the file: retrieval (FtpOperations.retrieveFile / SftpOperations, reached from GenericFileConsumer where the retrieve name is taken verbatim from GenericFile.getAbsoluteFilePath), deletion when delete=true (GenericFileDeleteProcessStrategy), and renaming when move, preMove, moveFailed or readLock=rename is configured (GenericFileProcessStrategySupport and GenericFileRenameExclusiveReadLockStrategy). Neither isValidFile nor isMatched performed any containment check. A listing entry that is not a single path segment therefore resolved to a path outside the configured polling directory, causing Camel to read, delete or rename files outside it using the endpoint's own credentials. A listing name is not route-controlled data. It is supplied by the remote server, and the FTP control channel carries no integrity protection at all, so an on-path attacker can rewrite a LIST response without holding any credentials; a compromised, malicious or multi-tenant server, or a server backed by a virtual filesystem, can emit such a name directly. Retrieval is reachable in a default consumer configuration, since the remote consumers download every listed file; deletion and renaming additionally require one of the disposition options above, all of which are common. Escape from the directory Camel was configured to poll is unconditional, while escape from the server's own account boundary additionally depends on whether that server confines the account. The jailStartingDirectory option, which is documented as restricting Camel to the starting directory and is enabled by default, governed producer writes and, since the localWorkDirectory containment work, consumer downloads to the local work directory - but it did not constrain this remote operand, so its name and description claimed a boundary that was not enforced here. The same entry point had already been recognised on the local side: the localWorkDirectory download path was constrained so that a remote file name containing parent-directory segments could not resolve outside the local work directory. The remote operand was the remaining half of that surface. This artifact provides the ftp, ftps and sftp schemes, all of which are affected. The reporter demonstrated the issue end to end against an ftp endpoint, driving a Camel route with a malicious server whose LIST response named a file outside the polled directory. Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x stream reached end of life and does not receive this fix; users on it should move to a supported releases stream.
CVE-2026-78162 Critical 2026-10-19 Protected by Waratek Proof of concept only Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The camel-hazelcast component applies a default Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig to the instances it creates from its own configuration, a protection introduced by CVE-2026-43865. That change did not reach two of the configuration paths Camel builds itself, so those paths continued to create Hazelcast instances whose Java deserialization is unrestricted. ReplicatedHazelcastAggregationRepository extends HazelcastAggregationRepository but overrides doStart() without calling super.doStart(), keeping its own copy of the bootstrap block, and therefore never received the filter: a route using it without supplying a hazelcastInstance starts a Hazelcast member that deserializes values read from the backing ReplicatedMap with no class restriction. HazelcastDefaultComponent#getOrCreateHzClientInstance() builds its own ClientConfig when hazelcastMode=client is selected and neither a referenced ClientConfig nor hazelcastConfigUri is supplied, and likewise applied no filter, so client-mode endpoints behaved differently from node-mode endpoints for an otherwise identical configuration. In both cases an attacker able to publish into the Hazelcast cluster that the affected instance is attached to can cause a serialized Java object of their choosing to be deserialized inside Hazelcast's own serialization layer, before Camel processes the exchange, resulting in remote code execution. Hazelcast clusters have neither authentication nor TLS enabled by default. Selecting client mode is a topology choice rather than a security option, so neither path required the deployment to opt in to unsafe behaviour. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, supply an explicit Hazelcast configuration carrying a JavaSerializationFilterConfig, or inject a pre-built HazelcastInstance, since a user-supplied configuration is never overwritten by Camel. Alternatively set the JVM-wide filter -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.;java.;javax.;org.apache.camel.;!* and enable Hazelcast cluster authentication and TLS to restrict who can reach the cluster.
CVE-2026-92415 Medium 2026-10-07 Protected by Waratek No public exploit — Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code vulnerability in Apache Jackrabbit's WebDAV/Davex client. A malicious WebDAV/DavEx server, or an attacker able to intercept the connection, can cause the client to instantiate arbitrary classes from its classpath, which can lead to arbitrary file creation or truncation. Only applications that use jackrabbit-spi2dav (directly or through jackrabbit-jcr2dav) to connect to a remote repository are affected. Jackrabbit servers are not affected. Category: unsafe reflection on wire data (HIGH). This issue affects Apache Jackrabbit: from 2.23.0 through 2.23.5, from 2.22.0 through 2.22.4, from 2.20.0 through 2.20.17. Users are recommended to upgrade to versions 2.23.6, 2.22.5, or 2.20.18 which fix the issue.