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Protection: Full✕Product emissary✕
Overview 4 matches · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
4matches 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 4 100.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 0 0.0%
Critical 1 25.0% High 2 50.0% Medium 1 25.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 4 100.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 0 0.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 1 25.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 3 75.0%
split by peak 4 / month
Protected by Waratek: 4 Medium: 1High: 2Critical: 1 blocked by ARMR today: 4 No public exploit: 3Proof of concept only: 1
Apr 26
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-35582 High 2026-04-18 Protected by Waratek Proof of concept only Emissary is a P2P based data-driven workflow engine. In versions 8.42.0 and below, Executrix.getCommand() is vulnerable to OS command injection because it interpolates temporary file paths into a /bin/sh -c shell command string without any escaping or input validation. The IN_FILE_ENDING and OUT_FILE_ENDING configuration keys flow directly into these paths, allowing a place author who can write or modify a .cfg file to inject arbitrary shell metacharacters that execute OS commands in the JVM process's security context. The framework already sanitizes placeName via an allowlist before embedding it in the same shell string, but applies no equivalent sanitization to file ending values. No runtime privileges beyond place configuration authorship, and no API or network access, are required to exploit this vulnerability. This is a framework-level defect with no safe mitigation available to downstream implementors, as Executrix provides neither escaping nor documented preconditions against metacharacters in file ending inputs. This issue has been fixed in version 8.43.0.
CVE-2026-35583 Medium 2026-04-07 Protected by Waratek No public exploit Emissary is a P2P based data-driven workflow engine. Prior to 8.39.0, the configuration API endpoint (/api/configuration/{name}) validated configuration names using a blacklist approach that checked for \, /, .., and trailing .. This could potentially be bypassed using URL-encoded variants, double-encoding, or Unicode normalization to achieve path traversal and read configuration files outside the intended directory. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.39.0.
CVE-2026-35581 High 2026-04-07 Protected by Waratek No public exploit Emissary is a P2P based data-driven workflow engine. Prior to 8.39.0, the Executrix utility class constructed shell commands by concatenating configuration-derived values — including the PLACE_NAME parameter — with insufficient sanitization. Only spaces were replaced with underscores, allowing shell metacharacters (;, |, $, `, (, ), etc.) to pass through into /bin/sh -c command execution. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.39.0.
CVE-2026-35580 Critical 2026-04-07 Protected by Waratek No public exploit Emissary is a P2P based data-driven workflow engine. Prior to 8.39.0, GitHub Actions workflow files contained shell injection points where user-controlled workflow_dispatch inputs were interpolated directly into shell commands via ${{ }} expression syntax. An attacker with repository write access could inject arbitrary shell commands, leading to repository poisoning and supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.39.0.