Overview 27,850 matches · 250 in Waratek scope · 0 protected · 322 exploited · 190 CISA KEV · 1,176 public PoC · 389 EPSS ≥ 0.5
27,850matches
250in Waratek scope0.9%
0protected0.0%
322exploited1.2%
190CISA KEV0.7%
1,176public PoC4.2%
389EPSS ≥ 0.51.4%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
27
0.1%
No exploit published
223
0.8%
Outside Waratek scope
934
3.4%
Not applicable
26,666
95.7%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
27,850
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
split by
peak 4,578 / year
19941
Not applicable1
Medium1
not blocked1
Working exploit published1
19953
Not applicable3
High1
Medium1
Low1
not blocked3
No public exploit3
199611
Not applicable11
Critical1
High6
Medium3
Low1
not blocked11
Working exploit published3
No public exploit8
199728
Not applicable28
High18
Medium9
Low1
not blocked28
Exploited1
Working exploit published6
No public exploit21
199828
Not applicable28
High13
Medium9
Low6
not blocked28
Exploited1
Working exploit published10
No public exploit17
199997
Not applicable97
Critical1
High48
Medium31
Low17
not blocked97
Working exploit published35
No public exploit62
200099
Not applicable99
High66
Medium20
Low13
not blocked99
Exploited2
Working exploit published46
No public exploit51
2001123
Not applicable123
High51
Medium33
Low39
not blocked123
Exploited2
Working exploit published33
No public exploit88
200262
Not applicable62
Critical1
High31
Medium15
Low15
not blocked62
Exploited2
Working exploit published12
No public exploit48
200378
Not applicable78
High30
Medium35
Low13
not blocked78
Exploited4
Working exploit published19
No public exploit55
2004176
Not applicable176
Critical3
High80
Medium53
Low40
not blocked176
Working exploit published34
No public exploit142
2005350
Outside Waratek scope1
Not applicable349
Critical4
High127
Medium118
Low101
not blocked350
Working exploit published51
No public exploit299
2006154
Not applicable154
High50
Medium73
Low31
not blocked154
Working exploit published17
Proof of concept only1
Forecast only1
No public exploit135
2007184
Outside Waratek scope1
Not applicable183
Critical1
High67
Medium89
Low27
not blocked184
Working exploit published24
Forecast only1
No public exploit159
2008186
Outside Waratek scope2
Not applicable184
Critical3
High83
Medium88
Low12
not blocked186
Exploited1
Working exploit published21
Proof of concept only1
No public exploit163
2009181
No exploit published1
Not applicable180
Critical3
High69
Medium98
Low11
not blocked181
Exploited8
Working exploit published30
No public exploit143
2010223
Outside Waratek scope2
Not applicable221
Critical7
High84
Medium94
Low38
not blocked223
Exploited11
Working exploit published29
No public exploit183
2011174
Outside Waratek scope1
Not applicable173
Critical1
High57
Medium91
Low25
not blocked174
Exploited7
Working exploit published11
Proof of concept only1
Forecast only1
No public exploit154
2012300
No exploit published1
Outside Waratek scope7
Not applicable292
Critical9
High105
Medium147
Low39
not blocked300
Exploited8
Working exploit published17
Proof of concept only3
No public exploit272
2013560
No exploit published1
Outside Waratek scope10
Not applicable549
Critical12
High139
Medium335
Low74
not blocked560
Exploited15
Working exploit published25
Forecast only2
No public exploit518
2014550
No exploit published2
Outside Waratek scope42
Not applicable506
Critical13
High151
Medium312
Low74
not blocked550
Exploited15
Working exploit published19
Proof of concept only3
Forecast only5
No public exploit508
2015647
No exploit published8
Outside Waratek scope35
Not applicable604
Critical15
High224
Medium340
Low68
not blocked647
Exploited21
Working exploit published18
Proof of concept only2
Forecast only2
No public exploit604
2016956
No exploit published14
Outside Waratek scope22
Not applicable920
Critical97
High444
Medium392
Low23
not blocked956
Exploited14
Working exploit published51
Proof of concept only7
Forecast only14
No public exploit870
20171,450
No exploit published15
Outside Waratek scope60
Not applicable1,375
Critical143
High726
Medium568
Low13
not blocked1,450
Exploited14
Working exploit published69
Proof of concept only9
Forecast only4
No public exploit1,354
20181,919
No exploit published15
Outside Waratek scope125
Not applicable1,779
Critical297
High802
Medium805
Low15
not blocked1,919
Exploited24
Working exploit published74
Proof of concept only10
Forecast only11
No public exploit1,800
20191,729
No exploit published25
Outside Waratek scope259
Not applicable1,445
Critical232
High697
Medium759
Low41
not blocked1,729
Exploited22
Working exploit published49
Proof of concept only15
Forecast only15
No public exploit1,628
20201,410
Mitigation candidate10
No exploit published32
Outside Waratek scope182
Not applicable1,186
Critical126
High545
Medium656
Low83
not blocked1,410
Exploited28
Working exploit published32
Proof of concept only29
Forecast only10
No public exploit1,311
20211,268
Mitigation candidate7
No exploit published40
Outside Waratek scope87
Not applicable1,134
Critical102
High654
Medium468
Low44
not blocked1,268
Exploited25
Working exploit published13
Proof of concept only34
Forecast only33
No public exploit1,163
20221,288
Mitigation candidate4
No exploit published34
Outside Waratek scope47
Not applicable1,203
Critical119
High635
Medium515
Low19
not blocked1,288
Exploited18
Working exploit published3
Proof of concept only185
Forecast only8
No public exploit1,074
2023968
Mitigation candidate4
No exploit published19
Outside Waratek scope14
Not applicable931
Critical61
High437
Medium455
Low15
not blocked968
Exploited34
Working exploit published4
Proof of concept only116
Forecast only8
No public exploit806
20244,578
Mitigation candidate2
No exploit published12
Outside Waratek scope25
Not applicable4,539
Critical180
High1,935
Medium2,424
Low39
not blocked4,578
Exploited17
Working exploit published3
Proof of concept only43
Forecast only4
No public exploit4,511
20254,466
No exploit published2
Outside Waratek scope5
Not applicable4,459
Critical135
High1,718
Medium2,603
Low10
not blocked4,466
Exploited15
Working exploit published1
Proof of concept only39
Forecast only1
No public exploit4,410
20263,603
No exploit published2
Outside Waratek scope7
Not applicable3,594
Critical234
High1,541
Medium1,806
Low22
not blocked3,603
Exploited13
Working exploit published4
Proof of concept only59
No public exploit3,527
19961999200220052008201120142017202020232026
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-111497 | Critical | 2026-10-22 | Outside Waratek scope | Exploited | A buffer overflow vulnerability in the Brotli decoder (c/dec/decode.c) in Google Brotli versions 1.0.3 through 1.2.0 on all platforms allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to corrupt adjacent decoder state memory, disclose sensitive memory contents, cause a denial of service, or potentially execute arbitrary code using a crafted Brotli-compressed stream. Users need to update any Brotli libraries or binaries between 1.0.3 through 1.2.0 to the latest available version: 1.0.10 or 1.1.1 or 1.2.1. |
| CVE-2026-98432 | Critical | 2026-10-15 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: free inet_opt and ireq_opt after an RCU grace period tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock() transfers ownership of ireq->ireq_opt to the child socket (newinet->inet_opt) without copying it. Another cpu can concurrently process a retransmitted SYN for the same request socket, and send a SYNACK from tcp_check_req(). tcp_v4_send_synack() and inet_csk_route_req() read ireq->ireq_opt under rcu_read_lock() only, and ip_build_and_send_pkt() and ip_options_build() then read opt->optlen twice. Note that the SYNACK timer itself is not an issue: it holds a reference on its request socket, and inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop() calls timer_delete_sync() before the child can be freed. Since commit 079096f103fa ("tcp/dccp: install syn_recv requests into ehash table"), request sockets are processed without holding the listener lock, so nothing prevents the child socket from being freed while the SYNACK is still being built. TCP child sockets do not have SOCK_RCU_FREE, and inet_sock_destruct() frees inet_opt with a plain kfree(), leading to a use-after-free in ip_options_build(). A similar issue exists with request socket migration (net.ipv4.tcp_migrate_req=1, or a BPF_SK_REUSEPORT_SELECT_OR_MIGRATE program). reqsk_timer_handler() clones the request socket with inet_reqsk_clone(), so that the old request socket and its clone share the same ireq_opt, then reqsk_migrate_reset() clears the pointer in the old one. Another cpu holding a reference on the old request socket can still be using these options (sending a SYNACK, or creating a child in tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock()) when the clone is freed, and tcp_v4_reqsk_destructor() also uses a plain kfree(). Readers already use RCU, and other paths replacing inet_opt (do_ip_setsockopt(), cipso_v4_sock_setattr()...) already use kfree_rcu(). Use kfree_rcu() in inet_sock_destruct() and tcp_v4_reqsk_destructor() as well. IPv6 is not affected by the first issue, because tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() duplicates the options. tcp_v6_reqsk_destructor() has the same migration issue with ipv6_opt, which is only set by CALIPSO. This will be addressed in a separate patch. |
| CVE-2026-96206 | Medium | 2026-10-13 | Not applicable | No public exploit | Use of uninitialized resource in Windows Subsystem for Linux allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| CVE-2026-85879 | High | 2026-10-13 | Not applicable | No public exploit | Time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition in Windows Subsystem for Linux allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| CVE-2026-88252 | Medium | 2026-10-06 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | A flaw was found in sssd. A local user can cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by exhausting the responder service's available file descriptors (system handles used for open connections). By opening and maintaining many concurrent connections to a responder socket while continuing to queue new connection attempts, an attacker can trigger an unthrottled retry loop. This condition leads to high CPU utilization and stalls the service, preventing legitimate identity and authentication requests from being processed. |
| CVE-2026-104048 | High | 2026-10-06 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | A flaw was found in SSSD. In trust-enabled identity management environments, SSSD evaluates Host-Based Access Control (HBAC) rules by stripping domain qualifiers and comparing only short usernames. An authenticated user in a trusted domain who shares the same username as an authorized local account can bypass access policies and gain unauthorized access to protected services or hosts. |
| CVE-2026-104047 | Medium | 2026-10-06 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A flaw was found in SSSD. When configured to use Microsoft Entra ID, search inputs are not properly sanitized before being incorporated into directory query filters. A local user can exploit this vulnerability by submitting a crafted lookup request, manipulating the query logic to cause unauthorized information disclosure from the directory. |
| CVE-2026-104046 | Medium | 2026-10-06 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A flaw was found in SSSD (System Security Services Daemon). When Identity Provider (IdP) authentication is enabled, pre-authentication requests retain state in memory without being cleared or timed out. A local attacker can repeatedly initiate authentication flows without completing them, causing unbounded memory consumption. This memory exhaustion can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) by degrading or terminating SSSD authentication services. |
| CVE-2026-104045 | Medium | 2026-10-06 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | A flaw was found in SSSD. A local user can trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) by exploiting a race condition in the autofs responder between asynchronous enumeration completion and map invalidation. By repeatedly sending concurrent map enumeration and invalidation requests, an attacker can cause memory to leak, leading to excessive memory consumption that can disrupt or crash the autofs service. |
