Overview 7 matches · 0 in Waratek scope · 0 protected · 1 exploited · 1 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 1 EPSS ≥ 0.5
7matches
0in Waratek scope0.0%
0protected0.0%
1exploited14.3%
1CISA KEV14.3%
1public PoC14.3%
1EPSS ≥ 0.514.3%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
Outside Waratek scope
7
100.0%
Not applicable
0
0.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
7
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
1
14.3%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
6
85.7%
split by
peak 2 / year
20161
Outside Waratek scope1
Medium1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
20170
20181
Outside Waratek scope1
High1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
20191
Outside Waratek scope1
High1
not blocked1
Exploited1
20201
Outside Waratek scope1
Medium1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
20211
Outside Waratek scope1
Medium1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
20222
Outside Waratek scope2
High2
not blocked2
No public exploit2
2016201720182019202020212022
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2022-39248 | High | 2022-09-28 | Outside Waratek scope | No public exploit | matrix-android-sdk2 is the Matrix SDK for Android. Prior to version 1.5.1, an attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield. Additionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. matrix-android-sdk2 would then additionally sign such a key backup with its device key, spilling trust over to other devices trusting the matrix-android-sdk2 device. These attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm. matrix-android-sdk2 version 1.5.1 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages and to stop signing backups on a successful decryption. Out of caution, several other checks have been audited or added. This attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, so those who trust their home servers do not need a workaround. |
| CVE-2022-39246 | High | 2022-09-28 | Outside Waratek scope | No public exploit | matrix-android-sdk2 is the Matrix SDK for Android. Prior to version 1.5.1, an attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages appearing to have come from another person. Such messages will be marked with a grey shield on some platforms, but this may be missing in others. This attack is possible due to the key forwarding strategy implemented in the matrix-android-sdk2 that is too permissive. Starting with version 1.5.1, the default policy for accepting key forwards has been made more strict in the matrix-android-sdk2. The matrix-android-sdk2 will now only accept forwarded keys in response to previously issued requests and only from own, verified devices. The SDK now sets a `trusted` flag on the decrypted message upon decryption, based on whether the key used to decrypt the message was received from a trusted source. Clients need to ensure that messages decrypted with a key with `trusted = false` are decorated appropriately (for example, by showing a warning for such messages). As a workaroubnd, current users of the SDK can disable key forwarding in their forks using `CryptoService#enableKeyGossiping(enable: Boolean)`. |
| CVE-2021-40824 | Medium | 2021-09-13 | Outside Waratek scope | No public exploit | A logic error in the room key sharing functionality of Element Android before 1.2.2 and matrix-android-sdk2 (aka Matrix SDK for Android) before 1.2.2 allows a malicious Matrix homeserver present in an encrypted room to steal room encryption keys (via crafted Matrix protocol messages) that were originally sent by affected Matrix clients participating in that room. This allows the attacker to decrypt end-to-end encrypted messages sent by affected clients. |
| CVE-2020-0404 | Medium | 2020-09-17 | Outside Waratek scope | No public exploit | In uvc_scan_chain_forward of uvc_driver.c, there is a possible linked list corruption due to an unusual root cause. This could lead to local escalation of privilege in the kernel with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android kernelAndroid ID: A-111893654References: Upstream kernel |
| CVE-2019-2215 | High | 2019-10-11 | Outside Waratek scope | Exploited | A use-after-free in binder.c allows an elevation of privilege from an application to the Linux Kernel. No user interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability, however exploitation does require either the installation of a malicious local application or a separate vulnerability in a network facing application.Product: AndroidAndroid ID: A-141720095 |
| CVE-2017-1000498 | High | 2018-01-03 | Outside Waratek scope | No public exploit | AndroidSVG version 1.2.2 is vulnerable to XXE attacks in the SVG parsing component resulting in denial of service and possibly remote code execution |
| CVE-2016-2427 | Medium | 2016-04-18 | Outside Waratek scope | No public exploit | The AES-GCM specification in RFC 5084, as used in Android 5.x and 6.x, recommends 12 octets for the aes-ICVlen parameter field, which might make it easier for attackers to defeat a cryptographic protection mechanism and discover an authentication key via a crafted application, aka internal bug 26234568. NOTE: The vendor disputes the existence of this potential issue in Android, stating "This CVE was raised in error: it referred to the authentication tag size in GCM, whose default according to ASN.1 encoding (12 bytes) can lead to vulnerabilities. After careful consideration, it was decided that the insecure default value of 12 bytes was a default only for the encoding and not default anywhere else in Android, and hence no vulnerability existed. |