Overview 2 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
2matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
2
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
1
50.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
1
50.0%
split by
peak 1 / year
2020202120222023202420252026
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-56820 | Critical | 2026-07-21 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and prior to 4.1.135.Final, `OcspClient` does not validate that the `CertificateID` in an OCSP response matches the requested `CertificateID`, which can lead to replay attack. `OcspClient.validateResponse` accepts a legitimately signed `GOOD` status response for an unrelated certificate issued by the same CA, allowing bypass of revocation checks for another certificate. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| CVE-2019-20445 | Critical | 2020-01-29 | No exploit published | No public exploit | HttpObjectDecoder.java in Netty before 4.1.44 allows a Content-Length header to be accompanied by a second Content-Length header, or by a Transfer-Encoding header. |