| CVE-2026-104039 | Medium | 2026-10-06 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A flaw was found in SSSD. A local user can cause a denial of service (DoS) by disrupting system authentication services. When handling Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface (GSSAPI) authentication in the Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) responder, cached connection state is freed upon completion without clearing the reference pointer. An attacker can exploit this by sending an additional request over the same connection, causing the service to access invalid memory and unexpectedly terminate. |
| CVE-2026-104032 | Medium | 2026-10-06 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | A flaw was found in SSSD. An unprivileged local user can repeatedly request master automount map updates through the autofs responder due to missing authorization checks. This triggers global cache invalidation and forces repeated lookups to backend directory providers, leading to a Denial of Service (DoS) from degraded automount availability and elevated resource consumption. |
| CVE-2026-104031 | Medium | 2026-10-06 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A flaw was found in SSSD. In configurations where the autofs responder service is enabled, memory allocated during successful request processing is not released until the client connection terminates. A local attacker can exploit this vulnerability by maintaining an open connection and repeatedly submitting valid requests, leading to memory exhaustion and a Denial of Service (DoS). |
| CVE-2026-104030 | Medium | 2026-10-05 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A flaw was found in sssd. This vulnerability allows a local user to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by submitting a specially crafted passkey authentication token that lacks null terminators. The authentication service reads past the end of the provided memory buffer, causing the process to crash and disrupting authentication services. |
| CVE-2026-104029 | Medium | 2026-10-05 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A flaw was found in SSSD. A local attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted request to the autofs responder UNIX socket. Due to improper buffer offset calculation during request parsing, the service performs an out-of-bounds memory read. This flaw can cause the autofs responder process to crash, resulting in a denial of service (DoS). |
| CVE-2026-98164 | High | 2026-09-29 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/mmu: Check write tracking in all address spaces kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked() checks only the supplied memslot, but page tracking is per-address-space and shadow pages are shared across all address spaces. With SMM, a GFN can therefore be write-tracked in one address space and appear untracked through the other. Check the supplied slot first, then the slot for the other address space. This ensures all callers honor write tracking regardless of the active address space. In particular, it prevents mmu_try_to_unsync_pages() from marking an upper-level shadow page unsync and eventually triggering the BUG in pte_list_remove(). [invert direction of the conditional. - Paolo] |
| CVE-2026-102560 | Critical | 2026-09-29 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A flaw was found in libsoup. When the permessage-deflate WebSocket extension compresses a very large outgoing message, truncated size calculations used for GByteArray growth could wrap, causing zlib to write past the allocated buffer and resulting in a heap buffer overflow. |
| CVE-2026-102559 | High | 2026-09-29 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A flaw was found in libsoup. When constructing a masked WebSocket client frame for a very large outgoing payload, size values passed to GByteArray allocation APIs could be truncated while the masking routine still used the full length, causing a heap buffer overflow. |
| CVE-2026-102558 | High | 2026-09-29 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A flaw was found in libsoup. When max-incoming-payload-size is unlimited (0), SoupWebsocketConnection could grow its incoming GByteArray based on an attacker-controlled frame length until the length wrapped, causing a heap buffer overflow while reading frame data. |
| CVE-2026-102557 | High | 2026-09-29 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A flaw was found in libsoup. When reassembling fragmented WebSocket messages into a GByteArray, libsoup did not adequately cap total message size against the limits of the underlying buffer type. A remote peer could send fragments that caused size truncation while the implementation still used the full length, leading to heap corruption or a crash. |
| CVE-2026-102556 | High | 2026-09-29 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A flaw was found in libsoup. When handling an incoming WebSocket Pong frame, SoupWebsocketConnection emitted the ::pong signal with a GByteArray pointer even though the signal is declared to pass a GBytes. Applications connecting a handler that follows the documented GBytes API can trigger heap corruption or a crash upon receiving a crafted Pong. |
| CVE-2026-102555 | High | 2026-09-29 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A flaw was found in libsoup. The soup_uri_decode_data_uri() function incorrectly treated base64 data-URI payloads as NUL-terminated strings when calling g_base64_decode_inplace(). If the percent-decoded payload contained embedded NUL bytes, the decoded length could remain uninitialized and be used as the size of the returned GBytes. This can lead to an out-of-bounds read or application crash when processing a crafted data URI. |
| CVE-2026-98163 | High | 2026-09-26 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L) |
| CVE-2026-98162 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb/server: fix tree connection leak in smb2_tree_connect() See the procedure below: smb2_tree_connect ksmbd_tree_conn_connect xa_store(&sess->tree_conns, tree_conn->id, tree_conn) ksmbd_counter_inc(KSMBD_COUNTER_TREE_CONNS) ksmbd_share_tree_conn_inc(sc) ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp // fail status.ret = KSMBD_TREE_CONN_STATUS_NOMEM // do not disconnect tree_conn Disconnect the new tree connection if ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp() fails. |
| CVE-2026-98161 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvdimm: pmem: keep PREFLUSH before data writes pmem_submit_bio() records a REQ_PREFLUSH error, but continues to copy the bio data and can later overwrite the error with a successful REQ_FUA flush. That lets data writes run after a failed preflush and can complete the bio successfully despite the failed ordering barrier. Run the REQ_PREFLUSH flush synchronously before touching the bio data and complete the bio with the flush error if it fails. Keep asynchronous flush chaining for REQ_FUA. At that point, data copy has completed and the parent bio can wait for the chained flush bio. |
| CVE-2026-98160 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix mismatched free of HalData in rtw_sdio_if1_init() padapter->HalData is allocated via vzalloc(), but incorrectly freed using kfree() in the rtw_sdio_if1_init() error path. Using kfree() to release this vmalloc-backed buffer can lead to memory corruption. Use rtw_hal_data_deinit() to pair the free correctly and free HalData with vfree(). The bug was first flagged by an experimental static analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs. Manual inspection confirms that the issue is still present in current mainline. An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. As we do not have suitable RTL8723BS SDIO hardware to test with, no runtime testing was able to be performed. |
| CVE-2026-98159 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7921: validate CLC firmware records The CLC region is supplied by firmware, but the loader trusts the region count and each record length. A malformed image can make the region table pointer precede the firmware buffer, make the record loop fail to advance, or index phy->clc past its end. Validate the table and record bounds before dereferencing or copying. |
| CVE-2026-98158 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ppp_async: drop the errored frame instead of resetting its headroom ppp_receive_nonmp_frame() prepends a two-byte direction tag before running the pass/active BPF filters: *(__be16 *)skb_push(skb, 2) = htons(PPP_FILTER_INBOUND_TAG); Nothing on the receive path guarantees those two bytes of headroom. The frame-error path in ppp_async's process_input_packet() resets a reused skb's headroom to zero while claiming to restore it to a freshly allocated state - but a fresh skb from dev_alloc_skb() carries NET_SKB_PAD: err: if (skb) { /* make skb appear as freshly allocated */ skb_trim(skb, 0); skb_reserve(skb, - skb_headroom(skb)); } ap->rpkt still points at that skb, so the next frame is reassembled into it with no headroom at all. A peer that sends a bad-FCS frame followed by one beginning ff 03 then leaves a single byte of headroom by the time the filter tag is pushed, which lands one byte below skb->head: skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:49 put:2 head:ffff888003c10000 data:ffff888003c0ffff tail:0x30 end:0x640 dev:<NULL> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214! RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x13e/0x230 Call Trace: skb_push+0xbd/0x100 ppp_receive_nonmp_frame+0x48a/0x1d10 ppp_input+0x4e9/0x2f80 ppp_async_process+0x2a/0xe0 tasklet_action_common+0x20f/0x8a0 handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Zeroing the headroom violates the NET_SKB_PAD guarantee that dev_alloc_skb() gives the rest of the receive path. Besides the filter panic above, when CCP compression is enabled ppp_decompress_frame() hands skb->data - 2 to ->decompress()/->incomp(), which then reads out of bounds before skb->head for the same reason. Rather than restore the headroom, drop the errored frame - as ppp_synctty already does on its error path - and clear ap->rpkt so the next frame is reassembled into a fresh skb with proper headroom. This is simpler and fixes both the filter under-panic and the CCP out-of-bounds read. The original V1 of this patch made room in ppp_receive_nonmp_frame() with skb_cow_head(); Eric pointed out that fixing the root cause in the transport is the right approach. Found by fuzzing the PPP receive path with a mutating peer on a pty; it is an interesting (remote) DoS: root configures PPP, the peer supplies two crashing frames. The reproducer (repro-ppp-skb.c, unchanged from v1) panics in about a second, and returns cleanly with this applied. |
| CVE-2026-98157 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: EDAC/device_sysfs: Use kstrtouint() for poll_msec to prevent truncation The poll_msec sysfs store file uses simple_strtoul() which accepts an unsigned long, but the target field (poll_msec) is unsigned int. On 64-bit systems, a value > UINT_MAX is silently truncated when stored. Fix the mismatch by using kstrtouint() instead. This rejects values larger than UINT_MAX at parse time, making truncation impossible. Also add a check for value < 1 to reject the 0-delay case, which would cause the poll work to spin without delay and consume 100% CPU. |
| CVE-2026-98156 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: use the DMA API for resource backing on Xen On a Xen PV domain page addresses bear no relation to the real machine addresses the host would have to use to reach it. virtio_ring.c handles this correctly, vring_use_map_api() returns true for any xen_domain() regardless of VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM. virtio-gpu makes the same decision independently, but its copy looks only at the feature bit: bool use_dma_api = !virtio_has_dma_quirk(vgdev->vdev); QEMU does not set iommu_platform on virtio-vga by default, so VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM is not negotiated, use_dma_api is false, and virtio_gpu_object_shmem_init() describes the framebuffer's backing pages to the host with sg_phys(). Those are guest-physical addresses. In a PV domain they resolve, on the host side, to pages belonging to some other domain, so the host scans out unrelated memory. Move the decision into virtio_gpu_use_dma_api() and give it the xen_domain() check, like vring_use_map_api() has. This additionally enables the dma_sync_sgtable_for_device() calls in virtgpu_vq.c, which are required for correctness whenever swiotlb is in play. Reproduced with a Xen 4.21 PV dom0 nested inside QEMU 8.2 with virtio-vga, on both a distro 6.8 kernel and 6.18 LTS. A PVH dom0 works fine and doesn't need this fix because it is identity-mapped, only PV dom0s are affected. |
