Overview 4 matches · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
1
25.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
3
75.0%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
0
0.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
1
25.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
3
75.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
1
25.0%
Proof of concept only
3
75.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 2 / quarter
Q1 242
Protected by Waratek1
No exploit published1
Critical1
Medium1
blocked by ARMR today1
not blocked1
Working exploit published1
Proof of concept only1
Q2 241
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q3 240
Q4 240
Q1 250
Q2 250
Q3 250
Q4 250
Q1 260
Q2 260
Q3 261
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q1 24Q2 24Q3 24Q4 24Q1 25Q2 25Q3 25Q4 25Q1 26Q2 26Q3 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-49989 | High | 2026-08-14 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | CrateDB is a distributed SQL database. Prior to versions 6.2.8 and 6.3.2, any authenticated user can read or delete any blob whose SHA-1 digest they know, and can plant new blobs unconditionally, in any blob table, regardless of `GRANT`s. CrateDB has two ways to access blob storage: SQL (`SELECT ... FROM blob.<table>` and friends) and the blob HTTP API (`GET|PUT|DELETE /_blobs/{table}/{digest}`). The SQL path goes through `AccessControl`, which is what enforces privilege grants; that's why `SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs` fails for a user who has no grants on the table. The HTTP path authenticates the request but never asks `AccessControl` whether the authenticated user is allowed to touch the table. So a user with no grants gets `MissingPrivilegeException` from SQL and `200 OK` plus the blob bytes from `GET /_blobs/secret_blobs/<digest>`. Deployments that don't use `BLOB TABLE` are unaffected. Authentication itself still works; the bug is strictly that being authenticated as anyone is treated as sufficient for any blob op. Versions 6.2.8 and 6.3.2 fix the issue. |
| CVE-2024-37309 | Medium | 2024-06-13 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | CrateDB is a distributed SQL database. A high-risk vulnerability has been identified in versions prior to 5.7.2 where the TLS endpoint (port 4200) permits client-initiated renegotiation. In this scenario, an attacker can exploit this feature to repeatedly request renegotiation of security parameters during an ongoing TLS session. This flaw could lead to excessive consumption of CPU resources, resulting in potential server overload and service disruption. The vulnerability was confirmed using an openssl client where the command `R` initiates renegotiation, followed by the server confirming with `RENEGOTIATING`. This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform a denial of service attack by exhausting server CPU resources through repeated TLS renegotiations. This impacts the availability of services running on the affected server, posing a significant risk to operational stability and security. TLS 1.3 explicitly forbids renegotiation, since it closes a window of opportunity for an attack. Version 5.7.2 of CrateDB contains the fix for the issue. |
| CVE-2024-24565 | Medium | 2024-01-30 | Protected by Waratek | Working exploit published | CrateDB is a distributed SQL database that makes it simple to store and analyze massive amounts of data in real-time. There is a COPY FROM function in the CrateDB database that is used to import file data into database tables. This function has a flaw, and authenticated attackers can use the COPY FROM function to import arbitrary file content into database tables, resulting in information leakage. This vulnerability is patched in 5.3.9, 5.4.8, 5.5.4, and 5.6.1. |
| CVE-2023-51982 | Critical | 2024-01-30 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | CrateDB 5.5.1 is contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the Admin UI component. After configuring password authentication and_ Local_ In the case of an address, identity authentication can be bypassed by setting the X-Real IP request header to a specific value and accessing the Admin UI directly using the default user identity.(https://github.com/crate/crate/issues/15231) |