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Including CVEs outside Waratek scope✕Product apache-activemq✕
Overview 3 matches · 0 protected · 2 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches 0protected0.0% 2exploited66.7% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 3 100.0% No exploit published 0 0.0% Outside Waratek scope 0 0.0% Not applicable 0 0.0% Withdrawn CVE 0 0.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 3 100.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 3 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 2 66.7% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 1 33.3% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%
split by peak 2 / quarter
Mitigation candidate: 3 High: 3 not blocked: 3 Proof of concept only: 1Exploited: 2
Q2 241 Mitigation candidate1 High1 not blocked1 Exploited1 Q3 240 Q4 240 Q1 250 Q2 250 Q3 250 Q4 250 Q1 260 Q2 262 Mitigation candidate2 High2 not blocked2 Exploited1 Proof of concept only1
Q2 24Q3 24Q4 24Q1 25Q2 25Q3 25Q4 25Q1 26Q2 26
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-42588 High 2026-06-01 Mitigation candidate Proof of concept only Improper Input Validation, Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') vulnerability in Apache ActiveMQ Broker, Apache ActiveMQ All, Apache ActiveMQ. Apache ActiveMQ Classic exposes the Jolokia JMX-HTTP bridge at /api/jolokia/ on the web console. The default Jolokia access policy permits exec operations on all ActiveMQ MBeans (org.apache.activemq:*), including BrokerService.addNetworkConnector(String). An authenticated attacker can invoke these operations with a crafted discovery URI that triggers the VM transport's brokerConfig parameter using the "masterslave:// " URL which can allow loading a Spring XML application context using ResourceXmlApplicationContext. Because Spring's ResourceXmlApplicationContext instantiates all singleton beans before the BrokerService validates the configuration, arbitrary code execution occurs on the broker's JVM through bean factory methods such as Runtime.exec(). This issue affects Apache ActiveMQ Broker: before 5.19.7, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.6; Apache ActiveMQ All: before 5.19.7, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.6; Apache ActiveMQ: before 5.19.7, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.6. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 5.19.7 or 6.2.6, which fixes the issue.
CVE-2026-40466 High 2026-04-24 Mitigation candidate Exploited Improper Input Validation, Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') vulnerability in Apache ActiveMQ Broker, Apache ActiveMQ All, Apache ActiveMQ. An authenticated attacker may bypass the fix in CVE-2026-34197 by adding a connector using an HTTP Discovery transport via BrokerView.addNetworkConnector or BrokerView.addConnector through Jolokia if the activemq-http module is on the classpath. A malicious HTTP endpoint can return a VM transport through the HTTP URI which will bypass the validation added in CVE-2026-34197. The attacker can then use the VM transport's brokerConfig parameter to load a remote Spring XML application context using ResourceXmlApplicationContext. Because Spring's ResourceXmlApplicationContext instantiates all singleton beans before the BrokerService validates the configuration, arbitrary code execution occurs on the broker's JVM through bean factory methods such as Runtime.exec(). This issue affects Apache ActiveMQ Broker: before 5.19.6, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.5; Apache ActiveMQ All: before 5.19.6, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.5; Apache ActiveMQ: before 5.19.6, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.5. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 5.19.6 or 6.2.5, which fixes the issue.
CVE-2024-32114 High 2024-05-02 Mitigation candidate Exploited In Apache ActiveMQ 6.x, the default configuration doesn't secure the API web context (where the Jolokia JMX REST API and the Message REST API are located). It means that anyone can use these layers without any required authentication. Potentially, anyone can interact with the broker (using Jolokia JMX REST API) and/or produce/consume messages or purge/delete destinations (using the Message REST API). To mitigate, users can update the default conf/jetty.xml configuration file to add authentication requirement: <bean id="securityConstraintMapping" class="org.eclipse.jetty.security.ConstraintMapping">   <property name="constraint" ref="securityConstraint" />   <property name="pathSpec" value="/" /> </bean> Or we encourage users to upgrade to Apache ActiveMQ 6.1.2 where the default configuration has been updated with authentication by default.