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Published to 2025-06-30✕Product apache-activemq✕
Overview 2 matches · 1 protected · 1 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek 1 50.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 1 50.0% No exploit published 0 0.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 2 100.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 1 50.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 1 50.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 1 50.0% Working exploit published 1 50.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%
split by peak 1 / month
Mitigation candidate: 1Protected by Waratek: 1 High: 2 not blocked: 1blocked by ARMR today: 1 Working exploit published: 1Exploited: 1
Nov 23Dec 23Jan 24Feb 24Mar 24Apr 24May 24
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2024-32114 High 2024-05-02 Mitigation candidate Exploited In Apache ActiveMQ 6.x, the default configuration doesn't secure the API web context (where the Jolokia JMX REST API and the Message REST API are located). It means that anyone can use these layers without any required authentication. Potentially, anyone can interact with the broker (using Jolokia JMX REST API) and/or produce/consume messages or purge/delete destinations (using the Message REST API). To mitigate, users can update the default conf/jetty.xml configuration file to add authentication requirement: <bean id="securityConstraintMapping" class="org.eclipse.jetty.security.ConstraintMapping">   <property name="constraint" ref="securityConstraint" />   <property name="pathSpec" value="/" /> </bean> Or we encourage users to upgrade to Apache ActiveMQ 6.1.2 where the default configuration has been updated with authentication by default.
CVE-2022-41678 High 2023-11-28 Protected by Waratek Working exploit published Once an user is authenticated on Jolokia, he can potentially trigger arbitrary code execution.  In details, in ActiveMQ configurations, jetty allows org.jolokia.http.AgentServlet to handler request to /api/jolokia org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#handlePostRequest is able to create JmxRequest through JSONObject. And calls to org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#executeRequest. Into deeper calling stacks, org.jolokia.handler.ExecHandler#doHandleRequest can be invoked through refection. This could lead to RCE through via various mbeans. One example is unrestricted deserialization in jdk.management.jfr.FlightRecorderMXBeanImpl which exists on Java version above 11. 1 Call newRecording. 2 Call setConfiguration. And a webshell data hides in it. 3 Call startRecording. 4 Call copyTo method. The webshell will be written to a .jsp file. The mitigation is to restrict (by default) the actions authorized on Jolokia, or disable Jolokia. A more restrictive Jolokia configuration has been defined in default ActiveMQ distribution. We encourage users to upgrade to ActiveMQ distributions version including updated Jolokia configuration: 5.16.6, 5.17.4, 5.18.0, 6.0.0.