Overview 2 matches · 0 in Waratek scope · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
2matches
0in Waratek scope0.0%
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
2
100.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
2
100.0%
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2012-4615 | Low | 2012-11-27 | Not applicable | No public exploit | EMC Smarts Network Configuration Manager (NCM) before 9.1 uses a hardcoded encryption key for the storage of credentials, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information via unspecified vectors. |
| CVE-2012-4614 | High | 2012-11-27 | Not applicable | No public exploit | The default configuration of EMC Smarts Network Configuration Manager (NCM) before 9.1 does not require authentication for database access, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a network session. |