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Protection: Full✕Published from 2022-04-01✕Product http✕
Overview 5 matches · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
5matches 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 1public PoC20.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 5 100.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 0 0.0%
Critical 2 40.0% High 2 40.0% Medium 1 20.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 5 100.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 0 0.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 1 20.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 4 80.0%
split by peak 4 / quarter
Q4 24Q1 25Q2 25Q3 25Q4 25Q1 26Q2 26Q3 26
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-61741 Critical 2026-09-24 Protected by Waratek No public exploit http4s-scala-xml provides `EntityDecoder[F, scala.xml.Elem]` instances that parse XML message bodies. Prior to versions 0.24.1 and 1.0.0-M39, these decoders used a `javax.xml.parsers.SAXParserFactory` obtained from `SAXParserFactory.newInstance` without any security configuration. With the JDK's default settings, the parser resolves DOCTYPE declarations, external general and parameter entities, and external DTDs.An application that uses these decoders to parse untrusted XML is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. An attacker can craft a request that discloses local files readable by the service process, performs server-side request forgery (SSRF) against internal network resources, and/or causes denial of service through entity expansion. Versions 0.24.1 and 1.0.0-M39 fix the issue.
CVE-2026-69201 Medium 2026-09-15 Protected by Waratek No public exploit Http4s is a Scala interface for HTTP services. Prior to 0.23.35 and 1.0.0-M47, ResourceService and WebjarService decode each URL path segment but reject only segments exactly equal to an empty string, a dot, or two dots. A request containing percent-encoded slash or backslash separators can turn an accepted segment into a parent-directory traversal after decoding, allowing access to classpath or WebJar resources outside the configured base when a directory-backed classpath is served and the backend preserves the encoded separator. The patch rejects decoded segments containing slash or backslash in ResourceService and WebjarService, and applies the same guard to the non-exploitable FileService for consistency. This issue is fixed in versions 0.23.35 and 1.0.0-M47.
CVE-2026-42527 High 2026-07-06 Protected by Waratek No public exploit Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel. The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering ('java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*', or the no-'javax.**' variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive 'java.**' glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object's class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components: camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation repository). This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to a version that contains the CAMEL-23372 fix once available: 4.21.0 for the 4.21.x line, 4.18.3 for the 4.18.x line, and 4.14.8 for the 4.14.x line. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a JMS-provider-side allow-list (Apache ActiveMQ Artemis 'deserializationAllowList' / 'deserializationDenyList', Apache ActiveMQ Classic 'org.apache.activemq.SERIALIZABLE_PACKAGES') as the primary mitigation, and/or override the in-code default via the endpoint-level 'deserializationFilter' option or the JVM-wide '-Djdk.serialFilter' system property with an explicit deny: '!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*' (or '!java.net.**;java.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*' for the aggregation-repository components, which do not include javax.**).
CVE-2026-40859 High 2026-07-06 Protected by Waratek No public exploit Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel. The camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.20.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.20.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, the deserialization performed by both helper utilities is constrained by a default ObjectInputFilter (allow-list java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*), which can be customised through the new deserializationFilter endpoint option or the JVM-wide -Djdk.serialFilter system property. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately: do not enable transferException=true (or allowJavaSerializedObject=true) on producers that talk to untrusted or network-reachable backends; ensure producer connections use TLS (https) so that a response cannot be substituted by a man-in-the-middle; and, where the option is required, set an explicit -Djdk.serialFilter allow-list (for example java.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*) to constrain deserialization.
CVE-2024-55875 Critical 2024-12-12 Protected by Waratek Proof of concept only http4k is a functional toolkit for Kotlin HTTP applications. Prior to version 6.50.0.0, there is a potential XXE (XML External Entity Injection) vulnerability when http4k handling malicious XML contents within requests, which might allow attackers to read local sensitive information on server, trigger Server-side Request Forgery and even execute code under some circumstances. The original fix shipped in v5.41.0.0 / v4.50.0.0 closed the documented external-entity attack class (SSRF, local-file disclosure, code execution) by setting `ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD=""`, `ACCESS_EXTERNAL_SCHEMA=""`, and `isExpandEntityReferences=false` on the default `DocumentBuilderFactory`. A residual gap remained: the parser still accepted documents containing `<!DOCTYPE>` declarations even though external entity resolution was blocked. This left open billion-laughs-style internal entity expansion DoS attacks against any application using `Body.xml()` or `Document.asXmlDocument()` on untrusted XML. v6.50.0.0 closes this residual by adding `disallow-doctype-decl=true` and `FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING=true` to `defaultXmlParsingConfig`. Any document containing a `<!DOCTYPE>` is now rejected at parse time.