Overview 6 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
6matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
6
100.0%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
0
0.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
6
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
6
100.0%
split by
peak 2 / year
20191
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
20200
20211
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
20220
20230
20241
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
20251
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
20262
No exploit published2
Medium2
not blocked2
No public exploit2
20192020202120222023202420252026
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-84501 | Medium | 2026-09-16 | No exploit published | No public exploit | An unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fake log lines into Apache ZooKeeper's operational log by sending a crafted add_auth("ensemble", ...) request containing newline characters (\n). When the ensemble name doesn't match, EnsembleAuthenticationProvider.handleAuthentication() logs the raw, unsanitized name via LOG.warn(). Because SLF4J's {} placeholder preserves embedded newlines, the attacker can forge complete log entries — with arbitrary timestamps, log levels, class names, and messages — that are visually indistinguishable from genuine ZooKeeper log output. This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.8.7 or 3.9.6, which fixes the issue. |
| CVE-2026-84439 | Medium | 2026-09-16 | No exploit published | No public exploit | When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.audit.enable=true), an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper's audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters (\t) embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated key=value format, the injected tabs are parsed as legitimate field separators, allowing the attacker to spoof audit results (e.g., injecting result=success), forge operation types, and corrupt forensic evidence. A log injection vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper allows a client that can call setACL to inject forged key-value fields into zookeeper_audit.log. When audit logging is enabled, the server serializes attacker-controlled digest ACL ids into the acl= audit field without escaping tab characters. Because audit events are emitted as tab-separated key=value records, a crafted ACL id can make one successful setAcl event appear to contain forged fields such as operation=delete and znode=/forged. This undermines the integrity of downstream audit parsing, alerting, and incident response. This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7, which fixes the issue. |
| CVE-2025-58457 | Medium | 2025-09-24 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Improper permission check in ZooKeeper AdminServer lets authorized clients to run snapshot and restore command with insufficient permissions. This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 before 3.9.4. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.4, which fixes the issue. The issue can be mitigated by disabling both commands (via admin.snapshot.enabled and admin.restore.enabled), disabling the whole AdminServer interface (via admin.enableServer), or ensuring that the root ACL does not provide open permissions. (Note that ZooKeeper ACLs are not recursive, so this does not impact operations on child nodes besides notifications from recursive watches.) |
| CVE-2024-23944 | Medium | 2024-03-15 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Information disclosure in persistent watchers handling in Apache ZooKeeper due to missing ACL check. It allows an attacker to monitor child znodes by attaching a persistent watcher (addWatch command) to a parent which the attacker has already access to. ZooKeeper server doesn't do ACL check when the persistent watcher is triggered and as a consequence, the full path of znodes that a watch event gets triggered upon is exposed to the owner of the watcher. It's important to note that only the path is exposed by this vulnerability, not the data of znode, but since znode path can contain sensitive information like user name or login ID, this issue is potentially critical. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.2, 3.8.4 which fixes the issue. |
| CVE-2021-21295 | Medium | 2021-03-09 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`. |
| CVE-2019-0201 | Medium | 2019-05-23 | No exploit published | No public exploit | An issue is present in Apache ZooKeeper 1.0.0 to 3.4.13 and 3.5.0-alpha to 3.5.4-beta. ZooKeeper’s getACL() command doesn’t check any permission when retrieves the ACLs of the requested node and returns all information contained in the ACL Id field as plaintext string. DigestAuthenticationProvider overloads the Id field with the hash value that is used for user authentication. As a consequence, if Digest Authentication is in use, the unsalted hash value will be disclosed by getACL() request for unauthenticated or unprivileged users. |