Overview 9 matches · 8 protected · 2 exploited · 1 CISA KEV · 3 public PoC · 3 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
9
100.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
8
88.9%
partly blocked
1
11.1%
not blocked
0
0.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
2
22.2%
Working exploit published
1
11.1%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
6
66.7%
split by
peak 2 / year
20131
Protected by Waratek1
High1
blocked by ARMR today1
Exploited1
20140
20151
Protected by Waratek1
High1
blocked by ARMR today1
No public exploit1
20160
20171
Protected by Waratek1
High1
partly blocked1
Exploited1
20181
Protected by Waratek1
High1
blocked by ARMR today1
No public exploit1
20191
Protected by Waratek1
High1
blocked by ARMR today1
No public exploit1
20201
Protected by Waratek1
High1
blocked by ARMR today1
Working exploit published1
20211
Protected by Waratek1
High1
blocked by ARMR today1
No public exploit1
20220
20230
20240
20250
20262
Protected by Waratek2
High2
blocked by ARMR today2
No public exploit2
2014201620182020202220242026
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-43865 | High | 2026-07-06 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Hazelcast component. The camel-hazelcast component creates and manages Hazelcast instances using a default configuration that applies no Java deserialization filter. When Camel builds the Hazelcast Config itself - that is, when no user-supplied HazelcastInstance, hazelcastConfigUri, or referenced Config bean is provided - neither Hazelcast's JavaSerializationFilterConfig nor a Camel-side ObjectInputFilter is configured, so objects received over the Hazelcast cluster protocol are deserialized inside Hazelcast's own serialization layer (ObjectInputStream.readObject) before Camel ever processes them. An attacker who can join or otherwise reach the Hazelcast cluster can publish a crafted serialized Java object that is then deserialized on every Camel node, resulting in remote code execution. The exposure is present by default and requires no opt-in endpoint configuration: any route using a hazelcast consumer (hazelcast-topic, hazelcast-queue, hazelcast-seda, hazelcast-map, hazelcast-multimap, hazelcast-replicatedmap, hazelcast-list, hazelcast-set), as well as the HazelcastAggregationRepository and HazelcastIdempotentRepository, is affected whenever the managed instance is created from Camel's default configuration. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes Camel apply a default Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig (whitelisting the java., javax. and org.apache.camel. class-name prefixes and blacklisting java.net.) to instances it creates from its own default configuration, while leaving any user-supplied Config or HazelcastInstance untouched. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a deserialization filter on the Hazelcast instance (Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig, or the JVM-wide system property -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*) and enable Hazelcast cluster authentication and TLS to restrict who can reach the cluster. |
| CVE-2026-42527 | High | 2026-07-06 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel. The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering ('java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*', or the no-'javax.**' variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive 'java.**' glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object's class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components: camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation repository). This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to a version that contains the CAMEL-23372 fix once available: 4.21.0 for the 4.21.x line, 4.18.3 for the 4.18.x line, and 4.14.8 for the 4.14.x line. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a JMS-provider-side allow-list (Apache ActiveMQ Artemis 'deserializationAllowList' / 'deserializationDenyList', Apache ActiveMQ Classic 'org.apache.activemq.SERIALIZABLE_PACKAGES') as the primary mitigation, and/or override the in-code default via the endpoint-level 'deserializationFilter' option or the JVM-wide '-Djdk.serialFilter' system property with an explicit deny: '!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*' (or '!java.net.**;java.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*' for the aggregation-repository components, which do not include javax.**). |
| CVE-2021-32623 | High | 2021-06-16 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Opencast is a free and open source solution for automated video capture and distribution. Versions of Opencast prior to 9.6 are vulnerable to the billion laughs attack, which allows an attacker to easily execute a (seemingly permanent) denial of service attack, essentially taking down Opencast using a single HTTP request. To exploit this, users need to have ingest privileges, limiting the group of potential attackers The problem has been fixed in Opencast 9.6. There is no known workaround for this issue. |
| CVE-2020-26217 | High | 2020-11-16 | Protected by Waratek | Working exploit published | XStream before version 1.4.14 is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution.The vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to run arbitrary shell commands only by manipulating the processed input stream. Only users who rely on blocklists are affected. Anyone using XStream's Security Framework allowlist is not affected. The linked advisory provides code workarounds for users who cannot upgrade. The issue is fixed in version 1.4.14. |
| CVE-2016-10750 | High | 2019-05-22 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | In Hazelcast before 3.11, the cluster join procedure is vulnerable to remote code execution via Java deserialization. If an attacker can reach a listening Hazelcast instance with a crafted JoinRequest, and vulnerable classes exist in the classpath, the attacker can run arbitrary code. |
| CVE-2016-1000338 | High | 2018-06-01 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | In Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier the DSA does not fully validate ASN.1 encoding of signature on verification. It is possible to inject extra elements in the sequence making up the signature and still have it validate, which in some cases may allow the introduction of 'invisible' data into a signed structure. |
| CVE-2017-12617 | High | 2017-10-04 | Protected by Waratek | Exploited | When running Apache Tomcat versions 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.0, 8.5.0 to 8.5.22, 8.0.0.RC1 to 8.0.46 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.81 with HTTP PUTs enabled (e.g. via setting the readonly initialisation parameter of the Default servlet to false) it was possible to upload a JSP file to the server via a specially crafted request. This JSP could then be requested and any code it contained would be executed by the server. |
| CVE-2015-0225 | High | 2015-04-03 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | The default configuration in Apache Cassandra 1.2.0 through 1.2.19, 2.0.0 through 2.0.13, and 2.1.0 through 2.1.3 binds an unauthenticated JMX/RMI interface to all network interfaces, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary Java code via an RMI request. |
| CVE-2013-1965 | High | 2013-07-10 | Protected by Waratek | Exploited | Apache Struts Showcase App 2.0.0 through 2.3.13, as used in Struts 2 before 2.3.14.3, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OGNL code via a crafted parameter name that is not properly handled when invoking a redirect. |