apache / apache calcite avatica CVEs · No exploit published

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Overview 1 match · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5

1match 0protected0.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%

Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 1 100.0%

Critical 0 0.0% High 1 100.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%

blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 1 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%

Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 1 100.0%

split by StatusSeverityProtectionExploit maturity peak 1 / month

Jul 221 No exploit published1 High1 not blocked1 No public exploit1

Jul 22

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CVE	Severity	Published▾	Status	Exploitation	Description
CVE-2022-36364	High	2022-07-28	No exploit published	No public exploit	Apache Calcite Avatica JDBC driver creates HTTP client instances based on class names provided via `httpclient_impl` connection property; however, the driver does not verify if the class implements the expected interface before instantiating it, which can lead to code execution loaded via arbitrary classes and in rare cases remote code execution. To exploit the vulnerability: 1) the attacker needs to have privileges to control JDBC connection parameters; 2) and there should be a vulnerable class (constructor with URL parameter and ability to execute code) in the classpath. From Apache Calcite Avatica 1.22.0 onwards, it will be verified that the class implements the expected interface before invoking its constructor.

CVE

Severity

Published▾

Status

Exploitation

Description

CVE-2022-36364

High

2022-07-28

No exploit published

No public exploit

Apache Calcite Avatica JDBC driver creates HTTP client instances based on class names provided via `httpclient_impl` connection property; however, the driver does not verify if the class implements the expected interface before instantiating it, which can lead to code execution loaded via arbitrary classes and in rare cases remote code execution. To exploit the vulnerability: 1) the attacker needs to have privileges to control JDBC connection parameters; 2) and there should be a vulnerable class (constructor with URL parameter and ability to execute code) in the classpath. From Apache Calcite Avatica 1.22.0 onwards, it will be verified that the class implements the expected interface before invoking its constructor.