| CVE-2026-98155 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/qaic: Address potential out-of-bounds read in resp_worker() Although 'commit 2feec5ae5df7 ("accel/qaic: Handle DBC deactivation if the owner went away")' fixes the scenario it was intended for by walking the message and only decoding QAIC_TRANS_DEACTIVATE_FROM_DEV, if present, it skipped over the bounds checking code that is included in decode_message(). This could lead to issues such as reading past the slab allocation's end, infinite loops or kernel panics. For those issues to happen, a malformed wire message is needed to be sent from the device. Instead of duplicating the bounds checking code already present in decode_message(), use the function inside resp_worker(). |
| CVE-2026-98154 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-rdma: fix -EIO cleanup order in queue_rq On -EIO, the RDMA queue_rq path reports a host path error and then still cleans up the command and unmaps the SQE DMA. The path error helper completes the request, so that is double cleanup and DMA unmap after the request is already complete. Unmap the SQE first, then report the host path error. Skip the outer command cleanup on that path. |
| CVE-2026-98153 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme: fix racy access to FDP placement id array nvme_query_fdp_info() is called per-path and therefore prone to races. It populates head->nr_plids/head->plids for fdp registration. But nothing protects that pair from concurrent access - two paths scanning the same namespace can race to populate it. Avoid the race by moving this initialization work to nvme_alloc_ns_head() which is called once per shared namespace. |
| CVE-2026-98152 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-rdma: fix queue leak when connect backlog is exceeded When pending disconnecting queues exceed the backlog limit, the connect path only drops the device reference and leaks the newly allocated queue and its IB resources. |
| CVE-2026-98151 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic Take the following unprivileged program as an example: r0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(...) /* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, offset 0 */ ... 14: r0 += r1 /* r1 is a bounded scalar */ 15: r9 = r0 Loading it triggers a verifier warning from reg_bounds_sanity_check(): verifier bug: REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (alu): const subreg tnum out of sync with range bounds r64={.base=0x0, .size=0x0} r32={.base=0x0, .size=0xffffffff} var_off=(0x0, 0x0) What happens: 1. Processing insn 14 (r0 += r1) in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the new offset is computed into dst_reg's var_off and 32/64-bit ranges. 2. Because pointer registers do not track 32-bit subregister bounds, __mark_reg32_unbounded() first sets r32 to the full range; r32 is re-derived from the offset at the end of the function by reg_bounds_sync(). 3. On the unprivileged path, sanitize_ptr_alu() is called and, via sanitize_speculative_path() -> push_stack(), snapshots the current register state and schedules the next instruction (insn 15) to be verified directly as a speculative path. 4. That snapshot is taken between step 2 and the final reg_bounds_sync(): at this point dst_reg's var_off still holds the (const) original offset while r32 has just been blanked to the full range, i.e. the two are out of sync. When the speculative path later verifies insn 15 (r9 = r0), the inconsistent state reaches reg_bounds_sanity_check() and trips the warning. var_off and the 32-bit range must always be consistent. There are two ways to keep the snapshot consistent: 1. sync var_off and r32 before the snapshot so they match, or 2. leave r32 at its original (already consistent) value and blank it only after the snapshot. The whole point of sanitize_ptr_alu() is to insert a harmless masking sequence that keeps the access in bounds under speculation, so the state it snapshots should faithfully represent that. Take approach 2: move __mark_reg32_unbounded() to after sanitize_ptr_alu(), so the speculative snapshot keeps the pointer's original, consistent r32. The non-speculative path is unchanged: r32 is still blanked before the offset is applied and re-derived by reg_bounds_sync(). |
| CVE-2026-98150 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix BPF_F_CPU validation for sparse CPU IDs BPF_F_CPU stores the target CPU ID in the upper 32 bits of the map operation flags. bpf_map_check_op_flags() currently compares that ID with num_possible_cpus(), which is the number of possible CPUs rather than a bound on CPU IDs. On an arm64 QEMU guest with a CPU device-tree hole, the possible CPU mask was 0,2-3. A userspace program using raw bpf() syscalls creates a BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY and performs update and lookup operations for each CPU by setting BPF_F_CPU and the CPU ID in the flags. With the old check, CPU 1 is incorrectly accepted while valid CPU 3 is rejected with -ERANGE. The CPU 1 update then reaches the per-CPU map access path and triggers: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ... pc : __pi_memcpy_generic+0x5c/0x22c lr : bpf_percpu_array_update+0x2dc/0x2e8 Call trace: __pi_memcpy_generic bpf_map_update_value map_update_elem __sys_bpf Check the CPU ID against nr_cpu_ids and cpu_possible() instead. This rejects CPU IDs outside the valid range and CPUs absent from the possible mask, while allowing valid sparse CPU IDs. |
| CVE-2026-98149 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix percpu map update indexing with sparse CPU IDs Per-CPU array, hash, and cgroup storage map updates without BPF_F_CPU or BPF_F_ALL_CPUS use a value buffer whose per-CPU slots are packed in possible-CPU order. The buffer is sized as: round_up(value_size, 8) * num_possible_cpus() The update paths iterate over possible CPUs, but use the logical CPU ID to calculate the source offset: value + size * cpu This only works when possible CPU IDs are contiguous starting at zero. For example, with a possible CPU mask of 0,2-3, the buffer contains three slots corresponding to CPUs 0, 2, and 3. CPU2 is therefore expected to use slot 1 and CPU3 slot 2. Instead, the current code uses slots 2 and 3 respectively, causing incorrect per-CPU values and an out-of-bounds read from the update buffer for CPU3. The corresponding lookup paths already use a dense offset while iterating over possible CPUs. Do the same for the array, hash, and cgroup storage update paths, advancing the source offset once for each possible CPU. BPF_F_ALL_CPUS continues to use the same value for every CPU. |
| CVE-2026-98148 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/gud: validate GUD_ROTATION_0 is present in supported rotations The rotation argument to drm_plane_create_rotation_property() is set to DRM_MODE_ROTATE_0, and the device reported rotation bitmask is used as the supported_rotations argument. The driver never validates that GUD_ROTATION_0 is present, so a device that omits it from its GUD_PROPERTY_ROTATION triggers the WARN_ON(rotation & ~supported_rotations) in drm_plane_create_rotation_property() Fix this by skipping the creation of rotation property if the device doesn't have the GUD_ROTATION_0 bit |
| CVE-2026-98147 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: printk: Don't WARN on kthread_run failure. Since __kthread_create_on_node() returns -EINTR upon SIGKILL, we should not use WARN_ON() in order to catch kthread_run() failure. |
| CVE-2026-98146 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: Remove __counted_by from struct amdxdna_cmd_chain struct amdxdna_cmd_chain contains a flexible array annotated with __counted_by(command_count). Since the structure is stored in shared AMDXDNA_BO_SHARE memory, userspace can modify command_count concurrently. If command_count is changed to zero, the bounds check generated from __counted_by may fail and trigger a kernel panic. Remove __counted_by to avoid relying on the userspace-controlled command_count for the flexible array bounds check. |
| CVE-2026-98145 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: reject a command chain that carries no commands A chain whose command_count is zero passes the payload length check, because struct_size(payload, data, 0) is just the header. The fill loop then does not run, so offset stays zero and the request is submitted with a zero-length buffer. On firmware without AIE2_NPU_COMMAND that ends at the opcode check, since op is still ERT_INVALID_CMD and aie2_get_chain_msg_op() answers MSG_OP_MAX_OPCODE. aie2_get_npu_chain_msg_op() answers MSG_OP_CHAIN_EXEC_NPU whatever it is given, so there the submission continues to drm_clflush_virt_range(cmd_buf, 0), which reads the byte before the buffer and faults on the vmap guard page. EXEC_CMD is reachable by any process that can open the render node. Reject the request instead. |
| CVE-2026-98144 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: put the chained BO when its mapping fails amdxdna_cmd_set_error() looks up the first BO of a command chain, which takes a reference, and drops it at the end of the function. The mapping of that BO is established in between, and the failure path returns without the put, so the reference is leaked. Ordinary use does not reach it. The chain has been submitted before any of this runs, so aie2_cmdlist_fill_slot() has already called amdxdna_cmd_get_op() on that BO and amdxdna_gem_vmap() has cached its address. What makes it reachable is that the BO is resolved again by handle here, and the handle is userspace's to recycle: closing it after submission and importing a dma-buf whose exporter implements no vmap onto the same id leaves amdxdna_gem_get_obj() returning an object this cannot map, since prime_import() types every import AMDXDNA_BO_SHARE. |
| CVE-2026-98143 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel: ethosu: Don't read the U65 rounding mode as a storage mode Bits 15:14 of NPU_SET_{IFM,OFM}_PRECISION select the activation storage mode on U85 only. On U65 the same field holds the rounding mode, and the command stream parser has read it as a storage mode since the driver was added. That went unnoticed while unknown values fell through the switch, but now that they are rejected, every U65 command stream that asks for natural rounding (2) fails CMDSTREAM_BO_CREATE with -EINVAL. Mesa emits it for average pooling, concatenation, split, unpack, strided slice, LUT and argmax, which is 72 failures of the Teflon test suite on an i.MX93. Truncating rounding (1) is misread as well: it picks the two-tile address path and computes a bogus feature map size from tile bases the command stream never set. Read the field as a storage mode only on the hardware where it is one. |
| CVE-2026-98142 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/cirrus-qemu: Validate BAR0 size during probe The `cirrus-qemu` driver relies on `CIRRUS_VRAM_SIZE` (4 MB) to validate framebuffer sizes. However, during PCI probe, the driver mapped BAR0 without verifying that its size matches `CIRRUS_VRAM_SIZE`. If a PCI device with a BAR0 smaller than 4 MB is bound to the driver, the mapped VRAM will be smaller than expected. Because validation checks assume 4 MB VRAM, framebuffers larger than the mapped memory can be created. When the display plane is updated (e.g. during release), `cirrus_primary_plane_helper_atomic_update()` copies the framebuffer to VRAM using `drm_fb_memcpy()`. Writing past the end of the mapped I/O memory causes a supervisor write page fault: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc9000389c000 ... RIP: 0010:memcpy_toio+0x7c/0xe0 arch/x86/lib/iomem.c:110 ... Call Trace: <TASK> iosys_map_memcpy_to include/linux/iosys-map.h:285 [inline] drm_fb_memcpy+0x325/0x5d0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_format_helper.c:442 cirrus_primary_plane_helper_atomic_update+0x98a/0xb00 drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/cirrus-qemu.c:358 drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes+0x626/0xea0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:3038 drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x60/0x510 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:1989 commit_tail+0x2b1/0x3c0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:2074 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0xa77/0xb10 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:2312 Fix this by validating in `cirrus_pci_probe()` that the PCI BAR0 resource is not less than `CIRRUS_VRAM_SIZE`, returning `-ENODEV` if it is less. |
