Overview 6 matches · 2 protected · 1 exploited · 1 CISA KEV · 4 public PoC · 4 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
2
33.3%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
2
33.3%
No exploit published
2
33.3%
blocked by ARMR today
2
33.3%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
4
66.7%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
split by
peak 2 / quarter
Q2 202
Protected by Waratek1
Mitigation candidate1
High2
blocked by ARMR today1
not blocked1
Working exploit published1
Proof of concept only1
Q3 202
Mitigation candidate1
No exploit published1
High2
not blocked2
Working exploit published1
Forecast only1
Q4 201
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q1 210
Q2 210
Q3 210
Q4 211
Protected by Waratek1
Critical1
blocked by ARMR today1
Exploited1
Q2 20Q3 20Q4 20Q1 21Q2 21Q3 21Q4 21
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-44228 | Critical | 2021-12-10 | Protected by Waratek | Exploited | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. |
| CVE-2020-17527 | High | 2020-12-03 | No exploit published | No public exploit | While investigating bug 64830 it was discovered that Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M9, 9.0.0-M1 to 9.0.39 and 8.5.0 to 8.5.59 could re-use an HTTP request header value from the previous stream received on an HTTP/2 connection for the request associated with the subsequent stream. While this would most likely lead to an error and the closure of the HTTP/2 connection, it is possible that information could leak between requests. |
| CVE-2020-13935 | High | 2020-07-14 | Mitigation candidate | Working exploit published | The payload length in a WebSocket frame was not correctly validated in Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M6, 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.36, 8.5.0 to 8.5.56 and 7.0.27 to 7.0.104. Invalid payload lengths could trigger an infinite loop. Multiple requests with invalid payload lengths could lead to a denial of service. |
| CVE-2020-13934 | High | 2020-07-14 | No exploit published | Forecast only | An h2c direct connection to Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M6, 9.0.0.M5 to 9.0.36 and 8.5.1 to 8.5.56 did not release the HTTP/1.1 processor after the upgrade to HTTP/2. If a sufficient number of such requests were made, an OutOfMemoryException could occur leading to a denial of service. |
| CVE-2020-11996 | High | 2020-06-26 | Mitigation candidate | Proof of concept only | A specially crafted sequence of HTTP/2 requests sent to Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M5, 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.35 and 8.5.0 to 8.5.55 could trigger high CPU usage for several seconds. If a sufficient number of such requests were made on concurrent HTTP/2 connections, the server could become unresponsive. |
| CVE-2020-9484 | High | 2020-05-20 | Protected by Waratek | Working exploit published | When using Apache Tomcat versions 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M4, 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.34, 8.5.0 to 8.5.54 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.103 if a) an attacker is able to control the contents and name of a file on the server; and b) the server is configured to use the PersistenceManager with a FileStore; and c) the PersistenceManager is configured with sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter="null" (the default unless a SecurityManager is used) or a sufficiently lax filter to allow the attacker provided object to be deserialized; and d) the attacker knows the relative file path from the storage location used by FileStore to the file the attacker has control over; then, using a specifically crafted request, the attacker will be able to trigger remote code execution via deserialization of the file under their control. Note that all of conditions a) to d) must be true for the attack to succeed. |