Overview 3 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
3
100.0%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
0
0.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
3
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
3
100.0%
split by
peak 1 / quarter
Q1 221
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q2 220
Q3 220
Q4 220
Q1 230
Q2 230
Q3 230
Q4 230
Q1 240
Q2 240
Q3 240
Q4 240
Q1 250
Q2 250
Q3 250
Q4 250
Q1 260
Q2 261
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q3 261
No exploit published1
Critical1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q1 22Q3 22Q1 23Q3 23Q1 24Q3 24Q1 25Q3 25Q1 26Q3 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-46454 | Critical | 2026-07-06 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Apache Camel Cometd Component. The camel-cometd component maps inbound Bayeux (CometD) message headers into the Camel Exchange without applying a HeaderFilterStrategy. CometdBinding.populateExchangeFromMessage copies the entire ext.CamelHeaders map supplied by the CometD client directly onto the Camel message (message.setHeaders), so any header name - including Camel-internal control headers such as CamelHttpUri, CamelFileName or CamelJmsDestinationName - is accepted unmodified. Because a CometdComponent installs no Bayeux SecurityPolicy by default, any client that can complete the Bayeux handshake against the CometD endpoint can publish such a message without authentication. An attacker can therefore inject arbitrary Camel control headers that influence the behaviour of downstream producers in the route (for example redirecting an HTTP producer, changing a file name, or overriding a JMS destination); the injected headers also persist across internal direct, seda and vm hops. The concrete downstream impact depends on which producers the route uses. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix implements a HeaderFilterStrategy in the camel-cometd binding (a long-standing TODO in the code) that filters the Camel header namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so client-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from inbound CometD messages before they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), and install an explicit Bayeux SecurityPolicy on the CometdComponent so that only authenticated clients can publish. |
| CVE-2025-53114 | High | 2026-06-18 | No exploit published | No public exploit | CometD is a scalable comet implementation for web messaging. In versions 5.0.0 through 5.0.22, 6.0.0 through 6.0.18, 7.0.0 through 7.0.18, and 8.0.0 through 8.0.8, bad clients that always send a fixed batch value when the server is using the acknowledgement extension may cause the unacknowledged message queue to grow indefinitely, eventually causing an `OutOfMemoryError`. Versions 5.0.23, 6.0.19, 7.0.19, and 8.0.9 patch the issue. As a workaround, disable the acknowledgement extension. |
| CVE-2022-24721 | High | 2022-03-15 | No exploit published | No public exploit | CometD is a scalable comet implementation for web messaging. In any version prior to 5.0.11, 6.0.6, and 7.0.6, internal usage of Oort and Seti channels is improperly authorized, so any remote user could subscribe and publish to those channels. By subscribing to those channels, a remote user may be able to watch cluster-internal traffic that contains other users' (possibly sensitive) data. By publishing to those channels, a remote user may be able to create/modify/delete other user's data and modify the cluster structure. A fix is available in versions 5.0.11, 6.0.6, and 7.0.6. As a workaround, install a custom `SecurityPolicy` that forbids subscription and publishing to remote, non-Oort, sessions on Oort and Seti channels. |