| CVE-2026-98141 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: propagate reparse index insertion failure update_reparse_data() ignores the return value of set_reparse_index(). When index insertion fails, the code removes the just-written reparse data as cleanup but still returns 0, so symlink(2) (and WSL special file creation) reports success while no reparse data exists on disk. When there was no previous reparse data (oldsize == 0), the failure was likewise silently ignored. Propagate the error to the caller. |
| CVE-2026-98140 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: fix kmap_local leak in write_mft_record_nolock() error paths write_mft_record_nolock() maps the MFT record folio with kmap_local_folio(), but the pre_write_mst_fixup() and bio_add_folio() failure paths jump to the error label without unmapping it. kmap_local mappings are stack-ordered per task, so leaking one corrupts the nesting for any outer mapping. Unmap the folio on those error paths too. |
| CVE-2026-98139 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: only count successfully cleared runs when freeing clusters ntfs_cluster_free_from_rl_nolock() adds a run's length to nr_freed whenever the error bookkeeping condition is false, which includes cases where ntfs_bitmap_clear_run() actually failed - e.g. a second run failing with the same errno as an earlier one, or any failure after a non-ENOMEM error was already recorded. Since a failed ntfs_bitmap_clear_run() rolls back its partial modifications, no bits were cleared for that run, yet its length still inflates vol->free_clusters, corrupting statfs output and the allocator's free space gate. Only count runs whose bitmap clear succeeded. |
| CVE-2026-98138 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: do not mark the volume clean in sync_fs when errors were recorded ntfs_put_super() and the remount-read-only path both clear the dirty bit only when NVolErrors(vol) is false. ntfs_sync_fs() clears it unconditionally, so any sync() on a volume that recorded an error marks that volume clean. A volume without this set is then seen as not needing recovery and it does not run one, so whatever went wrong is never repaired. This change skips resetting the dirty bit when there are volume errors. Reproduced on a volume whose $MFTMirr does not match $MFT, which sets the error flag while leaving the mount read-write: after a write and a sync, the on-disk volume flags read 0x0000 with this driver and 0x0001 with the guard in place. |
| CVE-2026-98137 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: treat any nonzero dio zero-range return as an error ntfs_dio_zero_range() returns either 0 or a negative errno from blkdev_issue_zeroout(); it never returns a positive value. The zeroing failure check in ntfs_attr_fallocate() therefore never fired, so a failed zeroing operation was silently ignored: the loop kept going, the newly allocated clusters were folded into initialized_size and the write could succeed leaving stale on-disk data. Treat any nonzero return as an error and abort the allocation. |
| CVE-2026-98136 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: bound $AttrDef table walk to the loaded table size ntfs_attr_find_in_attrdef() walks the in-memory $AttrDef table, but the loop condition bounds only the start of each entry, not the whole entry: for (ad = vol->attrdef; (u8 *)ad - (u8 *)vol->attrdef < vol->attrdef_size && ad->type; ++ad) struct attr_def is 160 bytes; the guard reads ad->type at offset 128 and the loop body reads further fields. vol->attrdef is kvzalloc(i_size), where i_size is the on-disk $AttrDef data size, checked in load_and_init_attrdef() only as 0 < i_size <= 0x7fffffff. A volume whose $AttrDef data size is smaller than one entry (e.g. 120 bytes) makes the read of ad->type run past the allocation. Creating a file reaches this through ntfs_attr_size_bounds_check() and reads out of bounds: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ntfs_attr_find_in_attrdef+0x66/0xa0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888005833280 by task init/1 ntfs_attr_find_in_attrdef ntfs_attr_size_bounds_check ntfs_attr_can_be_non_resident ntfs_attr_add Require the whole entry to lie within attrdef_size in the loop guard, and reject at mount a $AttrDef too small to hold one attr_def entry. |
| CVE-2026-98135 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: reject invalid sectors_per_cluster in the boot sector is_boot_sector_ntfs() checks the boot sector's sectors_per_cluster field with a range test that rejects 0x81..0xf3 but accepts 0 and other non-power-of-two counts. A zero value reaches parse_ntfs_boot_sector(): sectors_per_cluster_bits = ffs(sectors_per_cluster) - 1; ... vol->cluster_size = vol->sector_size << sectors_per_cluster_bits; ffs(0) is 0, so sectors_per_cluster_bits becomes (unsigned)-1 and the shift is undefined: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/ntfs/super.c:673:39 shift exponent 4294967295 is too large for 32-bit type 'int' This change rejects any non-power-of-two value, since it feeds the aforementioned shift via ffs() - 1, which only yields the correct shift for a power of two. |
| CVE-2026-98134 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: check_cond_jmp_op(): properly infer if register is null Nicholas Carlini reported a bug when verifier can incorrectly infer that a pointer is non-null. The bug occurs when two pointers are compared and one of them has a type w/o PTR_MAYBE_NULL flag, but which allows a value to be NULL at runtime. Here is an example: // `a` is PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED // `a` is 0 at runtime. // `b` is PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | PTR_MAYBE_NULL void *a = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0); int *b = bpf_map_lookup_elem(...); if (a == b) *b = 42; // verifier does not catch null pointer dereference This happens because of a special case in check_cond_jmp_op(), which attempts to strip PTR_MAYBE_NULL flags from pointer types, when processing comparisons like `rA == rB`, if either rA or rB can't be null. The non-null property is derived based on the absence of PTR_MAYBE_NULL flag on rA's or rB's type. But that is not sufficient for types like PTR_TO_MEM, as in the example. This patch replaces type_may_be_null() call with reg_not_null(), which contains an allowlist of types for which absence of PTR_MAYBE_NULL actually means that the value can't be NULL at runtime. At the moment, the list in the reg_not_null() omits two types for which PTR_MAYBE_NULL is applicable: PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK and PTR_TO_BUF. In order to remain backward compatible, and assuming that only comparison between pointers of the same type makes sense, this commit extends reg_not_null(). W/o such an extension e.g. verifier_jeq_infer_not_null/null_ptr_to_map_value fails. reg_not_null() can be extended further, but I deem that out of scope for the fix at hand. Explicit base_type(...) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID checks in the check_cond_jmp_op() can be removed with migration to reg_not_null(), but that is a behavioural change, as the special case would start matching for PTR_TO_BTF_ID that is also is_trusted_reg(). I omit the behavioural change from this commit. |
| CVE-2026-98133 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: leave HasEA flag untouched on setxattr failure In ntfs_set_ea(), the exit path unconditionally updates the HasEA flag based on ea_info_qsize. When an error occurs before ea_info_qsize is updated, NInoClearHasEA() hides existing on-disk EAs until the inode is evicted. Only update the flag on success. |
| CVE-2026-98132 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: don't downgrade half-dead scalar zero spills to STACK_ZERO states.c:__clean_func_state() can downgrade scalar zero spill to STACK_ZERO in the following case: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0; ... checkpoint ... r1 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 4); ... no reads from r10-8 ... Here 4 bytes at r10-8 are dead and verifier changes scalar spill to a combination: 0000pppp (p stands for poison). Such a change breaks precision propagation chains. All places that produce STACK_ZERO should call bpf_mark_chain_precision() for the zero source. This patch fixes the bug in a simplest way possible: avoids converting stack spills of zero to STACK_ZERO. Two smarter approaches are possible: - do bpf_mark_chain_precision() from __clean_func_state() - check slot liveness information in check_stack_write_fixed_off() I investigated both and the changes required are a bit tricky, hence go with a simple fix for the time being. |
| CVE-2026-98131 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: fix dma mapping leak in stmmac_tso_xmit() In stmmac_tso_xmit(), if the DMA mapping of an skb fragment fails, the frame is dropped but the DMA mappings already created for the linear part and for the fragments mapped before the failure are never unmapped, leaking DMA mappings. Fix the leak by walking back over the descriptors used by the frame and releasing each of them with stmmac_free_tx_buffer(). Moreover, release the descriptors with stmmac_release_tx_desc() unmapping the DMA buffers. |
| CVE-2026-98130 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: fix a TOCTOU race in SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START The SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START handler checks timer_pending() before calling timer_reduce(). The timer can expire and detach between these operations, causing timer_reduce() to rearm the timer without taking the association reference required for the newly armed timer. The timer callback later unconditionally drops its association reference, which can leave the association reference count unbalanced and result in use-after-free during association teardown. Use the return value of timer_reduce() to determine whether the timer was actually armed. Take the association reference only when timer_reduce() successfully starts a new timer, closing the race between checking the timer state and rearming it. This issue was reported by Nico Yip (@_cyeaa_) working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative. |
| CVE-2026-98129 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: mpi3mr: Fix NULL pointer dereference in mpi3mr_sas_port_add() sas_port_alloc_num() can return NULL on memory allocation failure. The return value is passed directly to sas_port_add() without a NULL check, which causes a NULL pointer dereference. Additionally, if sas_port_add() fails, the allocated port is not freed before jumping to out_fail, leaking the sas_port structure. Call sas_port_free() to properly release it. |
| CVE-2026-98128 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: mpi3mr: Fix target device refcount leak in mpi3mr_sas_port_add() mpi3mr_get_tgtdev_by_addr() increments the target device kref when it returns a device. If a subsequent error triggers a goto out_fail after the tgtdev reference is acquired, the reference is never released because the out_fail path does not call mpi3mr_tgtdev_put(). This prevents the target device structure from ever being freed. Add a tgtdev put in the out_fail path, guarded by a NULL check since tgtdev is only acquired for SAS_END_DEVICE types and the same cleanup path is shared by earlier error cases where tgtdev is still NULL. |
