Overview 2 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
2matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
2
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
2
100.0%
split by
peak 1 / month
Feb 23Mar 23Apr 23May 23Jun 23Jul 23Aug 23Sep 23Oct 23Nov 23Dec 23Jan 24
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-6291 | High | 2024-01-26 | No exploit published | No public exploit | A flaw was found in the redirect_uri validation logic in Keycloak. This issue may allow a bypass of otherwise explicitly allowed hosts. A successful attack may lead to an access token being stolen, making it possible for the attacker to impersonate other users. |
| CVE-2022-4492 | High | 2023-02-23 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The undertow client is not checking the server identity presented by the server certificate in https connections. This is a compulsory step (at least it should be performed by default) in https and in http/2. I would add it to any TLS client protocol. |