Overview 3 matches · 2 protected · 2 exploited · 2 CISA KEV
Protected by Waratek
3
100.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
2
66.7%
partly blocked
1
33.3%
not blocked
0
0.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
2
66.7%
Working exploit published
1
33.3%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 3 / month
Oct 17
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2017-12629 | Critical | 2017-10-14 | Protected by Waratek | Working exploit published | Remote code execution occurs in Apache Solr before 7.1 with Apache Lucene before 7.1 by exploiting XXE in conjunction with use of a Config API add-listener command to reach the RunExecutableListener class. Elasticsearch, although it uses Lucene, is NOT vulnerable to this. Note that the XML external entity expansion vulnerability occurs in the XML Query Parser which is available, by default, for any query request with parameters deftype=xmlparser and can be exploited to upload malicious data to the /upload request handler or as Blind XXE using ftp wrapper in order to read arbitrary local files from the Solr server. Note also that the second vulnerability relates to remote code execution using the RunExecutableListener available on all affected versions of Solr. |
| CVE-2017-12617 | High | 2017-10-04 | Protected by Waratek | Exploited | When running Apache Tomcat versions 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.0, 8.5.0 to 8.5.22, 8.0.0.RC1 to 8.0.46 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.81 with HTTP PUTs enabled (e.g. via setting the readonly initialisation parameter of the Default servlet to false) it was possible to upload a JSP file to the server via a specially crafted request. This JSP could then be requested and any code it contained would be executed by the server. |
| CVE-2017-12149 | Critical | 2017-10-04 | Protected by Waratek | Exploited | In Jboss Application Server as shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Application Platform 5.2, it was found that the doFilter method in the ReadOnlyAccessFilter of the HTTP Invoker does not restrict classes for which it performs deserialization and thus allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code via crafted serialized data. |