| CVE-2026-98127 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb/client: validate new EOF for insert range smb3_insert_range() does not check if the new file size (i_size + len) is valid. This allows FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE to bypass RLIMIT_FSIZE, exceed s_maxbytes, or produce a size outside the loff_t range. Use check_add_overflow() to calculate the new EOF. Validate it with inode_newsize_ok() before modifying the file. Reproducer, using a file on a CIFS mount: bash -c ' FILE=/mnt/cifs/repro trap "" SIGXFSZ ulimit -f 3072 # RLIMIT_FSIZE = 3 MiB # A regular write is stopped at 3 MiB. dd if=/dev/zero of="$FILE" bs=1M count=4 status=none stat -c "size after write: %s" "$FILE" # Insert 2 MiB into a 2 MiB file. truncate -s 2M "$FILE" fallocate -i -o 0 -l 2M "$FILE" stat -c "size after insert: %s" "$FILE" ' Before this change, the regular write stops at the 3 MiB limit, but insert range grows the file to 4 MiB: dd: error writing '/mnt/cifs/repro': File too large size after write: 3145728 size after insert: 4194304 After this change, insert range also fails at the limit and leaves the 2 MiB file unchanged: dd: error writing '/mnt/cifs/repro': File too large size after write: 3145728 fallocate: fallocate failed: File too large size after insert: 2097152 |
| CVE-2026-98126 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb/client: validate new EOF for zero range When FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE is used without FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE, smb3_zero_range() may extend EOF without checking RLIMIT_FSIZE, allowing the file to grow beyond the caller's file-size limit. Fix this by calling inode_newsize_ok() before sending the zero-range request when the operation would extend EOF. Reproducer, using a file on a CIFS mount: bash -c ' FILE=/mnt/cifs/repro trap "" SIGXFSZ ulimit -f 3072 truncate -s 2M "$FILE" fallocate --zero-range -o 0 -l 4M "$FILE" echo "fallocate rc=$?" stat -c "file size=%s" "$FILE" ' Before this change, the operation succeeds despite the 3 MiB limit: fallocate rc=0 file size=4194304 After this change, fallocate fails and leaves the file at 2 MiB. |
| CVE-2026-98125 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb/client: fix stale page cache in insert/collapse range smb3_insert_range() and smb3_collapse_range() use truncate_pagecache_range() to invalidate the affected page cache. However, if off or old_eof is not page-aligned, the boundary pages are only partially zeroed and remain uptodate. As a result, the client may return stale data after a successful insert/collapse range operation. For example, with 4K pages: page 0 page 1 page 2 0------4K 4K------8K 8K------12K ^ ^ off=2K old_eof=10K Page 1 is removed from the page cache, while the boundary pages are only partially zeroed. After COPYCHUNK moves the data on the server, these cached pages may still return stale data. This can be reproduced on a CIFS mount: bash -c ' FILE=/mnt/scratch/repro # Use a 6 KiB file so EOF is not page-aligned. dd if=/dev/urandom of=/tmp/src bs=1K count=6 status=none # Expected: a 4 KiB hole followed by the original data. rm -f /tmp/expected truncate -s 4K /tmp/expected cat /tmp/src >> /tmp/expected cp /tmp/src "$FILE" # Prime the page cache before moving data on the server. cat "$FILE" > /dev/null fallocate --insert-range -o 0 -l 4K "$FILE" if cmp -s /tmp/expected "$FILE"; then echo "readback: OK" else echo "readback: STALE DATA" fi ' Fix this by writing back dirty data and discarding the page cache from the start of the page containing off to EOF before moving data on the server. |
| CVE-2026-98124 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb/client: invalidate fscache for fallocate range operations smb3_zero_range(), smb3_punch_hole(), smb3_insert_range(), and smb3_collapse_range() modify file contents through server-side range operations. These operations discard the affected page cache, but leave the FS-Cache cookie valid, so a later read may return data cached before the range operation. Fix this by invalidating FS-Cache after outstanding I/O has completed and before modifying the file on the server. Run the following as root on a CIFS mount with fsc enabled and an active CacheFiles backend: bash -c ' MNT=/mnt/cifs FILE="$MNT/repro" # Generate four 1 MiB random blocks: [A][B][C][D]. dd if=/dev/urandom of=/tmp/src bs=1M count=4 status=none # Expected contents after zeroing B: [A][zero][C][D]. cp /tmp/src /tmp/expected dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/expected bs=1M seek=1 count=1 \ conv=notrunc status=none cp /tmp/src "$FILE" # Populate FS-Cache, then discard the page cache. sync echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches cat "$FILE" > /dev/null sync echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches fallocate --zero-range -o 1M -l 1M "$FILE" if cmp -s /tmp/expected "$FILE"; then echo "readback: OK" else echo "readback: STALE DATA" fi ' Before this change, the readback differs from /tmp/expected: readback: STALE DATA After this change, it matches: readback: OK |
| CVE-2026-98123 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: fix soft lockup from unpadded ASCONF-ACK parameter iteration sctp_verify_asconf() walks ASCONF-ACK parameters with sctp_walk_params(), which advances by SCTP_PAD4(length), while the consumer sctp_get_asconf_response() iterates the same parameters advancing by the raw length, without padding. A single odd-length parameter desynchronises the two walks and makes the consumer interpret attacker-controlled bytes at a misaligned offset. When those bytes yield a length of zero, the while loop over asconf_ack_len makes no progress, spinning forever in softirq context, and the watchdog reports a soft lockup. All reads stay within the received skb, so the lockup is a pure remote denial of service. A remote peer can trigger it with a crafted ASCONF-ACK on an ADD-IP enabled association with an outstanding ASCONF (RFC 5061 section 4.1.2 requires the chunk to be authenticated, but the predefined empty key id 0 allows the peer to compute the same association HMAC from publicly exchanged parameters, so the gate does not help). The SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE case of sctp_verify_asconf() also performs no length check, letting a parameter without a complete error header reach the consumer, which reads errhdr.cause past the end of the parameter, an out-of-bounds read. Reject SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE parameters shorter than sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_errhdr) at the verifier, and advance the consumer iterator with the same padding rule as the verifier to keep the two walks in lockstep. The verifier change guarantees a complete error header in every ERR_CAUSE parameter the consumer can see, so the consumer's asconf_ack_len check is dropped and it returns err_param->cause directly. The consumer padding fix is still required because odd lengths remain valid for SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE per RFC 5061. The issue was found by ZeroHive, a vulnerability hunting agent at Tencent Yunding Lab. |
| CVE-2026-98122 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: mdb: Fix use-after-free in vxlan_mdb_remote_src_del() vxlan_mdb_is_valid_source(), which validates MDBE_ATTR_SOURCE and every MDBE_ATTR_SRC_LIST member, accepts the all-zeros address. A source list is only accepted on a (*, G) entry, whose source is the all-zeros address, and for each member of the list an (S, G) entry is derived from it by substituting the source. Entries are keyed by a plain memcmp() of struct vxlan_mdb_entry_key, so if MDBE_ATTR_SOURCE is present and holds the all-zeros address and the source list holds it as well, the derived (S, G) key is byte-identical to the (*, G) key and resolves to the same entry. Omitting MDBE_ATTR_SOURCE is not equivalent, as the key is then left with a zero address family. vxlan_mdb_remote_src_del() removes the forwarding entry of a source before freeing the source entry: vxlan_mdb_remote_src_fwd_del(vxlan, group, remote, &ent->addr); vxlan_mdb_remote_src_entry_del(ent); With the keys aliased, the first call deletes the remote of the entry that owns 'ent' instead of a separate (S, G) entry, and frees 'ent'. The second call then runs on the freed entry, and its hlist_del() reads ->pprev and ->next out of it and writes through them. Adding the (*, G) entry with NLM_F_REPLACE and no source list marks the all-zeros source for deletion and reaches this from the sweep at the end of vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_replace(). BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __vxlan_mdb_add+0x1cd/0xd70 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888102852500 by task poc/84 __vxlan_mdb_add+0x1cd/0xd70 vxlan_mdb_add+0xc0/0x140 rtnl_mdb_add+0x157/0x2a0 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x207/0x5a0 Allocated by task 84: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x153/0x360 vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add+0x2eb/0x440 __vxlan_mdb_add+0x803/0xd70 Freed by task 84: kfree+0x14c/0x3b0 vxlan_mdb_remote_del+0x129/0x1a0 __vxlan_mdb_del+0x4f/0xe0 vxlan_mdb_remote_src_fwd_del.isra.0+0x162/0x1b0 __vxlan_mdb_add+0x1c5/0xd70 The MDB operations are netns-scoped, so an unprivileged user can perform them in a new user and network namespace. Reject the all-zeros address in vxlan_mdb_is_valid_source(), which covers both call sites. A (*, G) entry is expressed by omitting the source, so nothing legitimate is refused. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> |
| CVE-2026-98121 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: watchdog: msc313e: Fix NULL pointer dereference in PM callbacks msc313e_wdt_probe() doesn't set the driver data for the platform device. As a result, dev_get_drvdata() in msc313e_wdt_suspend() and msc313e_wdt_resume() will return NULL, leading to a NULL pointer dereference afterward. Set the platform device driver data in msc313e_wdt_probe(). |
| CVE-2026-98120 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix subreq ref leak Fix a subrequest ref leak in netfs_unbuffered_write() in the event that subreq->io_iter ends up zero length during preparation. |
| CVE-2026-98119 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: break unbuffered write when netfs_alloc_subrequest() fails syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref below [1] following a fault injection in netfs_alloc_subrequest(). [0] When netfs_alloc_subrequest() fails, subreq is NULL. Later, netfs_prepare_write() tries to initialize members of subreq(e.g., source), the issue in [1] is triggered. Let's handle the error of netfs_prepare_write() properly. [0] FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 Call Trace: netfs_alloc_subrequest+0x116/0x3f0 netfs_prepare_write+0x76/0x7b0 netfs_unbuffered_write+0x75c/0x2020 netfs_unbuffered_write_iter_locked+0x7d6/0xa80 netfs_unbuffered_write_iter+0x442/0x720 v9fs_file_write_iter+0xbf/0x100 vfs_write+0x6ac/0x1050 [1] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000a8-0x00000000000000af] RIP: 0010:netfs_prepare_write+0xbc/0x7b0 fs/netfs/write_issue.c:173 Call Trace: netfs_unbuffered_write+0x75c/0x2020 fs/netfs/direct_write.c:111 netfs_unbuffered_write_iter_locked+0x7d6/0xa80 fs/netfs/direct_write.c:290 netfs_unbuffered_write_iter+0x442/0x720 fs/netfs/direct_write.c:382 v9fs_file_write_iter+0xbf/0x100 fs/9p/vfs_file.c:409 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline] |
| CVE-2026-98118 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix readahead synchronisation issues by loading all folios upfront There are some synchronisation issues that derive from the app thread adding more folios to the rolling buffer whilst the collector thread is looking at them or trying to clear them, such as determining the setting of front_folio_order when the next folio hasn't been added yet, The reason for the rolling buffer approach is that loading the buffer upfront and then dropping all the refs just acquired is quite a slow operation, and loading progressively allows some of the cost to be deferred until after at least some of the I/O is started. Instead, a better way is to load all the folios into the rolling buffer upfront - and then drop the refs later, once the I/O is in progress. (Even better would be for the refs not to be there at all.) Fix this by changing the rolling buffer loader to load all the folios selected by the VM for readahead upfront into the folio queue. The folio queue is allocated a batch worth at a time as we don't know how many folios are involved (the readahead_control struct, alas, has a page count, not a folio count). The folio refs acquired from readahead are then dropped in bulk once the first subrequest is dispatched as it's quite a slow operation. The collector waits for NETFS_RREQ_NEED_PUT_RA_REFS to be cleared so that it doesn't unlock folios before the xarray has been scanned for them. This simplifies the buffer handling later and isn't noticeably slower as the xarray doesn't need to be modified and the folios are all already pre-locked. |
