Overview 8 matches · 5 in Waratek scope · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
8matches
5in Waratek scope62.5%
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
5
62.5%
Outside Waratek scope
3
37.5%
Not applicable
0
0.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
8
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
1
12.5%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
7
87.5%
split by
peak 5 / year
20192020202120222023202420252026
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-78329 | Critical | 2026-08-24 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Improper input validation vulnerability in Apache Camel Undertow component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.11.0 before 4.14.9, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.4, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.0. UndertowEndpoint defaulted its headerFilterStrategy field to the base HttpHeaderFilterStrategy and pushed that instance into the UndertowHttpBinding it creates lazily, overwriting the UndertowHeaderFilterStrategy that DefaultUndertowHttpBinding installs in its own constructor. Unless a deployment supplied a custom binding or an explicit headerFilterStrategy, the undertow-specific filtering therefore never executed on endpoint-configured routes: the strategy object was constructed and immediately replaced before it could be consulted. The consequence is that the legacy websocket. Exchange-header prefix was not filtered at the undertow transport boundary in either direction, so an undertow HTTP consumer mapped inbound wire headers of that form onto the Exchange, where an undertow WebSocket producer reads them as dispatch directives and can be made to deliver to a peer other than the one the route selected; and header names that undertow itself does not accept were mapped onto the Exchange rather than being skipped. Rest DSL consumers were never affected, because UndertowComponent assigns UndertowRestHeaderFilterStrategy explicitly, which extends the undertow strategy. This is not a regression of CVE-2025-30177: the base HttpHeaderFilterStrategy configures the inbound Camel-prefix filter itself, so the protection introduced by that advisory continued to work through the base class and was never lost. What the change did was leave the undertow strategy orphaned on the endpoint path, with the effect that two subsequent corrections written into it - one skipping header names undertow rejects, one filtering the legacy websocket. prefix in both directions - were applied to a class the endpoint no longer used and never took effect in the releases that shipped them. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.9. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.4. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure the strategy explicitly rather than relying on the default, for example by binding an UndertowHeaderFilterStrategy in the registry and referencing it on the endpoint as undertow:http://0.0.0.0:8080/foo?headerFilterStrategy=#myStrategy, and additionally strip the dispatch headers at the trust boundary with removeHeaders(“websocket.*”). Note a residual limitation that upgrading does not remove: the undertow component deliberately keeps the websocket. values as part of its externally visible API contract, and UndertowProducer reads them with in.getHeader, which does not consult a HeaderFilterStrategy at all. The restored filtering is therefore defence in depth at the undertow transport boundary only. A route that carries an untrusted message from a non-undertow consumer into an undertow producer is not protected by this fix and must strip those headers itself. |
| CVE-2026-28369 | Critical | 2026-03-27 | No exploit published | No public exploit | A flaw was found in Undertow. When Undertow receives an HTTP request where the first header line starts with one or more spaces, it incorrectly processes the request by stripping these leading spaces. This behavior, which violates HTTP standards, can be exploited by a remote attacker to perform request smuggling. Request smuggling allows an attacker to bypass security mechanisms, access restricted information, or manipulate web caches, potentially leading to unauthorized actions or data exposure. |
| CVE-2026-28368 | Critical | 2026-03-27 | No exploit published | No public exploit | A flaw was found in Undertow. This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to construct specially crafted requests where header names are parsed differently by Undertow compared to upstream proxies. This discrepancy in header interpretation can be exploited to launch request smuggling attacks, potentially bypassing security controls and accessing unauthorized resources. |
| CVE-2026-28367 | Critical | 2026-03-27 | No exploit published | No public exploit | A flaw was found in Undertow. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending `\r\r\r` as a header block terminator. This can be used for request smuggling with certain proxy servers, such as older versions of Apache Traffic Server and Google Cloud Classic Application Load Balancer, potentially leading to unauthorized access or manipulation of web requests. |
| CVE-2025-12543 | Critical | 2026-01-07 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | A flaw was found in the Undertow HTTP server core, which is used in WildFly, JBoss EAP, and other Java applications. The Undertow library fails to properly validate the Host header in incoming HTTP requests.As a result, requests containing malformed or malicious Host headers are processed without rejection, enabling attackers to poison caches, perform internal network scans, or hijack user sessions. |
| CVE-2020-1745 | Critical | 2020-04-28 | Outside Waratek scope | No public exploit | A file inclusion vulnerability was found in the AJP connector enabled with a default AJP configuration port of 8009 in Undertow version 2.0.29.Final and before and was fixed in 2.0.30.Final. A remote, unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to read web application files from a vulnerable server. In instances where the vulnerable server allows file uploads, an attacker could upload malicious JavaServer Pages (JSP) code within a variety of file types and trigger this vulnerability to gain remote code execution. |
| CVE-2019-10212 | Critical | 2019-10-02 | Outside Waratek scope | No public exploit | A flaw was found in, all under 2.0.20, in the Undertow DEBUG log for io.undertow.request.security. If enabled, an attacker could abuse this flaw to obtain the user's credentials from the log files. |
| CVE-2019-3888 | Critical | 2019-06-12 | Outside Waratek scope | No public exploit | A vulnerability was found in Undertow web server before 2.0.21. An information exposure of plain text credentials through log files because Connectors.executeRootHandler:402 logs the HttpServerExchange object at ERROR level using UndertowLogger.REQUEST_LOGGER.undertowRequestFailed(t, exchange) |