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Protection: None✕Published from 2022-06-01✕Product studio✕
Overview 5 matches · 0 protected · 1 exploited · 1 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 1 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 1 20.0% No exploit published 4 80.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 2 40.0% Medium 3 60.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 5 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 1 20.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 4 80.0%
split by peak 2 / quarter
Q3 23Q4 23Q1 24Q2 24Q3 24Q4 24Q1 25Q2 25
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2025-6384 High 2025-06-19 No exploit published No public exploit Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources vulnerability in Crafter Studio of CrafterCMS allows authenticated developers to execute OS commands via Groovy Sandbox Bypass. By inserting malicious Groovy elements, an attacker may bypass Sandbox restrictions and obtain RCE (Remote Code Execution). This issue affects CrafterCMS: from 4.0.0 through 4.2.2.
CVE-2023-1932 Medium 2024-11-07 No exploit published No public exploit A flaw was found in hibernate-validator's 'isValid' method in the org.hibernate.validator.internal.constraintvalidators.hv.SafeHtmlValidator class, which can be bypassed by omitting the tag ending in a less-than character. Browsers may render an invalid html, allowing HTML injection or Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) attacks.
CVE-2023-44487 High 2023-10-10 Mitigation candidate Exploited The HTTP/2 protocol allows a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly, as exploited in the wild in August through October 2023.
CVE-2023-41329 Medium 2023-09-06 No exploit published No public exploit WireMock is a tool for mocking HTTP services. The proxy mode of WireMock, can be protected by the network restrictions configuration, as documented in Preventing proxying to and recording from specific target addresses. These restrictions can be configured using the domain names, and in such a case the configuration is vulnerable to the DNS rebinding attacks. A similar patch was applied in WireMock 3.0.0-beta-15 for the WireMock Webhook Extensions. The root cause of the attack is a defect in the logic which allows for a race condition triggered by a DNS server whose address expires in between the initial validation and the outbound network request that might go to a domain that was supposed to be prohibited. Control over a DNS service is required to exploit this attack, so it has high execution complexity and limited impact. This issue has been addressed in version 2.35.1 of wiremock-jre8 and wiremock-jre8-standalone, version 3.0.3 of wiremock and wiremock-standalone, version 2.6.1 of the python version of wiremock, and versions 2.35.1-1 and 3.0.3-1 of the wiremock/wiremock Docker container. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should either configure firewall rules to define the list of permitted destinations or to configure WireMock to use IP addresses instead of the domain names.
CVE-2023-41327 Medium 2023-09-06 No exploit published No public exploit WireMock is a tool for mocking HTTP services. WireMock can be configured to only permit proxying (and therefore recording) to certain addresses. This is achieved via a list of allowed address rules and a list of denied address rules, where the allowed list is evaluated first. Until WireMock Webhooks Extension 3.0.0-beta-15, the filtering of target addresses from the proxy mode DID NOT work for Webhooks, so the users were potentially vulnerable regardless of the `limitProxyTargets` settings. Via the WireMock webhooks configuration, POST requests from a webhook might be forwarded to an arbitrary service reachable from WireMock’s instance. For example, If someone is running the WireMock docker Container inside a private cluster, they can trigger internal POST requests against unsecured APIs or even against secure ones by passing a token, discovered using another exploit, via authentication headers. This issue has been addressed in versions 2.35.1 and 3.0.3 of wiremock. Wiremock studio has been discontinued and will not see a fix. Users unable to upgrade should use external firewall rules to define the list of permitted destinations.