Overview 8 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
8matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
8
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
8
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
4
50.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
4
50.0%
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-56818 | Medium | 2026-08-07 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, the RedisArrayAggregator Redis codec clears retained partial aggregate state when the maxNestedArrayDepth limit is exceeded, but it does not clear the same state when the sibling maxElements limit is exceeded. A peer can start a valid RESP array, send a bulk string child, then send a nested array header longer than the configured maxElements. Netty throws a decoder exception in decodeRedisArrayHeader, but the existing partial aggregate remains retained in the handler. If the application leaves the channel alive after the exception, later messages are still consumed into the pre-error aggregate, allowing an unauthenticated peer to keep attacker-controlled aggregate state alive across a security-limit exception and pin retained pooled buffers. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| CVE-2026-59920 | Medium | 2026-07-29 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, Netty's STOMP encoder ( StompSubframeEncoder ) does not escape or validate header values in CONNECT and CONNECTED frames, so raw newline ( \n ) characters in a header value are written directly to the wire, allowing an attacker who controls a header value to inject additional STOMP headers. This happens because the encoder intentionally skips escaping for CONNECT/CONNECTED frames per the STOMP 1.2 specification but never rejects the raw newlines, and since a broker parses each line as a separate header, an attacker controlling a value such as a user-supplied login or passcode can overwrite connection parameters or add authentication/role headers to bypass authentication or escalate privileges (the actual impact is broker-dependent). The issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| CVE-2026-59919 | Medium | 2026-07-29 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, Netty's HAProxy encoder ( HAProxyMessageEncoder ) writes AF_UNIX source and destination socket addresses into the HAProxy V1 text protocol without validating them for CRLF characters, so an attacker who controls an AF_UNIX address can inject \r\n sequences and split the single PROXY header into multiple lines. This is possible because the V1 protocol uses CRLF as its line terminator and, unlike IPv4/IPv6 addresses whose format checks implicitly reject CRLF, AF_UNIX addresses are only validated for length (up to 108 bytes), allowing a forged second PROXY header line that spoofs the client source/destination IP to a downstream server or load balancer. The issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| CVE-2026-59900 | Medium | 2026-07-29 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, Netty's HTTP/2-to-HTTP/1.x translation layer (`Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` and `InboundHttp2ToHttpAdapter`) fails to deduplicate or validate `Host` headers when an HTTP/2 client supplies both the `:authority` pseudo-header and a literal `host` header in a single HEADERS frame. The translator maps `:authority` to `Host` and separately copies the literal `host` header, producing an `HttpRequest` object containing two `Host` headers with attacker-controlled differing values. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| CVE-2026-59899 | Medium | 2026-07-29 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, `HttpContentEncoder` (the superclass of the production handler `HttpContentCompressor`) maintains a per-channel `ArrayDeque<CharSequence>` named `acceptEncodingQueue` that accumulates attacker-controlled data without any size limit. The queue is filled on the I/O thread for every inbound HTTP request and drained only when the application later writes a non-1xx response. This creates a resource exhaustion vulnerability when an attacker exploits HTTP/1.1 pipelining to flood the connection with requests faster than the application produces responses. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| CVE-2026-59898 | Medium | 2026-07-29 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, ab attacker can force WebSocket upgrade via the lax V07 (or V08) handshaker by sending `Sec-WebSocket-Version: 7` and omitting `Connection: Upgrade` / `Upgrade: websocket` headers, completing a protocol switch that a proxy would not recognize as an Upgrade request and enabling HTTP request smuggling / protocol-confusion attacks. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| CVE-2026-59921 | Medium | 2026-07-28 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, HttpPostRequestEncoder constructs multipart HTTP request bodies by directly concatenating user-supplied filenames and field names into Content-Disposition MIME headers without validating or sanitizing CRLF characters (\r\n). Since MIME headers are delimited by CRLF, an attacker who controls the filename can inject arbitrary MIME headers into the multipart body part. The root cause is that neither the encoder nor the FileUpload implementations' setFilename() methods, which only check for null, neutralize CRLF characters before the filename is embedded into the header. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| CVE-2026-56746 | Medium | 2026-07-21 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and 4.1.0.Final through 4.1.135.Final, are vulnerable to security control bypass during the origin evaluation process. CorsHandler provides a shortCircuit() configuration designed to reject unauthorized cross-origin requests immediately, acting as a security control before requests reach the application. However, due to a logical operator error in the origin evaluation process, this protection can be entirely bypassed. An attacker can bypass the short-circuit mechanism by sending a request with an Origin: null header. This failure forwards unauthorized requests to the backend application, bypassing intended access controls. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |