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Including CVEs outside Waratek scope✕Product karaf✕
Overview 6 matches · 4 in Waratek scope · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
6matches 4in Waratek scope66.7% 1protected16.7% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 1public PoC16.7% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 1 16.7% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 3 50.0% Outside Waratek scope 0 0.0% Not applicable 2 33.3% Withdrawn CVE 0 0.0%
Critical 6 100.0% High 0 0.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 1 16.7% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 5 83.3% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 1 16.7% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 5 83.3%
split by peak 2 / year
Not applicable: 2No exploit published: 3Protected by Waratek: 1 Critical: 6 not blocked: 5blocked by ARMR today: 1 No public exploit: 5Proof of concept only: 1
20171 No exploit published1 Critical1 not blocked1 No public exploit1 20180 20191 Protected by Waratek1 Critical1 blocked by ARMR today1 Proof of concept only1 20200 20210 20221 No exploit published1 Critical1 not blocked1 No public exploit1 20230 20241 No exploit published1 Critical1 not blocked1 No public exploit1 20250 20262 Not applicable2 Critical2 not blocked2 No public exploit2
2017201820192020202120222023202420252026
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-91048 Critical 2026-09-29 Not applicable No public exploit The jdbc shell command scope shipped no org.apache.karaf.command.acl.jdbc.cfg. Karaf's command guard (SecuredSessionFactoryImpl) treats a command with no matching ACL rule as allowed, so any authenticated shell session (including one holding only the viewer role) could run every jdbc:* command. jdbc:ds-create stores a fully attacker-controlled JDBC URL into a pax-jdbc-config factory Configuration with no validation. pax-jdbc-config reactively turns that into a live DataSource. Several JDBC drivers run code or SQL at connection time based on URL parameters (e.g. H2 INIT=RUNSCRIPT), so a viewer-level shell user could reach arbitrary code execution, bypassing the admin-role gate that already protects shell:exec. This is a privilege-escalation-to-RCE chain, not merely an "admin misconfiguration". The same applies to jms:* shell commands.
CVE-2026-91012 Critical 2026-09-29 Not applicable No public exploit org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties), which backs the "config" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file it writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that the result stays inside ${karaf.etc}: * if the submitted property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry, that value is turned directly into a File (getCfgFileFromProperty), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to; * otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + ".cfg")), so a PID containing ".." segments resolves outside ${karaf.etc}. createFactoryConfiguration() has the same issue via the factory PID/alias. Both code paths are reachable by any caller holding the "manager" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg: "update = manager"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-controlled content to any file the Karaf process can write, including files the same ACL otherwise reserves to "admin" (etc/users.properties, etc/*.acl.*.cfg, etc/org.apache.karaf.management.cfg, and similar), allowing a manager-role user to grant themselves the admin role or otherwise take over the container. ConfigMBeanImpl.install() and the config:install shell command already guarded the equivalent risk on their own code path with a finalname.contains("..") string check, but that check does not stop absolute paths or symlink-based escapes, and it was never applied to ConfigRepositoryImpl.update() / createFactoryConfiguration() at all.
CVE-2024-34365 Critical 2024-05-14 No exploit published No public exploit ** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Apache Karaf Cave.This issue affects all versions of Apache Karaf Cave. As this project is retired, we do not plan to release a version that fixes this issue. Users are recommended to find an alternative or restrict access to the instance to trusted users.NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.
CVE-2022-40145 Critical 2022-12-21 No exploit published No public exploit This vulnerable is about a potential code injection when an attacker has control of the target LDAP server using in the JDBC JNDI URL. The function jaas.modules.src.main.java.porg.apache.karaf.jass.modules.jdbc.JDBCUtils#doCreateDatasource use InitialContext.lookup(jndiName) without filtering. An user can modify `options.put(JDBCUtils.DATASOURCE, "osgi:" + DataSource.class.getName());` to `options.put(JDBCUtils.DATASOURCE,"jndi:rmi://x.x.x.x:xxxx/Command");` in JdbcLoginModuleTest#setup. This is vulnerable to a remote code execution (RCE) attack when a configuration uses a JNDI LDAP data source URI when an attacker has control of the target LDAP server.This issue affects all versions of Apache Karaf up to 4.4.1 and 4.3.7. We encourage the users to upgrade to Apache Karaf at least 4.4.2 or 4.3.8
CVE-2018-11788 Critical 2019-01-07 Protected by Waratek Proof of concept only Apache Karaf provides a features deployer, which allows users to "hot deploy" a features XML by dropping the file directly in the deploy folder. The features XML is parsed by XMLInputFactory class. Apache Karaf XMLInputFactory class doesn't contain any mitigation codes against XXE. This is a potential security risk as an user can inject external XML entities in Apache Karaf version prior to 4.1.7 or 4.2.2. It has been fixed in Apache Karaf 4.1.7 and 4.2.2 releases.
CVE-2015-1778 Critical 2017-06-27 No exploit published No public exploit The custom authentication realm used by karaf-tomcat's "opendaylight" realm in Opendaylight before Helium SR3 will authenticate any username and password combination.