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High Blaze CVEs

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Product blaze✕
Overview 5 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
5matches 0protected0.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 5 100.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 5 100.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 5 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 5 100.0%
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-73494 High 2026-09-14 No exploit published No public exploit blaze is a Scala library for building asynchronous pipelines, with a focus on network IO. Prior to 0.23.18 and from 1.0.0-M1 until 1.0.0-M42, five HTTP/1.1 conformance laxities in the hand-written Java parser under http/src/main/java/org/http4s/blaze/http/parser/ can cause blaze to derive a different request boundary than a stricter fronting intermediary. A default BlazeServerBuilder accepts invalid or valueless header field names that violate tchar syntax, obsolete folded field lines (obs-fold), unsupported Transfer-Encoding values, duplicate Content-Length fields, and requests containing both Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length. If a lenient or legacy proxy forwards the malformed bytes but interprets them differently, the disagreement can permit front-end authorization bypass, response-queue poisoning on pooled backend connections, or cache poisoning. Exploitation requires a pair of disagreeing parsers; no non-default blaze configuration is required. The affected checks are enforced in BodyAndHeaderParser and Http1ServerParser. This issue is fixed in versions 0.23.18 and 1.0.0-M42.
CVE-2026-73495 High 2026-08-12 No exploit published No public exploit blaze is a Scala library for building asynchronous pipelines, with a focus on network IO. Prior to 0.23.18 and 1.0.0-M42, blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into Request.headers. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names and values, including X-Forwarded-For and internal authorization headers, that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application. Any http4s application using BlazeServerBuilder over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers, including X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, and X-Forwarded-Host, is affected. If a fronting proxy strips or normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists, rate limits, or auditing, forge the https scheme, or inject internal authorization headers. A promoted Connection: close trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections. This issue is fixed in versions 0.23.18 and 1.0.0-M42.
CVE-2026-73493 High 2026-08-12 No exploit published No public exploit Http4s (http4s-blaze-server) is a minimal, idiomatic Scala interface for HTTP services. Prior to 0.23.18 and 1.0.0-M42, http4s-blaze-server aggregates fragments of an incoming WebSocket message with no limit on total size or fragment count. A client that completes a WebSocket handshake can send an unterminated fragmented message and drive unbounded heap growth in the server JVM, resulting in denial of service through OutOfMemoryError. Any http4s application serving WebSocket routes over BlazeServerBuilder is affected, no non-default configuration is required, and maxWebSocketBufferSize does not bound the aggregate because it bounds only individual frames. A single connection sending continuation frames that never set FIN forces the server to buffer every fragment until the heap is exhausted, terminating the JVM with OutOfMemoryError on the blaze selector thread. Small fragments amplify the cost through per-frame object overhead, so a modest volume of wire bytes is sufficient. This issue is fixed in versions 0.23.18 and 1.0.0-M42.
CVE-2021-21294 High 2021-02-02 No exploit published No public exploit Http4s (http4s-blaze-server) is a minimal, idiomatic Scala interface for HTTP services. Http4s before versions 0.21.17, 0.22.0-M2, and 1.0.0-M14 have a vulnerability which can lead to a denial-of-service. Blaze-core, a library underlying http4s-blaze-server, accepts connections unboundedly on its selector pool. This has the net effect of amplifying degradation in services that are unable to handle their current request load, since incoming connections are still accepted and added to an unbounded queue. Each connection allocates a socket handle, which drains a scarce OS resource. This can also confound higher level circuit breakers which work based on detecting failed connections. http4s provides a general "MaxActiveRequests" middleware mechanism for limiting open connections, but it is enforced inside the Blaze accept loop, after the connection is accepted and the socket opened. Thus, the limit only prevents the number of connections which can be simultaneously processed, not the number of connections which can be held open. In 0.21.17, 0.22.0-M2, and 1.0.0-M14, a new "maxConnections" property, with a default value of 1024, has been added to the `BlazeServerBuilder`. Setting the value to a negative number restores unbounded behavior, but is strongly disrecommended. The NIO2 backend does not respect `maxConnections`. Its use is now deprecated in http4s-0.21, and the option is removed altogether starting in http4s-0.22. There are several possible workarounds described in the refrenced GitHub Advisory GHSA-xhv5-w9c5-2r2w.
CVE-2021-21293 High 2021-02-02 No exploit published No public exploit blaze is a Scala library for building asynchronous pipelines, with a focus on network IO. All servers running blaze-core before version 0.14.15 are affected by a vulnerability in which unbounded connection acceptance leads to file handle exhaustion. Blaze, accepts connections unconditionally on a dedicated thread pool. This has the net effect of amplifying degradation in services that are unable to handle their current request load, since incoming connections are still accepted and added to an unbounded queue. Each connection allocates a socket handle, which drains a scarce OS resource. This can also confound higher level circuit breakers which work based on detecting failed connections. The vast majority of affected users are using it as part of http4s-blaze-server <= 0.21.16. http4s provides a mechanism for limiting open connections, but is enforced inside the Blaze accept loop, after the connection is accepted and the socket opened. Thus, the limit only prevents the number of connections which can be simultaneously processed, not the number of connections which can be held open. The issue is fixed in version 0.14.15 for "NIO1SocketServerGroup". A "maxConnections" parameter is added, with a default value of 512. Concurrent connections beyond this limit are rejected. To run unbounded, which is not recommended, set a negative number. The "NIO2SocketServerGroup" has no such setting and is now deprecated. There are several possible workarounds described in the refrenced GitHub Advisory GHSA-xmw9-q7x9-j5qc.