Overview 3 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
3
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
3
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
3
100.0%
split by
peak 1 / quarter
Q2 20Q4 20Q2 21Q4 21Q2 22Q4 22Q2 23Q4 23
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2018-16153 | High | 2023-12-12 | No exploit published | No public exploit | An issue was discovered in Apereo Opencast 4.x through 10.x before 10.6. It sends system digest credentials during authentication attempts to arbitrary external services in some situations. |
| CVE-2021-43807 | High | 2021-12-14 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Opencast is an Open Source Lecture Capture & Video Management for Education. Opencast versions prior to 9.10 allow HTTP method spoofing, allowing to change the assumed HTTP method via URL parameter. This allows attackers to turn HTTP GET requests into PUT requests or an HTTP form to send DELETE requests. This bypasses restrictions otherwise put on these types of requests and aids in cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks, which would otherwise not be possible. The vulnerability allows attackers to craft links or forms which may change the server state. This issue is fixed in Opencast 9.10 and 10.0. You can mitigate the problem by setting the `SameSite=Strict` attribute for your cookies. If this is a viable option for you depends on your integrations. We strongly recommend updating in any case. |
| CVE-2020-5229 | High | 2020-01-30 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Opencast before 8.1 stores passwords using the rather outdated and cryptographically insecure MD5 hash algorithm. Furthermore, the hashes are salted using the username instead of a random salt, causing hashes for users with the same username and password to collide which is problematic especially for popular users like the default `admin` user. This essentially means that for an attacker, it might be feasible to reconstruct a user's password given access to these hashes. Note that attackers needing access to the hashes means that they must gain access to the database in which these are stored first to be able to start cracking the passwords. The problem is addressed in Opencast 8.1 which now uses the modern and much stronger bcrypt password hashing algorithm for storing passwords. Note, that old hashes remain MD5 until the password is updated. For a list of users whose password hashes are stored using MD5, take a look at the `/user-utils/users/md5.json` REST endpoint. |