Overview 1 match · 0 in Waratek scope · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
1match
0in Waratek scope0.0%
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
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0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
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0.0%
Outside Waratek scope
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0.0%
Not applicable
1
100.0%
Withdrawn CVE
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0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
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0.0%
partly blocked
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0.0%
not blocked
1
100.0%
not established
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0.0%
unrecorded
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Exploited
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0.0%
Working exploit published
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0.0%
Proof of concept only
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Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
1
100.0%
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-63569 | Critical | 2026-10-02 | Not applicable | No public exploit | Improper input validation in DHAgreement.CalculateAgreement (MTI/A0 two-pass Diffie-Hellman) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows an on-path attacker to make the local party compute an agreed value the attacker already knows, defeating the key authentication MTI/A0 is meant to provide. It also allows a malicious peer to learn the local static private key modulo the small factors of p-1, and to recover it entirely in groups with many such factors. The attack uses a crafted out-of-range or small-order ephemeral value, and works because that value is raised to the static private key without the range and subgroup-membership checks applied to DH public keys. Only applications that call DHAgreement directly are affected. |