Overview 2 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
2matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
2
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
2
100.0%
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-40999 | High | 2026-06-11 | No exploit published | No public exploit | When WS-Addressing is used with non-anonymous ReplyTo or FaultTo addresses, Spring WS may initiate outbound connections through configured WebServiceMessageSender instances to destinations taken directly from request headers without verifying that those destinations are safe to connect to. Affected versions: Spring Web Services 5.0.0 through 5.0.1; 4.1.0 through 4.1.3; 4.0.0 through 4.0.18; 3.1.0 through 3.1.8. |
| CVE-2026-40994 | High | 2026-06-11 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Wss4jSecurityInterceptor initialized its BSP (WS-I Basic Security Profile) compliance flag so that inbound validation disabled WSS4J BSP enforcement on RequestData. Services that validate WS-Security on the network could therefore accept messages that violate BSP rules, weakening protocol-level checks. Affected versions: Spring Web Services 5.0.0 through 5.0.1; 4.1.0 through 4.1.3; 4.0.0 through 4.0.18; 3.1.0 through 3.1.8. |