| CVE-2026-98117 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: Fix potential UAF/KASAN warning Currently, trace_cachefiles_coherency() is being passed a pointer to a __be64 lain over the coherency data in struct cachefiles_xattr so that it can display the first 8 bytes. However, the data is of variable length and could even be 0 bytes. This could lead to a UAF or KASAN warning. Fix this by making sure the buffer has room for at least 8 bytes and that those 8 bytes are pre-cleared. Further, those bytes are not 8-byte aligned, so fix the tracepoint to extract the data as four 2-byte words (they are 2-byte aligned) and reassemble the __be64. The compiler will convert this into a single 8-byte load where the CPU supports it. |
| CVE-2026-98116 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: pcm: Serialize PCM mmap with buffer reallocation to fix page UAF snd_pcm_hw_params() and snd_pcm_hw_free() guard buffer reallocation with an mmap_count check performed under the PCM stream lock, but the lock is released long before the buffer is actually freed: snd_pcm_sync_stop(), constraint refinement and do_free_pages() all happen in between. snd_pcm_mmap_data(), on the other hand, takes no lock at all: it validates against the old buffer's state and dma_bytes, remaps its pages into the VMA, and only then increments mmap_count. A concurrent mmap() can therefore slip in between the check and the free. remap_pfn_range() installs writable PTEs for the old buffer's pages without taking page references, and the subsequent do_free_pages() returns those pages to the page allocator while the VMA still maps them. This leaves a stale, writable mapping of freed pages: a page-level use-after-free that can be leveraged for local privilege escalation. Make snd_pcm_mmap_data() participate in the buffer-access scheme introduced for hw_params/hw_free: acquire runtime->buffer_accessing before validating and remapping, and release it afterwards. Buffer reallocation already fails with -EBUSY while accessors are active, and the mmap side now fails with -EBUSY while a reallocation is in progress, so the validate/remap sequence and the check/free sequence can no longer interleave. A reproducer that turns this race into a stale writable mapping of the freed DMA buffer pages is available on request. |
| CVE-2026-98115 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: safely drain sessions during logoff SMB3 multichannel allows requests for one session to run on multiple connections. Wait for all channels bound to a session before freeing shared session objects. A deferred byte-range lock remains counted as a running request and only wakes when its file closes. Wake blocked locks during the drain without unpublishing or modifying their file objects. Synchronous CANCEL requests must invoke their cancellation callback to wake pending operations, while CHANGE_NOTIFY completion remains specific to the asynchronous path. Serialize session teardown with channel registration and previous-session cleanup, and use atomic work-state transitions so LOGOFF, CANCEL, and connection teardown invoke cancellation callbacks only once. |
| CVE-2026-98114 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: propagate DACL parsing errors parse_dacl() silently accepts truncated ACEs and allocation failures, allowing set_info_sec() to continue with an incomplete ACL conversion. Return parsing and allocation errors to parse_sec_desc() so malformed security descriptors are rejected before inode attributes or ACL xattrs are updated. |
| CVE-2026-98113 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: rate limit unmapped SID errors A client can include many structurally valid but unmapped SIDs in a DACL. Logging every mapping failure lets one request generate hundreds of kernel error messages. Rate limit the message to prevent an authenticated client from flooding the kernel log. |
| CVE-2026-98112 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix listener task lifetime on netdev events The listener thread exits when its listening socket is shutdown. The netdevice notifier shuts down the socket before calling kthread_stop(), so the task_struct can be freed before kthread_stop() gets its reference. Create the listener in a stopped state and hold an extra task_struct reference until kthread_stop_put() completes. Also stop and release listeners before freeing their interface records during TCP teardown. |
| CVE-2026-98111 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btintel: validate version TLV value lengths btintel_parse_version_tlv() verifies that a complete TLV is present in the response, but it does not ensure that the value is long enough for the specific TLV type. A short value can therefore cause an out-of-bounds read through get_unaligned_le16(), get_unaligned_le32(), or memcpy(). Reject values shorter than the minimum required by each known TLV type. Also reject responses that do not contain the Command Complete Status field. |
| CVE-2026-98110 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btintel: bound firmware ID by TLV length The firmware ID is treated as a NUL-terminated string even though the TLV length is its only boundary. If the value does not contain a NUL terminator, snprintf() can read beyond the received response. Limit the conversion to the advertised TLV value length. |
| CVE-2026-98109 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix race condition during device registration In hci_register_dev(), the power_on work item is queued to hdev->req_workqueue before initializing hdev->adv_monitors_idr and registering the MSFT extension via msft_register(). For devices marked with quirks such as HCI_QUIRK_RAW_DEVICE, the HCI_UNCONFIGURED flag is set on the device. When the power_on work item runs concurrently on another CPU, hci_power_on() detects that the device is unconfigured and immediately invokes hci_dev_do_close(), which calls msft_do_close(). Concurrently, msft_register() allocates the msft structure and exposes it to hdev->msft_data prior to calling mutex_init(&msft->filter_lock). If msft_do_close() executes while hdev->msft_data is already assigned but the mutex has not yet been initialized, mutex_lock(&msft->filter_lock) operates on an uninitialized mutex, triggering a DEBUG_LOCKS warning: DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock) WARNING: kernel/locking/mutex.c:625 at __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:625 [inline] WARNING: kernel/locking/mutex.c:625 at __mutex_lock+0x12d8/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821 ... Call Trace: <TASK> msft_do_close+0x308/0x7b0 net/bluetooth/msft.c:693 hci_dev_close_sync+0x86b/0x10a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5522 hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:499 [inline] hci_power_on+0x32c/0x750 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:937 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3322 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa8e/0x14e0 kernel/workqueue.c:3405 worker_thread+0x92d/0xe10 kernel/workqueue.c:3486 kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Fix this by moving the queue_work() call in hci_register_dev() to after idr_init(&hdev->adv_monitors_idr) and msft_register(hdev) so that device structures and extensions are fully initialized before asynchronous tasks can access them. Additionally, assign hdev->msft_data in msft_register() only after mutex_init(&msft->filter_lock) has completed. |
| CVE-2026-98108 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix chan mode for LE_CONN_REQ + EXT_FLOWCTL pchan l2cap_new_connection() sets default value of channel mode to match the parent channel. l2cap_le_connect_req() left this at the default, and created L2CAP_MODE_EXT_FLOWCTL channels if listening pchan has that mode. This causes FLAG_DEFER_SETUP channels to reply to L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ with L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_RSP, which is incorrect. It can also result to stack OOB write (of l2cap_alloc_cid determined values) in l2cap_ecred_rsp_defer(), as l2cap_le_connect_req() does not limit maximum number of deferred channels or check for duplicate ident. Fix by setting chan->mode correctly in l2cap_le_connect_req(). Also check channel mode in l2cap_ecred_rsp_defer(), and do WARN_ON_ONCE instead of OOB write to make it less brittle. |
| CVE-2026-98107 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix out-of-bounds write in l2cap_ecred_connect l2cap_chan_connect() tries to ensure there are no more than L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_SCID_MAX pending ECRED channels, so they fit in the same L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_REQ that l2cap_ecred_connect() constructs. However, the check only counts deferred channels. If 6 L2CAP sockets are connected at the same time in order DDDDND (D=deferred, N=non-deferred), the last can bump the total to max+1. It results to one __le16 written out of bounds of the scid array, and an invalid ECRED_CONN_REQ being sent. Fix by leaving room for the non-deferred pending ECRED channels in the counting in l2cap_chan_connect(), so the limit can't be exceeded. Move counting under same critical section where the channel is added. Although race conditions involving this appear unreachable, it's easier to see. Also add WARN_ON_ONCE check in l2cap_ecred_defer_connect() to make this less brittle. |
| CVE-2026-98106 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/pagemap: Prevent double migration of device pages A device-private folio migrated to system memory by a CPU fault can remain reachable through the raw-PFN eviction path until migration finalization drops the source reference. If eviction selects the same device-private folio during this window, it can attempt to migrate the folio again. The second migration can leave an uncharged folio on an LRU list, causing folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave() to retry indefinitely and resulting in a soft lockup and RCU stall. Mark successfully migrated device-private folios using a low bit of their zone_device_data before migration finalization. Make both CPU-fault and raw-PFN migration paths skip device-private folios carrying this flag. Mask the flag when retrieving the drm_pagemap_zdd pointer and preserve it when a device-private folio is split. Keeping the state on the physical folio also avoids depending on a virtual address that may change before a fault occurs. v2: - Replace the retired-PFN XArray with an embedded bitmap. (Matthew Brost) - Mark every base page covered by a migrated folio so retirement remains valid if the folio is later split. v3: - Store the migrated state in a low bit of zone_device_data instead of adding virtual-range and bitmap tracking to the ZDD. (Matthew Brost) - Mask the flag when retrieving the ZDD and preserve it when splitting a folio. - Drop the pre-existing fixes already covered by Matthew Brost's series: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/171651/ v4: - Advance by the folio size only for migration entries marked with MIGRATE_PFN_COMPOUND. (Sashiko) v5: - Simplify ZDD flag updates and folio iteration. (Matthew Brost) - Skip retired device-private folios in the CPU-fault path. (Matthew Brost) - Preserve flag bits while taking a new ZDD reference for split folios. v6: - Restore MIGRATE_PFN_COMPOUND-aware stepping so non-compound migration entries are processed one at a time. (Sashiko) - Drop the pre-existing fixes already covered by Matthew Brost's series: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/171651/ The lockup was observed as: [10109.860465] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u65:5:6557] [10109.860524] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [O]=OOT_MODULE [10109.860524] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z790-P WIFI, BIOS 0812 02/24/2023 [10109.860525] Workqueue: xe_page_fault_work_queue xe_pagefault_queue_work [xe] [10109.860644] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x57/0x80 [10109.860655] Call Trace: [10109.860655] <TASK> [10109.860657] folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x216/0x220 [10109.860661] ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10 [10109.860665] folio_batch_move_lru+0xc8/0x450 [10109.860670] ? lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2d0 [10109.860674] ? __folio_batch_add_and_move+0x60/0x2e0 [10109.860677] ? folio_migrate_mapping+0xa6/0x110 [10109.860679] ? folio_migrate_flags+0x13b/0x1b0 [10109.860681] ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10 [10109.860683] __folio_batch_add_and_move+0xe7/0x2e0 [10109.860685] ? dma_iova_try_alloc+0xb0/0x140 [10109.860689] folio_add_lru+0x64/0x80 [10109.860691] __migrate_device_finalize+0x12c/0x270 [10109.860695] migrate_device_finalize+0x10/0x20 [10109.860698] drm_pagemap_evict_to_ram+0x185/0x370 [drm_gpusvm_helper] [10109.860704] ? drm_pagemap_evict_to_ram+0x96/0x370 [drm_gpusvm_helper] [10109.860709] xe_svm_bo_evict+0x15/0x20 [xe] [10109.860819] ? xe_svm_bo_evict+0x15/0x20 [xe] [10109.860921] xe_bo_move+0x107e/0x1570 [xe] [10109.860992] ? xe_ttm_tt_create+0x168/0x340 [xe] [10109.861059] ? __up_read+0x98/0x2b0 [10109.861061] ? lock_is_held_type+0xa3/0x130 [10109.861067] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xe8/0x1e0 [ttm] [10109.861075] ttm_bo_evict+0x141/0x1c0 [ttm] [10109.861081] ttm_bo_evict_cb+0x9f/0x100 [ttm] [10109.861086] ttm_lru_walk_for_evict+0x84/0x190 [ttm] [10109.861091] ? xe_ttm_vram_mgr_new+0x258/0x3a0 [xe] [10109.861198] ttm_bo_alloc_resource+0x219/0 ---truncated--- |
| CVE-2026-98099 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: mcast: use rcu_assign_pointer() for __rcu list updates Several places in net/ipv6/mcast.c update RCU-protected lists (np->ipv6_mc_list, idev->mc_list, idev->mc_tomb) using direct pointer assignments instead of rcu_assign_pointer(): 1. In __ipv6_dev_mc_dec(), unlinking a group from idev->mc_list did: *map = ma->next; without rcu_assign_pointer() while concurrent readers traverse idev->mc_list locklessly under rcu_read_lock(). 2. In ipv6_sock_mc_drop() and __ipv6_sock_mc_close(), unlinking a group from np->ipv6_mc_list directly assigned *lnk = mc_lst->next and np->ipv6_mc_list = mc_lst->next without rcu_assign_pointer(), racing with lockless readers in inet6_mc_check(). 3. In __ipv6_sock_mc_join(), mc_lst->next was initialized to np->ipv6_mc_list via raw assignment before publishing mc_lst. 4. In mld_del_delrec() and __ipv6_dev_mc_inc(), __rcu source pointers passed into rcu_assign_pointer() lacked explicit dereference helpers. Fix these by consistently using rcu_assign_pointer() along with mc_dereference() / sock_dereference(). |
| CVE-2026-98098 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix NULL deref in tipc_named_node_up() on empty publication list User-space applications can bind a large number of service addresses to one or more sockets. Each binding of a local-scope service address inserts one entry (publication) into the TIPC name table. If the number of these publications exceeds TIPC_MAX_PUBL (65535), protocol service types (such as node state and link state) are no longer inserted into the name table. This causes two issues: 1. User-space applications subscribing to node or link up/down events stop receiving notifications. 2. A NULL pointer dereference can occur: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000d0 ... CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4-default+ #5 PREEMPT(full) ... RIP: 0010:tipc_named_node_up (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2251 net/tipc/name_distr.c:195 net/tipc/name_distr.c:221) ... Call Trace: <IRQ> tipc_node_write_unlock (net/tipc/node.c:428) tipc_rcv (net/tipc/node.c:934 net/tipc/node.c:2189) tipc_udp_recv (net/tipc/udp_media.c:389) Thread 1 (tipc_net_finalize) | Thread 2 (named_distribute) -----------------------------|----------------------------- | ... | list_for_each_entry(publ, pls, binding_node) { | ... | __skb_queue_tail(list, skb); | ... | } | ... | hdr = buf_msg(skb_peek_tail(list)); ... | tipc_nametbl_publish(); | If 'tipc_nametbl_publish()' (Thread 1) fails because the number of local publications reaches TIPC_MAX_PUBL, list (Thread 2) will be empty. As a result, NULL is passed to 'buf_msg()', leading to a NULL pointer dereference. Fix these issues by allowing protocol service types (node state, link state, and topology server) to be inserted into the name table unconditionally. This ensures that users subscribing to these types always receive notifications. In addition, the maximum number of local user publications is reduced to (TIPC_MAX_PUBL - 1). This ensures that the maximum bulk size calculated in tipc_link_set_queue_limits() remains valid. |
| CVE-2026-98097 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: Dont send random pad bytes in RESET/ACTIVATE messages The interface name is passed in a fixed length (TIPC_MAX_IF_NAME) buffer. Replace the strcpy(data, l->if_name) with memcpy() so that the pad bytes are actually written (l->if_name[] is zero padded) rather than sending random bytes from the skb to the remote system. Replace two other strcpy() with strscpy(). |
| CVE-2026-98096 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: sr: restore network header before routing and forwarding ipv6_srh_rcv() runs with skb->data at the Segment Routing Header (SRH) while skb_network_header() points at the IPv6 header. When segments_left > 0, ipv6_srh_rcv() previously restored the skb->data position by pushing sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), assuming the SRH immediately followed the fixed IPv6 header. If another extension header (such as a Hop-by-Hop options header) precedes the SRH, skb_network_offset() remained negative. This led to two problems: 1. During ip6_route_input(), fib6_rules_early_flow_dissect() invokes __skb_flow_dissect() which passes the negative skb_network_offset() to flow dissection, breaking BPF and C flow dissector logic. 2. If forwarded via ip6_forward() or redirected via act_mirred, downstream handlers (like sch_fragment() or neighbour output) pass the negative offset as an unsigned length, triggering OOB memcpy or buffer overflows. Fix this by pushing -skb_network_offset(skb) before routing, ensuring skb_network_offset(skb) is 0 for route lookup / flow dissection as well as downstream forwarding. On the loopback path, pull skb_transport_offset(skb) to restore skb->data to the SRH before looping back. |
| CVE-2026-98095 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_packet: Don't cast tpacket_hdr.tp_len to int in tpacket_parse_header(). syzbot reported BUG() in sock_sendmsg_nosec(). [0] The problem is that tpacket_parse_header() casts user-provided tpacket_hdr.tp_len, which is u32, to int. If the length is larger than INT_MAX, the following condition in tpacket_parse_header() passes, if (unlikely(tp_len > size_max)) and any negative value can be returned to the caller, up to sock_sendmsg_nosec(). The repro set tpacket_hdr.tp_len to 0xfffffdef, which is cast to -EIOCBQUEUED (-529), triggering BUG() in sock_sendmsg_nosec(). *(uint64_t*)0x200000000008 = 0xfffffdef; ... syscall(__NR_write, /*fd=*/r[0], /*buf=*/0x200000000000ul, /*count=*/1ul); Let's define the local tp_len as u32 in tpacket_parse_header(). [0]: kernel BUG at net/socket.c:803! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5628 Comm: syz-executor176 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/24/2026 RIP: 0010:sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x145/0x180 net/socket.c:803 Code: 06 67 48 0f b9 3a eb 95 e8 e8 3a 22 f8 48 89 df 4c 89 f6 4c 89 e2 4d 89 fb 2e e8 32 a5 5c 16 e9 51 ff ff ff e8 cc 3a 22 f8 90 <0f> 0b e8 c4 3a 22 f8 48 83 c3 18 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 RSP: 0018:ffffc90003aefb48 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff89a578d4 RBX: ffff8880764c67c0 RCX: ffff88807fb23e80 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffffdef RDI: 00000000fffffdef RBP: 00000000fffffdef R08: ffffc90003aef747 R09: 1ffff9200075dee8 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200075dee9 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffc90003aefbc0 R15: ffffffff8aac4310 FS: 000055559101b400(0000) GS:ffff888124ce0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000200000000210 CR3: 0000000073dca000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: <TASK> __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:815 [inline] sock_write_iter+0x2de/0x3e0 net/socket.c:1266 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline] vfs_write+0x612/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:687 ksys_write+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:739 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f173130ecb9 Code: c0 79 93 eb d5 48 8d 7c 1d 00 eb 99 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 d8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffd67e44248 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000200000000000 RCX: 00007f173130ecb9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000200000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd67e44388 R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00002000000000c0 R15: 0000000000000002 </TASK> |
| CVE-2026-98094 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: fbtft: make dirty_lock IRQ-safe fbtft_mkdirty() can be reached from the fbcon rendering path while processing printk() in hardirq context. Meanwhile, dirty_lock is also taken by fbtft_deferred_io() in workqueue context with local interrupts enabled. Lockdep reports a possible IRQ lock inversion involving dirty_lock and console_owner. A hardirq can interrupt a CPU holding dirty_lock and enter the console rendering path, which can attempt to acquire dirty_lock again. The following lockdep report was observed on an RK3566 system with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING enabled: WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected swapper/2/0 just changed the state of lock: (console_owner){-...}-{0:0} but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past: (&par->dirty_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&par->dirty_lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(console_owner); lock(&par->dirty_lock); <Interrupt> lock(console_owner); *** DEADLOCK *** Use spin_lock_irqsave() for fbtft_mkdirty() and spin_lock_irq() for fbtft_deferred_io(). They only access the dirty line range, so the IRQ-off regions remain short. |
| CVE-2026-98093 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: fsl_micfil: balance mclk enable/disable hw_params() enables mclk unconditionally and hw_free() disables it unconditionally, but the PCM core does not guarantee 1:1 pairing: hw_free() can run without hw_params(), and hw_params() can be called multiple times from the SETUP state. This triggers an "already disabled" WARN() in the first case and leaks an enable reference in the second, leaving the clock ungateable. Guard both sides with the existing mclk_flag, as fsl_sai.c does with mclk_streams. |
| CVE-2026-98092 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: amd: yc: fix memory leak in acp6x_pdm_dma_close() acp6x_pdm_dma_close() does not free the runtime->private_data buffer allocated in acp6x_pdm_dma_open(). Add the missing kfree. |
| CVE-2026-98091 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: detach failed sprout device from transaction update list When creating the first metadata chunk for a sprout filesystem, create_chunk() adds the new device to the transaction dev_update_list through device->post_commit_list. If the subsequent system chunk creation fails, btrfs_init_new_device() aborts the transaction and releases the device while post_commit_list is still linked. This triggers a warning in btrfs_free_device() and leaves the transaction list referencing freed memory. Detach the device while holding chunk_mutex before releasing it. |
| CVE-2026-98090 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: restore active device pointers after failed sprout btrfs_init_new_device() switches latest_dev and possibly s_bdev from the seed device to the new sprout device before creating the first writable chunks. If chunk creation or the subsequent sprout setup fails, the error path releases the new device without switching those pointers back. btrfs_show_devname() can then dereference the freed latest_dev and crash. Restore the active device pointers to the latest seed device before removing and releasing the failed sprout device. |
| CVE-2026-98089 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bonding: alb: fix uninitialized transport header access in alb_determine_nd() alb_determine_nd() uses icmp6_hdr(skb) to inspect ICMPv6 headers. However, in xmit paths (e.g. packets sent via AF_PACKET / raw sockets or forwarded packets), skb->transport_header is not guaranteed to be initialized. While pskb_network_may_pull() ensures the packet data is linear starting from the network header, it does not set or adjust the transport header offset. Dereferencing icmp6_hdr(skb) can therefore access out-of-bounds memory. Fetch the icmp6hdr directly after ipv6hdr following pskb_network_may_pull(), and reload ipv6hdr in case pskb_may_pull() reallocated skb->head. Also remove the unused bond argument from alb_determine_nd(). |
| CVE-2026-98083 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix transaction use-after-free in raid stripe insertion If allocation of a RAID stripe extent fails, btrfs_insert_one_raid_extent() aborts and ends the transaction before returning -ENOMEM. btrfs_finish_one_ordered(), the production caller through btrfs_insert_raid_extent(), still owns the transaction handle. It handles the error by aborting the transaction and then reaches the common exit path, which ends the transaction again. The premature end can free the handle and drop its transaction reference. Transaction cleanup can then free the transaction before the caller's second abort accesses the handle and transaction, resulting in use-after-free. Keep the abort at the failure site, but let the caller's common exit path end the transaction once, after it has finished using both objects. |
| CVE-2026-98082 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix the possible bioc_list memory leak during error There are two possible ways to leak bioc memory on btrfs_ordered_extent::bioc_list: - An error occurred for btrfs_insert_one_raid_extent() Then the function btrfs_insert_raid_extent() immediately return without freeing any bioc in the bioc_list. - An ordered extent hit an IO error In that case the ordered extent will have BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR set, and skip the call on btrfs_insert_raid_extent() completely. Fix the problem by: - Introduce a new helper, btrfs_cleanup_ordered_bioc_list() Which will remove all bioc from the bioc_list, and release the bioc. - Call the above helper for btrfs_insert_raid_extent() So that the cleanup helper is always called no matter what. - Call the above helper for btrfs_finish_one_ordered() This is called just before the final release on the ordered extent. This was reported by Sashiko when reviewing another patch. |
| CVE-2026-98080 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: do not force reloc root creation during qgroup_account_snapshot() [BUG] When running btrfs/252 with quota enabled through MKFS_OPTIONS="-O quota", it has a high chance to trigger the following kernel warning and flips the fs RO: BTRFS info (device dm-2): relocating block group 30408704 flags metadata|dup ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:879 at lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x74b/0x960 [btrfs], CPU#4: btrfs/2173 CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 2173 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 7.2.0-rc6-custom+ #457 PREEMPT(full) 3adc6528fb66f7a55fe1095385818e742f200aab Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022 RIP: 0010:lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x74b/0x960 [btrfs] Call Trace: <TASK> insert_inline_extent_backref+0x7c/0x160 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72] __btrfs_inc_extent_ref+0xa9/0x270 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72] __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x4af/0x11c0 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x9d/0xf0 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72] create_pending_snapshot+0x39d/0xf00 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72] create_pending_snapshots+0x9b/0xc0 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x280/0xeb0 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72] prepare_to_relocate+0x147/0x200 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72] relocate_block_group+0x6b/0x5e0 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x92c/0x2380 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x3f/0x1a0 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72] btrfs_balance+0xa2c/0x19c0 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72] btrfs_ioctl+0x2839/0x2d30 [btrfs 32f09462c54d9c922fca74a3e4866f4aa7737b72] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x416/0x9a0 do_syscall_64+0xe1/0x790 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- BTRFS info (device dm-2): leaf 4593991680 gen 233 total ptrs 175 free space 5953 owner 2 BTRFS info (device dm-2): refs 3 lock_owner 2173 current 2173 item 0 key (166772736 METADATA_ITEM 1) itemoff 16250 itemsize 33 extent refs 1 gen 222 flags 2 ref#0: tree block backref root 266 [ Skip the tree dump ] item 174 key (263225344 METADATA_ITEM 0) itemoff 10328 itemsize 33 extent refs 1 gen 162 flags 258 ref#0: tree block backref root 267 BTRFS error (device dm-2): extent item not found for insert, bytenr 179847168 num_bytes 16384 parent 4594335744 root_objectid 273 owner 0 offset 0 BTRFS error (device dm-2): failed to run delayed ref for logical 179847168 num_bytes 16384 type 182 action 1 ref_mod 1: -117 [CAUSE] The above error is showing that there is a tree reference to a metadata extent that is no longer there. With "ref_verify" mount option (requires CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG), there is some extra debug output: BTRFS error (device dm-2): dumping block entry [180961280 16384], num_refs 0, metadata 1, from disk 0 BTRFS error (device dm-2): root entry 256, num_refs 18446744073709551615 BTRFS error (device dm-2): root entry 273, num_refs 18446744073709551615 BTRFS error (device dm-2): Ref action 3, root 273, ref_root 273, parent 0, owner 0, offset 0, num_refs 1 btrfs_force_cow_block+0x129/0x7d0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0x10a/0x250 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x5eb/0xf40 [btrfs] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x3a/0x70 [btrfs] insert_with_overflow+0x53/0x130 [btrfs] btrfs_insert_dir_item+0x125/0x290 [btrfs] btrfs_add_link+0xaa/0x410 [btrfs] btrfs_rename+0x5ea/0xcd0 [btrfs] btrfs_rename2+0x28/0x60 [btrfs] vfs_rename+0x5b2/0xe10 filename_renameat2+0x244/0x430 __x64_sys_rename+0x48/0x70 do_syscall_64+0xe1/0x790 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 ---truncated--- |
| CVE-2026-98078 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: fix reversed sequence option serialization hton_seq() expects the host-order source first and the unaligned network-order destination second. The version 1 sync sender passes these arguments in reverse for both sequence blocks. This leaves 24 bytes of the kmalloc-backed message unwritten. It may disclose stale heap data and replace the live connection sequence state with values read from the buffer. Pass the connection sequence state as the source and the message payload as the destination for both blocks. |
| CVE-2026-98062 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Mark signal tracepoint siginfo arguments as scalar The signal_generate and signal_deliver tracepoints declare their info argument as a struct kernel_siginfo pointer. btf_ctx_access() therefore treats it as a trusted pointer for tp_btf programs. Signal delivery also uses SEND_SIG_NOINFO and SEND_SIG_PRIV as special values for this argument. Those values are zero and one respectively, and are not pointers. A tp_btf program can currently dereference either value and fault the kernel. In particular, signal_generate can run from timer interrupt context, turning the fault into a kernel panic. Record both tracepoints in raw_tp_null_args[] and mark argument one as a non-pointer. This preserves scalar access to the cookie while rejecting direct and helper-mediated pointer use. Merely marking it nullable would not suffice because SEND_SIG_PRIV is nonzero. |
| CVE-2026-98059 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Mark sched_process_wait argument as nullable do_wait() passes wo->wo_pid to the sched_process_wait tracepoint. kernel_wait4() leaves wo_pid NULL for wait4(-1), and kernel_waitid_prepare() does likewise for waitid(P_ALL). btf_ctx_access() currently types argument 0 as PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED. Without PTR_MAYBE_NULL, the verifier accepts an unchecked dereference. Trusted pointer loads have no fault protection, so a wait for any child can then cause a NULL pointer dereference in JITed BPF code. Add sched_process_wait to raw_tp_null_args[] with argument 0 marked nullable. The verifier rejects an unchecked dereference while preserving access after the program checks the pointer for NULL. |
| CVE-2026-98058 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Mark syscall helpers as sleepable bpf_sys_bpf() executes the bpf(2) syscall body, which can take mutexes, allocate with GFP_KERNEL, and wait for an RCU grace period. bpf_sys_close() reaches close_fd() and filp_close(), which can sleep as well. Both helpers are limited to BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL, whose main program is sleepable. That does not make every callback sleepable: a syscall program can register a bpf_timer callback, and the verifier checks that callback in a non-sleepable context while retaining the syscall helper set. Without .might_sleep on the prototypes, such a callback can invoke bpf_sys_bpf() from hrtimer softirq context and trigger a scheduling-while-atomic failure. bpf_sys_close() is exposed through the same missing context check. Set .might_sleep on both prototypes so the existing helper-context check rejects them from timer callbacks and other atomic regions. Calls from the sleepable main body remain valid. |
| CVE-2026-98054 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: Intel: avs: Fix unbalanced module reference count strace_open() invokes try_module_get() which on success takes the module reference. If any follow up operation causes strace_open() to fail, the refcount shall be put down. |
| CVE-2026-98053 | Medium | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: Intel: avs: Refactor and fix init_config access Existing code accesses enties found in ->init_configs array through indexes that are part of ->config_ids array. Those two are limited by: ->num_init_configs and ->num_config_ids respectively. Using ID larger or equal to ->num_init_configs leads to out-of-bounds access: avs_path_module_send_init_configs() loop: (...) &acomp->tplg->init_configs[ids[i]] ^ out-of-bounds candidate Rather than adding another if-statement, refactor the code. There is no need to store the IDs, have a list of pointers to actual config-entries instead. As the verification of ->init_config entries does not differ from verification of other types that are part of the topology.c file, simply reuse the code. |
| CVE-2026-98052 | High | 2026-09-25 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bcmasp: clear txcb->last before writing each descriptor bcmasp_xmit() only wrote txcb->last = true for the final fragment of an SKB; non-final fragments left the field untouched. If a descriptor slot was reused while it still held a stale true from a previous SKB (possible when tx_spb_ring_full() underreported fullness), bcmasp_tx_reclaim() would see last == true mid-SKB and call dev_consume_skb_any() prematurely, freeing the sk_buff while its remaining fragments were still in flight. Unconditionally clear txcb->last before the conditional set so every descriptor slot starts from a known false state regardless of what a prior transmission left behind. |